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SUMMARY
This thesis investigates how two distinctive and conflicting literary modernisms 
generate, and subsequently attempt to deal with the proliferation of difficult 
historical meaning.
! Part one scrutinizes three novels from William Faulkner’s middle period, 
The Sound and the Fury (1929), As I Lay Dying (1930), and Sanctuary (1931). Its 
arguments issue from three linked assumptions: first, that semantic meaning, in 
Faulkner, resides within the smallest of textual locations; second, that this 
meaning is insistently historical; and third, that the attempt to hide its release as 
historical meaning generates a formal opacity that, in turn, occasions acutely 
visual problems at the level of the text. Specific attention is drawn to what I 
consider to be the “compacted doctrines” (Empson) of Faulkner’s prose: the 
pronoun. It is argued that, in these three novels, historically sedimented 
meaning congeals in three single words: “them”, “I” and finally, “it”.
! If Faulkner’s texts come into meaning at the level of the word, John Dos 
Passos’ come into meaning at the level of the concept. What was “small”, 
begrudging, and intractable in Faulkner becomes “big”, abundant, and 
eminently retrievable in Dos Passos. The semantic “concept” to which I attend 
is The Camera Eye, a place of visual efficiency. Two parallel concerns drive these 
chapters. First, I claim that The Camera Eye is the preeminent site of the dialectic 
in U.S.A.; second, that these episodes provide the formal indices for Dos Passos’ 
shift in political intensities. Sustaining an antagonistic tension between aesthetic 
modernity and historical memory, however, these mechanical integers 
problematize their own semantic productions. With reference to the generation 
of surplus and to Marx’s concept of “hoarding” I route the (over)production of 
the textual product, and its subsequent channelling into distinct textual 
locations, into conversations regarding commodification, reification and the 
division of labour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
HIDING AND SEEKING: 
FORM, VISION, AND HISTORY 
IN WILLIAM FAULKNER AND JOHN DOS PASSOS
This thesis is centrally concerned with the proliferation and management of 
historically sedimented meaning in the prose work of William Faulkner and 
John Dos Passos. Taking as its primary materials two modernist trilogies, this 
thesis argues that Faulkner’s prose of the 1929-1931 period and Dos Passos 
U.S.A. trilogy (1930; 1932; 1936; [1938];) offer two distinct and antagonistic ways 
of contending with difficult historical meaning. Faulkner, rooted in the loam of 
the South and snarled by the historical meshes of slavery and modernization, 
generates a “language” of secrecy, in which difficult meaning is buried, 
concealed, smuggled into discreet locations. Dos Passos, by contrast, seeks out 
prose efficiency by way of the implementation of a modern textual 
epistemology. This thesis attends, then, to what we might dub two antagonistic 
economies of scale. 
! My methodologies are reflective of the variance between these two 
contrasting formalisms. The first half of the thesis situates the pronoun as the 
“compacted doctrine” of Faulkner’s middle period. The pronoun, I argue, 
provides a formal grammar by which Faulkner can miniaturize, and thus 
encrypt, the massive and unspoken traumas of the Southern past. Three words 
provide the focus for these first three chapters: first “them”, then “I” and finally 
“it”. Cramped, bruised and pained, these single words are restricted words, 
words that seek to condense into slim grammatical locations a vast web of 
abuses. Faulkner’s words are sites of opacity; his texts sites of hiddenness. 
Copious work has been completed on the historical conditions of the American 
South. This thesis draws from a number of these materials, from Eugene 
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Genovese through Joel Williamson and from Grace Elizabeth Hale to Eric Lott.1 
The historiography has been used as justification for myriad historicist readings 
of Faulkner’s prose and is familiar to us as readers and critics of Faulkner. Ted 
Atkinson and Kevin Railey have provided two recent and stimulating 
materialist readings of Faulkner, readings to which I refer in the coming 
arguments.2 An entirely separate critical community has argued powerfully for 
the structural workings of literary language. From Wolfgang Iser to William 
Empson to the Russian linguist Valentin Volosinov, accounts abound as to the 
sociality of the word. These “literary” studies are also consulted in the pages 
that follow. While the “historical” and the “textual” scholarship exist in 
isolation, no critic attends to the relation between Faulkner’s formal grammar 
and the historicity of his literary texts. This thesis bridges the “historicist” 
Faulkner and the “textual” one and, by so doing, connotes the first articulation 
of such an effort. By attending to the workings of the pronoun in the context of 
the American South, the first half of this thesis provides the only extended 
examination of the historicity of Faulkner’s grammar.
! The second half of the thesis mines an entirely different semantic 
economy. Whereas Faulknerian textuality generates its meaning at the level of 
the word, the prose practice of Dos Passos generates its meaning at the level of 
the concept. The “concept” to which I attend is The Camera Eye. Fifty one in 
number, these highly rationalized, mechanical interludes connote a single and 
singular narrative belt of what Dos Passos referred to as his “four-way 
conveyor system”. Calibrated to meet the demands of a thoroughly modern 
6
1 Eugene D. Genovese,  Roll, Jordan, Roll:  The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 
1976); Joel Williamson, The Crucible of Race: Black White Relations in the American South (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984); Grace Elizabeth Hale, Making Whiteness: The Culture of 
Segregation in the South, 1890-1940 (New York: Random House, 1999);  Eric Lott, Love and Theft: 
Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993).
2 Ted Atkinson, Faulkner and the Great Depression: Aesthetics,  Ideology and Cultural Politics (Athens 
and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2006);  Kevin Railey, Natural Aristocracy: History, 
Ideology and the Production of William Faulkner (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama 
Press, 1999).
epistemology, these prose “conveyors” render efficient the literary text. In 
distinction to the grinding formalism of Faulkner, which seeks to render opaque 
and thus inefficient its (historical) meanings, The Camera Eye streamlines literary 
language, rendering it fluid and maximizing its output. What was small and 
begrudging in Faulkner is big and seemingly limitless in Dos Passos. If 
Faulkner is minded to narrate a “postage stamp of native soil”, Dos Passos is 
driven, in Mike Gold’s phrasing, to “digest a continent”.3  Stylistically and 
semantically attuned to modern modes of industrial production, The Camera Eye 
occasions an aesthetics of overproduction. The proliferation of abundant 
semantic flows is the cardinal feature of Dos Passos’ literary formalism. Yet as 
the coming discussions seek to show, the textual apparatus generates a glut of 
meaning that Dos Passos struggles to manage. 
! Much has been written about Faulkner and, separately, about Dos Passos 
as modernist entities, yet no study has attempted to read them in dialogue. That 
the critical industry has fluctuated in the timing of its proliferations might 
explain why Faulkner and Dos Passos have not been subjected to joint 
evaluations. Simply stated, Faulkner and Dos Passos have both been prominent 
at different times in the critical imagination. During the inter-war period, Dos 
Passos’ star was clearly in the ascendancy. Famously hailed by Jean-Paul Sartre 
as “the greatest writer of our time”, Dos Passos stood at the summit of 
American literature.4  Faulkner, during the same period would, by contrast, 
suffer from a sort of critical palsy; at the outbreak of the second World War the 
majority of his novels were out of print. Malcolm Cowley’s editorship of a 
“portable Faulkner” in 1946 and the award of a Nobel prize three years later 
lifted Faulkner’s spirits, his rhetoric, and his ratings in the academe. No such 
accolades for Dos Passos, who, by the early fifties had disappeared almost 
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3 Mike Gold, “The Education of John Dos Passos”, The English Journal, Vol. 22,  No. 2 (Feb., 1933), 
pp.87-97. p.95.
4 Jean Paul Sartre, “John Dos Passos and 1919”, Situations I (1947), trans. Annette Michelson 
(London: Rider, 1955), pp.88-96, p.96.
entirely from the critical radar. Rarely considered as anything more than a 
period piece of leftist political activity, U.S.A. has been consigned to the critical 
scrap-heap. 
! Since the publication of The 42nd Parallel in 1930, The Camera Eye has been 
an occasion for critical floundering. Contemporary readers would despair at the 
formalism of The Camera Eye. Constitutive of “queer glimpses of almost 
anything”, many keen readers simply did not know what to do with Dos Passos 
modernist “conveyors”.5  James N. Westerhoven and Townsend Ludington 
groped toward exegesis in the seventies yet encountering similar difficulty, 
opted instead to draw out The Camera Eyes biographical details; other critics 
have, with reference to the other three narrative modes, charted Dos Passos’ 
shift in politics.6 Recently, the confusion regarding The Camera Eye has turned to 
silence. In his recent book, Mourning Modernity: Literary Modernity and the 
Injuries of American Capitalism Seth Moglen mounts a rare investigation into the 
formal exigencies of Dos Passos’ prose forms. Moglen proves eminently 
sensitive to the political alienations that subtend U.S.A. yet he remains silent on 
the formal exigencies of The Camera Eye.7  Barbara Foley’s recent work is 
similarly attuned to the alienations and deformations of Dos Passos’ aesthetic. 
Foley, however, like Moglen, pays scant attention to the political capacities of 
The Camera Eye. Conscious of the inadequacy of these readings and convinced 
that The Camera Eye is the key with which to unlock the “political unconscious” 
8
5 Upton Sinclair, “Review”, New Masses (April, 1930), Vol. v, pp.18-19, p.19.
6 For cultural analysis of Dos Passos see Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of 
American Culture in the Twentieth Century (London and New York: Verso, 1996); for a 
biographical report see Townsend Ludington, John Dos Passos: A Twentieth Century Odyssey 
(London: E.P. Dutton, 1980). Political commentary can be found in Barbara Foley, Radical 
Representations: Politics and Form in U.S. Proletarian Fiction (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1993); and Robert C. Rosen, John Dos Passos: Politics and the Writer (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1981).
7 Seth Moglen, Mourning Modernity: Literary Modernity and the Injuries of American Capitalism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
of U.S.A., this is the first study to attend uniquely to The Camera Eye and the 
only one to semanticize its operations.
! Faulkner and Dos Passos offer two distinctive formal responses to the 
deleterious onset of modernity. As different ways of conceiving of historical 
contingency, these two writers demand an entirely different way of reading. By 
implication they require a different critical methodology. By attending to the 
word in Faulkner and to the concept in Dos Passos I strive to do more than flag 
up two neglected facets of two independent critical discourses. In reading the 
meagre semantic yield of Faulkner against the abundant proliferations of Dos 
Passos, I set out a methodology through which a rigorous semantic comparison 
between two key prose modernisms can gain discursive traction. The 
comparative aspect of this thesis thus seeks to provide a methodological frame 
through which we can draw out a number of key formal, political and 
epistemological differences between two of America’s primary formalists and 
producers of modernist texts.
*
Chapter 1, “Them”, or White on the Outside: The Semantics of Race in The 
Sound and the Fury” considers the generative capabilities of the collective third 
person pronoun, “them”, in relation to Faulkner’s fourth - and arguably most 
notorious - prose production. Organized into four discreet portions, the chapter 
opens by providing an historical backdrop against which Faulkner’s formal 
grammar can be contextualized. I suggest that the collective pronoun “them” 
tacitly invokes the recently freed blacks who, in migrating from the American 
South in the wake of Emancipation, bereaved the white sense of self, or “I-
hood”, in Heidegger’s term. Borne out of an assumption that The Sound and the 
Fury’s formal grammar is a textual outgrowth of a doggedly historical set of 
problems, I parse the social, economic and psychological consequences of 
black’s breaking from white. By so doing I position the collective impersonal 
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pronoun as a compacted grammar for the fraught intersections of black 
“thems” and white “Is” in the context of the Great Migration. These prefatory 
discussions classify as historically sedimented the opacities that subtend 
Faulkner’s prose forms.
! The remainder of chapter 1 investigates these opacities as they manifest 
at the level of Faulkner’s text. Across three linked readings I explore the ways in 
which Benjamin, Quentin and Jason Compson struggle to articulate and 
navigate the fault-lines of a difficult racial past. For each Compson brother the 
specter of the black “them” occasions a set of acutely visual problems. For 
Benjy, idiot savant and mute witness to the fall of the “Old South", the black, as 
the custodian of a slave past, flashes up in a problematic moment of eye contact 
with his recently pregnant (and thus culturally “black”) sister, Caddy. This 
black look, I argue, is the central maneuver in a panicked, yet socially attuned 
attempt to reassert the “whiteness” of a sullied sibling, yet the eyemindedness 
of Benjy’s racial rescue annihilates the very notion - the “whiteness” - that it 
seeks to preserve. Passed through Benjy’s miscegenated “eye”/”I”, Caddy’s 
“whiteness” is dependent upon yet simultaneously dismissive of the magical 
sway of the (penetrating) black eye. The visual commerce between Benjy and 
Caddy connotes a modest textual event but it is not an ahistorical one. In fact, 
Benjy’s narrative (re)visions proffer tacit, if under-articulated evidence of a 
familiarity with what Richard Godden, following Paul Ricoeur, calls the “pre-
plots of his time”.8  Despite the semantic densities that subtend his narrative, 
Benjy is sufficiently embedded in the sociality of the South to “know” what to 
do, and where to go, at specific moments of crisis and loss. Benjy’s “knowing” 
does not constitute a fully blown epistemology, yet it does infer an 
acculturation to the racial codes that underpinned Southern regimes of 
accumulation. This acculturation occasions what Raymond Williams dubs a 
10
8  Richard Godden, Fictions of Labour: William Faulkner and the South’s Long Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.18.
“structure of feeling”. Historical consciousness is a quality that Faulkner 
scholarship rarely assigns to Benjy Compson. A brief review of the critical 
literature prefaces my close reading and outlines the frequency with which 
Benjy is deemed an entirely passive narrator wholly lacking control over the 
vicissitudes of his textual praxis. My arguments seek to complicate these 
prevailing critical evaluations. 
A third section suggests that the notion of a “them” terrorises the racial 
subjectivity of Quentin, the novel’s second narrator. For Quentin, the black 
emerges through a bruise that he receives in a bungled attempt to defend the 
notion of a sister’s sexual purity, or “whiteness”, from the “blackguards” (SF 
948; 962; 963; 969; 971) that move in her orbit. This bruise, or “shiner” (SF 1003) 
activates a semantic insurgency in which submerged black presence rises up 
and pushes through the crust of Quentin’s newly miscegenated, thus 
historicised face. Inspected in the wobbling surface of a basin, this “black 
eye” (1011) gets Quentin to thinking about race. Drawing upon postcolonial and 
phenomenological critical frameworks, I claim that as Quentin peers into the 
basin, the full force of black slavery pushes to the forefront of his consciousness. 
Overwhelming his fragile racial identity, Quentin’s reflection takes him to the 
brink of the Other. 
A final reading investigates the proliferation of racialised meaning in the 
narrative of Jason Compson. For Jason, the black gathers behind the eye and is 
an occasion for excruciating headaches. These aches, which intensify when 
Jason considers black labour, the cotton market and the sexual activity of his 
(now “black”) sister, are historically derived. Testimony to what Jean-Paul 
Sartre refers to as a “sinking in” of historical consciousness, these pains threaten 
to send Jason into “blackout”; by extension, they threaten to re-race his 
whiteness. In sum, my opening chapter investigates how Faulkner’s most 
famous, and famously sedimented historical fiction struggles to answer what 
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Edouard Glissant refers to as the “relentless question of race”.9
! Chapter 2, ““I”, or, Splitting the Eye in As I Lay Dying” shifts its focus 
from the collective “them” to the first person pronoun “I”. The employment of 
the first person pronoun propels Faulkner toward his fullest dissection of 
existentialism. “I” is the novel’s “compacted doctrine” and the primary means 
by which Faulkner can interrogate questions of being.10  The chapter moves 
through three discrete phases. Its opening discussions map the 
phenomenological contours of the imperilled “I” with reference to the novel’s 
most prolific yet most precarious “Eye”/”I”, Darl Bundren. Drawing from the 
ontological investigations of Sartre and Heidegger, I parse a single episode in 
Darl’s narration in which he, situated on the edge of sleep and “thinking of 
home” (AILD 52) sets to philosophising on the existential dimensions of the “I”.
! My middle section provides an aesthetic identity for the alienated textual 
“I”. From Stephen M. Ross to Owen Robinson, a constellation of valuable work 
has emphasized the the dialogism that inflects Faulkner’s fifth novel.11 
Attending, in turn, to what Volosinov refers to as the “clash of live social 
accents”, these critical efforts shed light on the narrative fragmentations to 
which the splitting of the “I” refers.12 Counter to these recent trends in Faulkner 
studies, I read the “fundamental polysemanticity” of Faulkner’s fifth novel not 
through Bakhtin but through Sartre.13  Specifically, I discuss Faulkner’s textual 
divisions - the splitting of the narrative “I” - with reference to the notion of the 
“series”, as set out in the Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960). Given Sartre’s 
12
9 Edouard Glissant, Faulkner, Mississippi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.3.
10 William Empson, The Structure of Complex Words (London: Chatto and Windus, 1952), p.39.
11 Stephen M. Ross,  ““Voice” in Narrative Texts: The Example of As I Lay Dying” in PMLA, Vol. 
94, No, 2 (Mar., 1979), pp.300-10; Owen Robinson, Creating Yoknapatawpha:  Readers and Writers in 
Faulkner’s Fiction (London: Routledge, 2006).
12  V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. 
Titunik (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986), p.23.
13 Ibid. p.80.
appreciation of Faulkner’s prose it strikes me as remiss that the existentialist 
deliberations of the novel, noted by writers as diverse as Michel Delville and 
Daniel Singal, have not extended to the concept of the series.14  John K. Simon’s 
essay “Faulkner and Sartre: Metamorphosis and the Obscene” constitutes 
perhaps the closest that any critic has come to a serialized conception of 
Faulkner’s formal grammar, yet here it is the notion of le regard rather than the 
series that comes to the fore.15 This chapter is the first articulation of the “serial 
situation” as it applies to the formal strategies of As I Lay Dying.16 
! As a second set of discussions seek to show, Faulkner’s text is invested in 
the forms and syntax of French avant-gardes. In a section entitled “From 
Seriality to Surreality: Faulkner’s Aesthetic Corpse”, I pin the deathly 
procession of the Bundrens to the cadavre exquis, as formulated by Andre Breton 
in Paris in 1924. Attuned to the notion of the series as extrapolated by Sartre 
and to the shredded formalism of French Surrealism, As I Lay Dying is a collage 
prose work which comes into meaning by coming apart at the seams. This 
serialised and bizarre journey to the grave resounds as Faulkner’s exquisite 
corpse.
! A third and final section routes the fragmentation of the narrative “I" into 
an historical context. The phenomenological and textual alienations issue from 
the fragmentation attendant upon the disintegrative shift toward a modern 
South. Faulkner’s narrative is an analogue for a painful journey to town and, an 
investment in commodity culture. Drawing upon a rich tradition of cultural 
historiography, the forty mile death drag to Jefferson doubles as an odyssey of 
consumption. 
13
14 Michel Delville. “Alienating Language and Darl’s Narrative Consciousness in Faulkner’s As I 
Lay Dying”, Southern Literary Journal,  Vol. 27, Iss. 1 (Fall 1994), pp.61-72; Daniel J. Singal, William 
Faulkner: The Making of a Modernist (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
15  John K. Simon, “Faulkner and Sartre: Metamorphosis and the Obscene”, Comparative 
Literature, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1963), pp.216-225, p.220. 
16 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p.249.
! Chapter 3, ““It”, or Sanctuary’s Reversible Bodies”, closes the readings on 
Faulkner’s compacted pronominal trilogy. Occasioning the most sustained 
textual analysis of the thesis, the chapter attends to the materiality of the sign in 
its smallest workings. Here, a case is made for the centrality of the third person 
singular neuter pronoun “it” in Faulkner’s sixth and most infamous prose 
production, Sanctuary (1931). The work, an earlier version of which appears in 
Faulkner and Yoknapatawpha: Returns of the Text (2011) consolidates the claims of 
my first two chapters that the pronoun resonates as a semantically generative 
textual element in Faulkner’s prose fiction of the middle period. Taking a 
problematically under-articulated rape as its focal subject, the chapter draws 
upon linguistic, formalist, and Freudian methodologies, and claims that the 
pronoun “it” is key to a series of textual, material and psychosexual inversions. 
As the novel’s “compacted doctrine”, the word “it” provides Temple Drake 
with a grammatical means of displacing and deflecting the pain of literal 
meaning. Paying close scrutiny to an act of “telling” that never really tells, the 
chapter situates Faulkner’s grammar as a place of violence. Temple’s incessant, 
habitual use of the impersonal pronoun sits at the centre of a bid to re-narrate 
her painful past, yet the desire to revise or to reconstruct transcends the limits 
of Temple’s body. The word “it”, as the final section of the chapter infers, 
situates Temple midway between the hideous past of American slavery and the 
unimaginable future of modernity. 
! Chapter 4 is entitled “Machining Meaning: U.S.A.” This chapter, the first 
of three on Dos Passos’ modernist trilogy, offers a theoretical framework 
through which Dos Passos’ abundant semantic proliferations can be 
conceptualized. The framing is explicitly Marxian and reads Dos Passos’ 
camera-texts as conduits for the stowing of semantic surpluses. A case is made 
here for The Camera Eyes as the hoards of the textual economy. The twenty-
seven prose compartments function as linked semantic locations within which 
extruded textual matter - the textual surplus - is held and duly prevented from 
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clogging up the rest of the textual mechanism. These arguments consider Dos 
Passos’ suggestive mention that his Camera Eyes were intended as “safety 
valves” employed to pump subjective liquidities away from the rest of the text, 
facilitating its objectivity. As “conveyors” and as “safety vales”, The Camera Eye 
is awkwardly situated. These exchanges function both as the mode of (over)
production and the means of controlling the excess. Having provided a 
theoretical frame in the first part of the chapter I seek, in the second, to probe 
the eminently dialectical relation between form, as a modernist imperative that 
rushes forward, and history, as a reach into the past. I classify The Camera Eye as 
the only place throughout the U.S.A. trilogy at which the tension between form 
and history manifests as a dialectical imperative and thus draw out a tension 
between text and context that supplements the tension between use and 
surplus.
! Chapter 5, “Eyes Left: Nineteen Nineteen” (1932) solicits The Camera Eye as 
a lens through which significant shifts in Dos Passos’ politics achieve focus. The 
chapter takes as its primary materials three of the novel’s fifteen Camera Eyes, 
and argues that the formal nature of these episodes is a key to understanding 
coterminous fluctuations in Dos Passos’ political stance. With reference to 
Sartre’s concept of the petrification consequent upon capitalist modes and 
Walter Benjamin’s notions of a jetztzeit or “now-time”, I read the opening 
Camera Eye as a formal outgrowth of the intensification of Dos Passos’ Marxian 
commitments. This is the materialist moment for Dos Passos, the point at which 
his formal praxis and his political leftism fuse. For the only time in U.S.A. Dos 
Passos’ formal aesthetic proves sensitive to the workings of dialectical 
materialism. Close analyses of two late Camera Eyes seeks to show that by the 
publication of Nineteen Nineteen in 1932, however, Dos Passos’ Marxism would 
start to slide. I pass the intensification and subsequent disavowal of Dos Passos’ 
leftism through Freud, Marx and Bataille, and claim that by 1932, Dos Passos’ 
former commitment to the American left had entered into “ebullition”.
15
! The final chapter of the thesis, “Eyes Right: The Big Money” considers the 
cultural, economic, and political ramifications of The Camera Eye’s withdrawal 
as structuring narratives for U.S.A. Having played a prominent part in The 42nd 
Parallel and less of a role in Nineteen Nineteen, the camera-text undergoes a final 
reduction in The Big Money. What was twenty-seven in the opening novel 
became fifteen in the second, which becomes nine in the third. The draining 
away of the visual surplus (and with it Dos Passos’ “subjectivity”) is a 
development that no critic warrants as worthy of serious attention. In 1976 
Westerhoven mentioned the trend; the following year Ludington suggested that 
it had been “seldom noted”.17  More than thirty years have passed since these 
mentions and no study has attended to the shift. I want to argue in this final 
chapter that the attenuation of the Camera Eye is of threefold significance. First, 
the depletion is visually aggregated. Dos Passos reneges on his previously 
abundant visual commitments because Americans had, in his terms, “become 
eyeminded” by the time that The Big Money is published in 1936. Having 
achieved full proficiency in the eye-dialect of American modernity, the camera-
texts, as the eye-prompts or ideological stabilizers of the prose “system” can 
come off. These figurations of surplus seem themselves, by 1936, to have 
become surplus to the demands of the textual economy. Drawing upon the 
theoretical approaches of Theodor Adorno, Alfred Sohn Rethel and Rachel 
Bowlby, I suggest that the phasing out of the camera-text implies the 
normalization of the signs and symbols of modern industrial capital and, by 
implication, connotes a begrudging acceptance of labour’s commodification. 
Through an extended close reading of The Big Money’s opening Camera Eye, I 
suggest that the “eye cramp” occasioned by the onset of commodification 
spreads to the throat and to the spine. The decision to shift from a tight “eye” to 
a tight “throat” and a stiff “spine” issues from a conviction that the contractions 
16
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of Dos Passos’ text are informed by and responsive to contractions in the United 
States economy. By offering throat and spine as parallel sites of narrowness and 
constriction, I locate the “eyemindedness” of Americans within a more 
extensive social physiognomy. 
! The third and concluding section of chapter considers the political 
ramifications of Dos Passos’ shift in formal praxis. With reference to a number 
of later Camera Eyes and to Dos Passos’ literary correspondence of the mid 
thirties, it is argued that the final three Camera Eyes problematise Dos Passos’ 
formal practice. Referring to a period of political radicalism yet composed 
during a shift toward the right, these final Camera Eyes provide Dos Passos with 
a means of revising a former political radicalism. 
! The thesis terminates via a coda: “The Truth About Visual Training”, an 
unpublished research paper drafted by Dos Passos in collaboration with the eye 
doctor and behavioral optometrist Amiel Francke. Held in the special 
collections at the University of Virginia, these materials have yet to register on 
the radar of Dos Passos scholarship. That these grouped papers have received 
no mention in what is a notoriously vast critical pile is on its own a sufficient 
reason to draw attention to them here. Yet I do not rescue these papers from the 
margins for this reason alone. These texts enfranchise new ways of seeing the 
visual project to which Dos Passos was committed. More, they testify to a 
longer preoccupation with the implementation of visual efficiency than the 
current scholarship is willing to admit. In short, they provide a suggestive 
teleology thorough which Dos Passos’ most famous fictions might be re-
considered. 
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CHAPTER ONE
“THEM”, 
OR, 
WHITE ON THE OUTSIDE: THE SEMANTICS OF RACE IN 
THE SOUND AND THE FURY.
There was something terrible in me sometimes at night I could see it grinning at 
me I could see it through them grinning at me through their faces it’s gone now 
and I’m sick. 18
                Caddy Compson, The Sound and The Fury.
This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into 
the kind of Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the Others, 
as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this 
inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 
“they” is unfolded [….] The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which 
all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of 
everydayness. 
         Martin Heidegger, Being and Time.19
It is early 1928. William Faulkner, in a funk with his publishers with regard to 
repeated rejections of his third novel, Flags in the Dust, begins work on a short 
story centring on the demise of the Compson family, an aristocratic clan that 
struggle, in the wake of Reconstruction, to come to terms with their social, 
psychological and material dissipation. Faulkner would call the story 
“Twilight”. Within twelve months, by February 1929, the story had been 
emboldened and extended, and accepted for publication as a novel. For some 
reason uncomfortable with “Twilight” as its title, Faulkner had it changed. The 
18
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novel he would call The Sound and the Fury (1929). Faulkner’s description of the 
process by which Flags became “Twilight” which subsequently became The 
Sound and the Fury has been etched in the stone of Faulkner criticism: “[o]ne day 
I seemed to shut a door, between me and all publishers’ addresses and book 
lists. I said to myself, Now I can write.”20  Typically Faulknerian in its 
indirection and in its ambiguity, the pronouncement connotes the privation of a 
literary life. This thesis is less interested in Faulkner as a man than as a 
producer of texts, of texts that, in turn, problematise the kind of separation or 
disengagement to which Faulkner’s famous statement refers. While Faulkner’s 
solitude indeed resonates at the personal level, it also has repercussions at the 
level of form. By shutting the figurative “door” between himself, his publishers, 
and his reading public, Faulkner would secrete his novel behind the arras. As 
an exercise in hiddenness and opacity, this secretion, pertaining to the “secrets” 
of the South, is an apposite one. Faulkner, having withdrawn himself from “the 
social metabolism”, blocks off the narrative sight-lines, vistas that realist prose 
sought to keep clear.21 The Sound and the Fury, then, not only “shut the door” on 
“publishers’ addresses and book lists” but it “shut the door” on the aesthetic 
assumptions of a literary genre. “Transparency” and “precision” - watchwords 
of literary realism - would, in Faulkner’s most durable fictions, collapse into 
obscurity and contradiction. In his study Critic as Scientist: The Modernist Poetics 
of Ezra Pound (1981) Ian F. A. Bell recalls an exchange between Gustave Flaubert 
and Guy de Maupassant that we might consider typical of the preeminent 
visuality from which Faulkner’s novel would radically depart. Flaubert, 
Maupassant writes
19
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compelled me to describe in a few phrases a being or an object in such a 
manner as to clearly particularize it, and distinguish it from all other 
objects of the same race, or the same species. ‘When you pass’, he would 
say, ‘a grocer seated at his shop door, a janitor smoking his pipe, a stand 
of hackney coaches, show me that grocer and that janitor, their attitude, 
their whole physical appearance, including also by a skilful description 
their whole moral nature so that I cannot confound them with any other 
grocer or any other janitor: make me see, in one word, that a certain cab-
horse does not resemble the fifty others that follow or precede it.22  
With the publication of The Sound and the Fury in October 1929 Faulkner 
provided a full repudiation of the terms of literary composition as set out in 
Flaubert’s 1914 tutorial to Maupassant. Faulkner’s novel seeks not to 
“particularize” but to ruin the particular. In this chapter I argue that Faulkner 
reverses Flaubert’s insistent appeal to “make me see”, thus, and in the terms of 
the visual theorist Martin Jay, “problematizing the notion of the transparency of 
visual experience”.23  The Sound and the Fury is an episode in opacity; it strives 
not toward what Flaubert dubbed “unequalled accuracy of perception”, but 
toward obscurity. Despite its anti-visual tendencies, Faulkner’s prose is far from 
meaningless. In fact, and in the idiom of Malcolm Bull, the Faulknerian text 
comes into meaning by “coming into hiding”.24  But what, we might ask, is 
being hidden? Why must it be hidden? What are the textual ramifications of its 
concealment? And how do we react to its unearthing? I address these questions 
in the following three chapters.
Most immediately, the attempt to block, hide or cover poses significant 
problems at the level of Faulkner’s text. The formal condition of The Sound and 
the Fury is often governed by opacity; indeed, opacity forms a constitutive part 
of reading Faulkner’s early novels, its presence threatening to frustrate attempts 
20
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to extract “meaning” from the text. As Myra Jehlen writes in connection with 
Faulkner, “knowing has become increasingly problematical.”25  Much of this 
thesis zeroes in on the smallest of Faulkner’s textual operations, how meaning 
accrues in one word, to flash back to Flaubert. Specifically, it attends to the 
workings of three pronouns, “them”, “I” and finally “it”. The pronoun, I argue, 
is the pre-eminent grammatical means by which Faulkner’s texts of the 
1929-1931 period generate - yet simultaneously preclude the release of - 
semantic meaning. They, in effect, shut the door. We would commit an error, 
however, if we were to locate these figurations of opacity exclusively - or, for 
that matter, even primarily - at the textual level. The textual difficulty, 
substantial and notorious as it is, is the manifestation of a prior difficulty: a 
difficulty at the level of Southern history. The “dictatorship of the they”, then, in 
Heidegger’s terms, occasions not just a semantic problem but an historical one. 
Faulkner’s texts of the middle period generate their meaning by (dis)engaging 
with what Eric Sundquist calls “the single most agonizing experience of 
[Faulkner’s] region and his nation: the crisis and long aftermath of American 
slavery.”26  A full investigation of this “agonizing experience” exceeds the 
jurisdiction of the present work. I restrict my early discussions to a more 
portable topic, namely, how black movement from the South in the wake of 
Emancipation contextualised (albeit belatedly, and in sporadic bursts) the shape 
and feel of American slavery; how, in other words, free blacks, by mobilising 
and migrating from the region, gave form to slavery’s “structure of feeling” to 
borrow an expression from Raymond Williams. 27 
The 1920s bore witness to black migration on an unprecedented scale. 
According to the historian Cheryl Lester, two and a half million blacks left the 
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South between 1915 and 1930.28 Having begun in the “teens as an effort on [the] 
part of free blacks to take control of their lives”, black migration, in the words of 
economic historian Jay Mandle, “redoubled throughout the ‘20s.“ Mandle notes 
that “the rapid pace of out-migration of blacks continued with nearly 700,000 
blacks estimated as having vacated the six plantation states [Alabama, Georgia, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, and the Carolinas] in these years.”29  All too quickly for 
the white landowning classes, the “thems” of the plantation South, those 
terrifying, indistinct “others” that strike fear into Caddy Compson, became 
history, became “gone now”. This “going” magnified and thus made public the 
flaws that, prior to black Emancipation, had remained a discrete, if constitutive 
feature of Southern modes of accumulation. The end of legal slavery 
articulated, in Michael Taussig’s terms, “that which is generally known, but 
cannot be articulated”.30  To be legally “free” was one thing; to move away from 
the South, asserting one’s “humanity” or “I-hood” was quite another. 
Indeed, in the wake of Emancipation the benefits of life under wages - a 
form of economic control prevalent in the urban north - was difficult to 
differentiate from that which obtained under chattel slavery. As Mandle notes 
elsewhere, the coming of wages in fact rerouted many blacks back into the kind 
of subordination that was a feature of slavery.31  For many, the transition to a 
wage did little more than displace the power relations from master/slave to 
boss/worker. At a basic level, money wages legitimated the kinds of labour 
practices that were performed for free under slavery. The “freedom” that came 
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from emancipation often meant little more than the freedom to toil for the 
private profit of others. Trudier Harris has more recently made a similar point. 
“In the 1930s” Harris writes, “sharecropping was as much a system of slavery 
as that state that existed for Blacks in this country prior to 1860. Invisible chains 
of debt took the place of rope and shackles, but the mental state which existed 
during slavery did not change much.”32  Material incentives drove many white 
employers from Northern industries to lure blacks out of the South. Carole 
Marks writes that, “[i]n the Great Migration, the initial line of communication 
was established by agents of northern companies, acting as intermediaries 
between employers and potential labor migrants.”33  In scouting for degraded 
labor, these “intermediaries” differ only nominally from those sent, as per pre 
civil war custom, to buy slaves at auction. Yet blacks did move, in increasing 
numbers, figuratively shutting the door on the social and economic forms of the 
“old time” (SF 929) and, by so doing, moving away from the primal scene of 
American slavery.
 Black out-migration would hamper Southern modes of production. As 
Jonathan M. Wiener writes, “[p]ostwar Southern society was evolving in the 
same direction as the rest of the nation, though at a slower pace because of the 
ideological and cultural heritage of slavery.”34 While rapid industrialisation and 
an abundance of labour in the North would see the national economy expand at 
a steady rate throughout the first third of the century, the Southern economy 
continued to fester. Bereft of black labour, the South, economically speaking, 
became “sick”. Manumission, and the migration that (painstakingly) followed 
decimated the productive apparatus of the Southern economy. By 1927, the year 
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before Faulkner began work on The Sound and the Fury - more than 41% of 
cotton spindles lay idle in the Southern states.35  The turgid performance of the 
Southern economy reached its terminus in the crash of the cotton markets in 
October 1929. Articulating a singular break in the national experience, the crash 
was in no small part the culmination of an inability, on behalf of the owning 
classes, to deal with the twin shocks of modernisation and black migration. 
Michael Bernstein sums up the severity of the crisis: 
[t]he crash created a massive disruption in the financial markets of the 
country, drastically devalued capital stocks, greatly depressed levels of 
disposable income, and, by virtue of the high unemployment [peaking at 
25% in 1933]36  and rapid deflation it generated, so biased the already 
unequal distribution of purchasing power as to virtually eliminate 
consumer and investor confidence.37 
The collapse of the cotton markets hit the South particularly hard. That in the 
wake of mass black migration the region proved unable to fend off the toxic 
effects of the marketplace might come as no real surprise. Indeed, notice had 
been served for some time that the cotton markets were unable to function as a 
profitable means of production in an increasingly modern - and increasingly 
global - system of exchange. As early as April 1928, Jason Compson, the third of 
the Compson children, would loudly speculate on the precarious condition of 
the “cotton market” (SF 1044), an economic system that was, in his idiomatic 
phrasing, “on the point of blowing its head off”. (1065) Perhaps more difficult 
than the rupture itself was the discretion with which it threatened to become 
manifest: the “whole dam top could blow off and we'd not know it”. (1051) The 
cumulative pressures of a decade of black movement had pulled the veil from 
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the face of the old South. Consequently, and in the phrasing of W.E.B. Du Bois, 
“that dead weight of social degradation partially masked behind a half-named 
Negro problem” came to the fore.38
The economic hardship that issued from black migration was real and it 
was sharp. Yet perhaps the greatest shock to come out of this “moving” was 
psychological in kind. For generations, white and black had been tied by white 
dependency on black labour; with the loss of black labour, the social contract 
between white and black had to be redrawn. In effect, as rural blacks moved 
toward the financial independence offered - yet often never realised - by 
Northern capital, the fundamental principles that underpinned the logic of 
Southern means of production - first slavery, and then debt peonage at its centre 
- suddenly dissolved.39 As blacks moved North the Southern white land owning 
class would come to realise, yet simultaneously attempt to repress, the 
implications of a difficult racial past. 
The uncoupling of black from white - the cleaving of “them” from “us” - 
would cause massive damage to the white psyche, especially “among white 
Southerners who experienced black migration as loss and abandonment”.40 
Slavery, as a social configuration determined by economic incentives, 
demanded the psychological interpenetration of white and black. As Eugene 
Genovese affirms, “[t]he racial catastrophe that accompanied the whites’ 
moment of truth had its roots in a genuine intimacy, not merely in black 
pretense.”41 Ultimately this “catastrophe” was the result of what Eric Lott dubs 
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a “conflicted intimacy”.42  To lose (sight of) the black body was not only to lose 
(sight of) the labour that it represented but it was also to lose (sight of) a part of 
oneself. Joel Williamson forcefully states the case: “[i]n order for an individual 
white person to let black people go, the white person, in a sense, had to die, had 
to cease to be in an important way what he or she had been.”43 This inability to 
“let black people go” occupies the epistemological centre of The Sound and the 
Fury. It also occupies the corporeal centre of Caddy Compson, as my epigraph 
infers. Evidence enough of a “conflicted intimacy”, “Caddy’s” nervously 
italicised utterance is this:
[t]here was something terrible in me sometimes at night I could see it grinning 
! at me I could see it through them grinning at me through their faces it’s gone 
! now and I’m sick. (SF 963) 
“Caddy’s” terms, which are more properly “Quentin’s”, occasion a number of 
tensional displacements which, in turn, occasion what I wish to call a problem 
of throughness. In the present example the throughness is multi-layered. Not 
only does Caddy claim that there was “something terrible in” her (“she could 
see it grinning”) but this terrifying “something” can be seen “through” the 
submerged, pluralized “faces” of indistinct others. 
! In the first instance the plurality of “grinning [...] faces” refers to Caddy’s 
alleged promiscuity. Worryingly, for the Compson brothers, Caddy is unaware 
of (or perhaps more likely unwilling to disclose) the exact number of sexual 
partners that she has taken since she became, in Quentin’s awkward term 
“unvirgin” (SF 937), and thus “sick” in the summer of 1909. Quentin is 
especially interested in Caddy’s sexploits: “Have there been very many Caddy / I 
dont know too many will you look after Benjy and Father / You dont know whose it is 
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then does he know” (SF 965, italics in original). Quentin pursues his sister, again 
with recourse to the term “them” and again through a fractured syntax that, 
constituting a sort of narrative ventriloquism, allows Quentin to furnish 
answers for his own questions: “did you love them Caddy did you love them When 
they touched me I died” (SF 991).44  On one hand, then, the word “them” provides 
begrudging reference to Caddy’s perceived sexual openness. In short, the word 
“them” nominates the multiplicity of lovers that may or may not have been “in” 
Caddy Compson. However, these myriad “faces” function as more than screens 
upon which the shame and recrimination of a deepening sexuality receive 
projection. Faulkner, I submit, uses the collective pronoun as a means by which 
Caddy’s conception might be racialized.
! The fluidity of Caddy’s/Quentin’s syntax renders opaque the nature of 
her/his “sightings”. The “thing” which resides within Caddy, pushing through 
her stomach is indeterminate and menacing, dreadful yet amorphous and 
shifting in its threat. That this vaguely defined “something” becomes visible 
only “sometimes”, materialising only “at night”, and that it - whatever it is - 
disappears almost as soon as it is seen (“it’s gone now”) thickens the opacity of 
what is a barely perceivable material presence. The “something” is not just “in” 
Caddy but “in” that presence which is “in” her; this wretched, grinning cargo 
subsequently struggles to push “through” the submerged, collective faces of an 
unnamed and apparently unknowable “them”. It is in this sense that a word - 
here the word “them”, may, in Empson’s meticulous phrasing “become a sort of 
solid entity, able to direct opinion, thought of as like a person”.45 By pushing the 
“grinning” through “Caddy”, and in turn, through the faces of mysterious 
others, Faulkner semanticizes what Glissant refers to as “the opacity of the 
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other”.46 The word “grinning” racializes Caddy’s nocturnal anxieties. Faulkner 
draws on racist stereotype as a means of generating metaphoric meaning. As 
Homi Bhabha explains, stereotype is itself a (by)product of a social sort of 
breeding. Gestating in the amnion of culture, stereotypes reproduce yet they 
reproduce only to infer a sort of epistemic stillbirth. Bhabha writes that
! [a]s a form of splitting and multiple belief, the ! stereotype requires, for 
! its successful signification, a continual and repetitive chain of other 
! stereotypes. The process by which the metaphoric ‘masking’ is inscribed 
! on a lack which must then be concealed gives the stereotype both its 
! fixity and its phantasmatic quality – the same old stories of the Negro’s 
! animality, the Coolie’s inscrutability or the stupidity of the Irish must be 
! told (compulsively) again and afresh, and are differently gratifying and 
! terrifying each time.47 
Albeit partially and in an occluded manner, Faulkner tells “the same old 
stories”, here centring on the “grinning”, subhuman, rubber-lipped “nigger”. In 
the context of the post-bellum South, “grinning” implies “blackness”. Duly 
“tethered to treacherous stereotypes of primitivism and degeneracy”, these 
“faces” semanticize as black Caddy’s “sickness”.48 
! Faulkner’s terminology as well as his imagery draws, from the semantic 
well that is Caddy’s stomach, implicit yet unutterable racial meaning. Caddy’s 
penetration is most likely the result of sexual contact with the “blackguard”  (SF 
948; 962; 969; 971) Dalton Ames, although fittingly we never know for sure. 
What we do know is that her penetration results in pregnancy, a state that 
Caddy (again through Quentin) euphemistically tags a “sickness”. Caddy never 
affirms her pregnancy directly yet her insistence that she has “got to marry 
somebody” (SF 963; 965) confirms the reader’s suspicions of a conception. 
Caddy’s penetration and subsequent “sickness” is a source of considerable 
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anxiety for her brothers, not least because they, with varying degrees of 
eloquence, equate Caddy’s loss of virginity to a loss of “whiteness”. Caddy’s 
“blackness” issues from a sexual transgression, specifically the loss of virginity 
outside of the institutional parameters of marriage. Quentin poses the question 
frankly: “[w]hy must you do like nigger women do in the pasture the ditches the dark 
woods hot hidden and furious in the dark woods” (SF 947). While initially 
functioning as a sex line, then, Caddy’s hymen doubles as a colour line; its 
crossing marks her, culturally speaking, as “black”. 
! Quentin would not have been alone in equating Caddy’s alleged 
promiscuity with moral or cultural “blackness”. The judgement was rife within 
the social context of the post-bellum American South. Lillian Smith vividly 
recalls the rhetorical thrusts that gave rhythm to turn of the century teachings 
on Southern sexual etiquette. Dispensed down the maternal line, these lessons 
conflated the language of sex and the language of race. Citing her mother, Smith 
recalls the tutorial: “parts of your body are segregated areas which you must 
stay away from and keep others away from [….] Especially must you be careful 
about what enters your body [. . . .] what enters and leaves the doors of your 
body is the essence of morality.”’49  To be white one must “shut the door[s]”. 
Agonisingly, for the Compson brothers, this is a lesson that Caddy has chosen 
to skip. (The portentous brown stain on Caddy’s “nether garments” (SF 1081)  - 
the image from which the novel grew - telescopes this later transgression.)50
Caddy is not alone in her surrogacy of a hidden black. Each of the 
Compson brothers undergoes a substantive - and historically meaningful - 
“blackening” somewhere in the course of his narrative that chimes with the 
dismal miscegenation of “Caddy”. Importantly, for present purposes, and 
thoroughly in keeping with our first reading, these raced moments generate 
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specifically visual problems. For Quentin, the problematic intersection of race 
and vision manifests via the blacking up of his eye; for Jason it manifests in the 
form of a headache that risks his blacking out. I begin my analyses of the 
Compson brothers, however, by exploring the racial “visions” of Benjy 
Compson, visions that attempt to counter the sexual “blackening” of an absent 
sister. 
BENJY COMPSON: BECOMING BLUE(GUM)
To claim a racial consciousness for Benjy Compson might strike many as a 
precocious - if not entirely disingenuous - assertion. The notion that Benjy 
might be “raced” and, as I seek to suggest, “raced” as other than “white”, cuts 
against the vast majority of interpretive positions on the novel’s opening 
session. Given the diversity of readings on The Sound and the Fury it is of note 
that critical responses to Benjamin Compson are so narrow. Scholars from 
disparate political, theoretical and national positions reach a near consensus in 
assuming that Benjy lacks, and lacks in toto, a sense of place, time and history. 
Benjy’s narrative, the critical tradition maintains, formalises the unbearable 
turmoil to which he is subjected, and over which he has no control. In 1948 
Lawrence Bowling peddled what would become the standard line on Benjy 
Compson: “[t]o expect Benjy to explain the phenomena which his mind 
perceives is like expecting a phonograph to comment upon a recording. All his 
mind does is reproduce what it takes in through the physical senses.”’51  In an 
influential essay of 1966, Michael Millgate claimed that Benjy’s “observations 
do not pass through an intelligence which is capable of ordering”. For Millgate, 
Benjy ”reports the events of which he is a spectator, and even those in which he 
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is himself a participator, with a camera-like fidelity.”52  Four years later, James 
Mellard, with a camera-like fidelity of his own, would reproduce Millgate’s 
argument which, in turn, reproduced Bowling’s. Faulkner’s narrative, Mellard 
insists, “forces Benjy into the role of the passive, machine-like recorder that can 
convey sensations without intellectual mediation”.53 Lacking intention, will and 
logic Benjy, Mellard exhorts, “cannot cause events to happen” but is instead 
done to, acted upon. “The world does not make sense only sensation”, he 
concludes.54 I consider Mellard’s claim as odd on two fronts. First, it infers that 
the world makes “sense” to the text’s other narrators. Clearly, it doesn’t; be it 
Quentin’s failure to fathom the maturing sexuality of his sister or Jason’s 
inability to comprehend the machinations of the “cotton market” (1044), the 
fictional “world” of The Sound and the Fury is an habitual source of confusion. 
That Benjy might not be able to extract clear and consistent meaning from his 
experiences is not a problem that he alone faces. The signal difference between 
Benjy and his brothers is that Benjy lacks a language through which he can 
articulate the extent to which it confuses him.
Critical responses would continue to read Benjy as an essentially passive 
narrator whose primary function was to reproduce faithfully the words of 
others. The camera analogy has proved especially durable. For Noel Polk, 
Benjy’s narrative is constituted by no more than the “simple registering of sense 
impressions”.55  For Eric Sundquist, the narration belies “the static image-
making capacity of Benjy’s “mind”“.56  John T. Matthews gives the lie to Benjy’s 
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alleged passivity, claiming that he “witnesses loss but cannot reply to it“'57 as does 
Donald Kartiganer, who claims that “Benjy’s mind moves through the world 
and time wholly without a controlling perspective, voicing a prose of pure 
presentation.” In fact, Kartiganer claims that “[t]hings seem to reveal 
themselves of their own accord, unchosen, uncontrived, as if to an innocent eye 
unwilling or unable to impose any imaginative pressure on them, any prior 
models of ordering or cultural bias.”58 I contest the notion of an “innocent eye” 
in the coming pages. Suffice it to say that predominant critical reactions, 
whether they cast Benjy as a primitive or as a machine, divest him of agency.59 
The following pages offer a riposte to this impacted critical tradition. With 
reference to a key moment of “revelation” I argue that Benjy does have some 
control over where he goes and, more, that he knows why he goes there. Roskus 
plainly testifies to the epistemological range of Benjy Compson: “He know lot 
more than folks thinks” (SF 901). 
Benjy’s “knowing” is evident in an “eyeminded” exchange in which he 
attempts to negotiate the difficult realisation of his sister’s pregnancy. Benjy 
recalls it this way:
Caddy came to the door and stood there, looking at Father and Mother. 
Her eyes flew at me, and away. I began to cry. It went loud and I got up. 
Caddy came in and stood with her back to the wall, looking at me. I went 
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toward her, crying, and she shrank against the wall and I saw her eyes 
and I cried louder and pulled at her dress. She put her hands out but I 
pulled at her dress. Her eyes ran. 
Versh said, your name Benjamin now. You know how come your name 
Benjamin now. They making a bluegum out of you. Mammy say in old time 
your grandpa changed nigger’s name, and he turn preacher, and when they look 
at him, he bluegum too. Didn’t use to be bluegum neither. And when family 
woman look him in the eye in the full of the moon chile born bluegum. And one 
evening, when they was about a dozen them bluegum chillen running around 
the place, he never come home. Possum hunters found him in the woods, et 
clean. And you know who et him. Them bluegum chillen did.
We were in the hall. Caddy was still looking at me. Her hand was 
against her mouth and I saw her eyes and I cried. We went up the stairs. 
She stopped again, against the wall, looking at me and I cried and she 
went on and I came on, crying, and she shrank against the wall, looking 
at me. She opened the door to her room, but I pulled at her dress and we 
went to the bathroom and she stood against the door, looking at me. 
Then she put her arm across her face and I pushed at her, crying. (SF 
929-30)
In this exchange, two significant - and significantly troubling - moments from 
Benjy’s past intersect. The first, designated by roman type, and consisting of the 
entirety of the first and third paragraphs, locates the reader in the “early 
summer” of 1909, and marks Benjy’s realisation that his sister is no longer a 
virgin. The second, designated by italics, and subsuming the second paragraph, 
locates the reader in November 1900, and centres upon Benjy’s change of name 
from “Maury” - a change consequent upon Caroline Compson’s shame at the 
manifesting of her son’s disability.60 In the first instance, as Richard Godden has 
noted, these two moments of change evoke a parallel sense of loss: the first a 
loss of a maidenhead, the second the loss of a maiden (or first) name. “Caddy’s 
sexual change”, Godden suggests, “is associated with Benjy’s name change, in 
an essentially cultural analogy involving two impurities.”61  These “impurities” 
carry an implicit racial accent: Caddy is “blackened” by a sexual act in 1909; 
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Benjy by his disability in 1900. Whilst Jason talks about it and Quentin reflects 
upon it, Benjy takes it upon himself to actually do something about his sister’s 
pregnancy. By moving back to 1900, Benjy predates Caddy’s act of intercourse, 
figuratively reinstating her hymen. For Benjy the reinstatement is a matter of 
the utmost urgency, as implied in the loss of Cadddy’s virginity is the loss of 
her “purity” and by extension the staining of her “whiteness”. 
Benjy’s efforts at backdating his sister’s virginity ultimately prove 
counterintuitive. In his attempt to expunge or negate an initial penetration - 
perpetrated (we think) by Dalton Ames in 1909 - Benjy enacts another. This 
“anecdotal rupture”, in the phrasing of Catherine Gallagher and Stephen 
Greenblatt, pushes 1900 through the tender roman middle of 1909.62 Connoting 
what Sartre calls a “double nihilation” this narrative flashback gives rise to a 
penetration that penetrates a penetration.63  The regressive move solicits what 
Benjy understands as a practical measure of getting his sister back. Ironically, 
yet tragically for Benjy, the “moment” that he nominates as a means of affecting 
this racial rescue connotes the point of his blackening. In 1900, “Maury” - the 
name of a revered Uncle - would become “Benjamin”; drawn to Caddy’s “loss” 
the name change infers a stigma that turns a “white” child “black”. Recast 
through Versh’s folkloric narrative, Benjy’s attempt to retrieve his sister’s racial 
“purity”, or whiteness, elicits a second penetration in which a culturally black 
Benjy enters a “tarnished” - and thus “black” - Caddy. The narrative 
impregnation thus elicits an “innocent incest” between black siblings.64  Part 
punitive measure, part attempt to claim Caddy’s unborn child as his own, Benjy 
is attuned to what Godden, following Paul Ricoeur, calls the “pre-plots of his 
time”. As Benjy judges it, he can only “penetrate” his sister - can only gain the 
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historical “stiffness” necessary to move properly “inside” her - by using the 
(fetishized) black body as a proxy. The point here is that Benjy opts to return to 
the early summer of 1909 because this is the vault, or “getting place” (SF 888), 
within which he can acquire the (historical) resources to affect a change to his 
sister’s unplanned and unwanted pregnancy.
The narrative transaction sequesters the body of the “bluegum”. The 
Dictionary of American Slang defines the “bluegum” as a pejorative designation 
for the “negro”, dating back to the Civil War - or “old time” (930), as Versh puts 
it. The “bluegum”, in Calvin S. Brown’s phrase, is “viewed with that mixture of 
reverence and fear which constitutes awe. He has many strange properties, such 
as a fatal bite, and he is a particularly adept and powerful conjurer”.65 For many 
whites the “bluegum” represented a very real threat to racial purity. As Newbell 
Niles Puckett writes in Folk Beliefs of the Southern Negro (1926) “this idea of a bite 
from a blue-gummed Negro being fatal has considerable spread throughout the 
South.” Yet, for Puckett, as it is for Benjy, the potency of the bluegum’s bite is 
trumped by the penetrative magic of its eye. As Puckett counsels, “[c]onjuration 
on the part of a blue-gummed Negro or a Negro with one eye black and the 
other blue is unduly effective and death usually results”.66  Here death is 
avoided yet the magic of the eye oversees a fate equally as terrible: the 
envisaged race change of Caddy’s unborn child. Versh, Benjy’s black ward, puts 
it this way: “when family woman look [the bluegum] in the eye”, the “chile” of said 
woman will be turned “bluegum”. The visual commerce is visually determined. 
Not only does Caddy’s shifty, evasive eye give the game away with regard to 
her pregnancy - disclosing her “black act” - but it provides a visual clue as to 
where Benjy might go to find the (dark) materials with which he might help his 
“sick” (SF 963) sister, now a “family woman.” (930) Intuiting Caddy’s sexual 
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blackening in 1909, Benjy travels to 1900, picks up the memory of the bluegum, 
dragging it back into the “present”, 1909. Benjy “eyes” his sister; he remembers 
the “bluegum” story into her. Caddy is penetrated with Benjy’s racialised, 
eyeminded anecdote. The move from 1909 to 1900 is thus sanctioned by an 
eminently visual contract which takes as its coordinates three sets of eyes: 
Benjy’s, Caddy’s, and the eyes of the bluegum. The ontic traffic that darts 
between these three sets of (miscegenated) eyes is historically pertinent. For a 
black, or any person with any black blood, to look directly into the eye of a 
white woman represented a flagrant transgression of southern racial codes. 
Nicholas Mirzoeff provides a suggestive contextual frame for the historical 
breach of racal etiquette:
after the Haitian revolution and the dramas of abolition and 
! Reconstruction, “reckless eyeballing,” a simple looking at a white per- 
! son, especially a white woman or person in authority, was forbidden to 
! those classified as “colored” under Jim Crow. Such looking was held to 
! be both violent and sexualized in and of itself, a further intensification 
! of the policing of visuality.67
The “look” that Benjy fires into his sister is thus wired into the Hegelian 
mainframe, reverberating as one strand within the master slave dialectic. 
! It is not just Caddy that seems in the sway of Benjy’s powerful eye. 
Benjy’s aptitude for black magic clearly concerns Frony Gibson, Versh’s sister, 
who fears that Benjy might alter the (racial) characteristics of her son, Luster: 
‘“You take Luster outen that bed, mammy.” Frony said. “That boy conjure 
him.”’ (SF 901) Reacting to Frony’s call, Dilsey places a “long piece of wood and 
la[ys] it between” Luster and Benjy. This segregationist plank not only brings 
the infectious magical potential of Benjy into sharp relief but it acts as a 
metaphor for larger division along the “color-line”: ‘“[s]tay on your side now”’, 
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Dilsey warns Benjy. As Grace Elizabeth Hale might put it, Luster’s bed 
figuratively encapsulates “the primal scene of the culture of segregation.”68 
QUENTIN COMPSON: BECOMING BLACK(GUARD)
If the racial subtext of the “Benjy” narrative was difficult to dredge up from the 
recesses of Faulkner’s text, the recovery of raced material in the narrative of his 
older brother Quentin seems a less laborious task.69  In fact, artefacts of 
blackness regularly float up to - and indeed force their way through - the 
“white” surface of Quentin’s consciousness. This section attends to these black 
(up)risings, and examines how Quentin mounts various attempts to block them 
or put them down. I begin by exploring a moment of violence through which 
vision and race are brought into immediate, and problematic congress: the 
blacking of Quentin Compson’s eye.
In an attempt to defend the honour of his sister - and by extension her 
claims to “whiteness” - from the “blackguards” that move in her orbit, Quentin 
- imagining a previous fracas with Dalton Ames - fights with Gerald Bland, a 
Kentuckian of aristocratic blood, and receives a punch to the face that sets his 
racial alarm bells ringing. Quentin relates the immediate effects of the blow to 
the ever attendant Shreve: “it was like I was looking at him [Bland] through a 
piece of colored glass”. (SF 1001) Not only does this blow recolour Quentin’s 
vision, recolouring those around him (those ‘”blackguards” are re-blackened) 
but it affects a swelling that traumatises his conception of race and, by 
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extension, his notion of self. Describing the feeling in his face as the blood flows 
into his bruise, Quentin states that the blood
kept on running for a long time, but my face felt cold and sort of dead, 
and my eye, and the cut place on my finger was smarting again. I could 
hear Shreve working the pump, then he came back with the basin and a 
round blob of twilight wobbling in it, with a yellow edge like a fading 
balloon, then my reflection. I tried to see my face in it. (SF 1003, italics 
added)
The blow fails to cause total blindness yet the impairment that issues from 
Quentin’s injury is substantial enough that he is unable to see - or more 
accurately, unable to recognise  - his “face” in the basin delivered by Shreve. 
Quentin’s search for a (white)face is problematised by the difficult external 
conditions under which the attempt to “see” proceeds; the “wobbling” surface 
of the water distorts the “reflection” and thereby destabilises Quentin’s efforts 
to achieve a reliable visual representation. Worse, Shreve decants (or “pumps”, 
a term to which we shall return) the water in the near dark of twilight. In 
addition to his looking through a bloody - soon to be “black” (1011) eye - 
Quentin attempts to fix his sight on a moving target in failing (twi)light. The 
punch, in P. Adams Sitney’s phrasing, “make[s] the crucial moment of vision 
problematic.”70  Ultimately, however, this moment of opacity is problematic 
because it infers a slippage across “the color-line”.71 A perceptual problem thus 
bleeds into a racial one. 
The first thing that Quentin notices about the “basin” is its terrifying 
cargo: there was, he trembles, “a round blob of twilight wobbling in it, with a 
yellow edge like a fading balloon”. The “round blob of twilight wobbling” - a 
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reference to the setting sun - carries implicit racial sediment.72  For Quentin, 
“twilight” (that which “wobbles”) registers as a moment of tonal ambiguity or 
“two-ness” in which the light of day mixes with the dark of night. As a 
transitional phase between day and night, “twilight” sets up an atmospheric 
miscegenation toward which Quentin’s remaining imagery (notably “fading 
balloon”) is drawn. “[T]wilight” intimates a problematic compound shade, an 
ominous “gray halflight where all stable things had become shadowy 
paradoxical”. (SF 1007) Quentin’s term “halflight”, which tacitly evokes 
“halfwhite”, creates the suitable gloominess within which the “stability” of 
racial absolutes undergoes dissolution, starts “wobbling”. Opening up an 
ambivalent zone - a “gray” area, perhaps - between “white” and “black”, 
“twilight” triggers a metaphoricity by which Faulkner, through Quentin, can 
racialise the setting of the sun. This quotidian event bears monumental 
significance for Quentin. Indeed, as he states, in an echo of his sister, it was as if 
“there was something in the light itself”. (1007, italics added.) 
The racial accent of “twilight” becomes more pronounced when read in 
relation to Quentin’s sighting of the “balloon”. Often attended by grotesque 
rubbery lips and a smooth, distended head, the racist epithet of the “balloon 
faced nigger” is a familiar trope in Faulkner’s mature prose.73  Through the 
rubber s(i)mile, Quentin likens the face and head of a black person to that of a 
balloon. Quentin’s metaphoric inflation pertains to anxieties consequent of 
racial mixing: whether he likes it or not, there is a black “wobbling” about in 
Shreve’s basin. Quentin’s response to the occupancy splits in two directions: 
grammatical and corporeal. First, Quentin attempts to displace the black 
balloon via the employment of a tricksy adverb: “then”. “Then” is not quite 
“them”, yet the demonstrative cadences of Quentin’s adverb sit close enough to 
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his tacitly racialised pronoun that “then” absorbs and offsets some of the 
iterative force of “them”. The significant part of Quentin’s phrase runs thus: “a 
fading balloon, then my reflection. I tried to see my face in it.” Ostensibly, 
Quentin’s adverb polices a simple grammatical handover in which one clause - 
“a fading ballon” - cedes ground so that another - “then my reflection” - may 
emerge. Quentin's is no innocent intervention, however. The adverb “then” 
arbitrates a separation between two grammatical clauses that Quentin wants 
made clearly distinct. Quentin inserts “then” between these two proximate 
clauses in the hope that his grammar might effect a semantic clear-out, 
preventing “balloon” and his “reflection” from merging. A grammatical 
intervention thus renders the black “them” and the white “I”/”eye” as distinct. 
Conveniently, for Quentin, the word “then” acts as a lexical hinge by which 
Quentin can figuratively swing clear from black inference (“balloon”) and 
locate safely in white (“my reflection”). It is imperative for Quentin that 
“balloon” and “my reflection” (continue to) connote two distinct lexical phases. 
Soliciting a grammatical injunction that strains to prevent mixing across the 
“color-line”, Quentin’s adverb carries considerable semantic weighting. Its 
deployment denotes a stubborn refusal to acknowledge the interrelationships 
between black and white, a relation that was deeply entrenched in the 
psychology of the South yet at the same time strenuously denied. Quentin’s 
“then” provides a formal grammar that is both appropriate to and informed by 
the social and legal logic of Southern racial codes in the aftermath of black 
Emancipation. His, in effect, is a syntax of segregation; an adverb labours to re-
inscribe racial borders that are, Quentin fears, “fading”. Transitioning from 
black to white with all deliberate speed, and pertaining to a successive rather 
than simultaneous grammar, “then” suggests that black was black until it was 
white. The segregationist intent of Quentin’s language cannot hold, however. 
Indeed, his “then”, proves counterintuitive, providing a “bridge” across which 
black and white enter into congress. The imposition of (adverbial) distance 
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between “fading balloon” and “my face” unwittingly facilitates what the 
semiotician Michael Riffaterre dubs a “semantic transfer”, the activation of 
which brings black and white into a dialogic relation.74 
The problematic intersection of black with white is not limited to 
Quentin’s grammatical urges. Having failed to keep blackness at bay via a 
segregationist syntax, Quentin changes tack. Driven partly by a desire to inspect 
the extent to which he has been “blackened” and partly to displace the blobby 
figure of the “balloon”, Quentin moves his face over the reflective surface of the 
basin. Coming into alignment with the “round blob of twilight”, Quentin’s face 
mingles with the “fading balloon”. The latent miscegenation of “twilight” thus 
intensifies as “face” eclipses “moon” (“blob of twilight”); Quentin’s “reflection” 
is mired in blackness. In his attempt to displace the “balloon” Quentin becomes 
part of it. This racial mixing, in which first (“I”) and third (“them”) form a 
compound, represents a colossal blow to Quentin’s sense of self-hood. The 
connection equates to what Orlando Patterson calls “social death”.75 
Occasioned by an anxious glimpse into the basin, this “social death” preempts a 
material death which is realised, later that night, as Quentin plummets into the 
Charles River. 
The sense of dread that flanks Quentin’s blackening is exacerbated by 
Shreve, who delivers a punch line immediately after Quentin’s attack. The line 
represents a knockout comic blow: “[d]amn it if you wont have a shiner 
tomorrow.” Shreve’s term “shiner” is racially astute. The O.E.D cites “shine” as 
“an abusive term for a black”, first used in 1908, two years before Quentin’s 
suicide. The term “shiner”, a reference to one who shines links Quentin’s eye to 
the professional “bootblack”. For Quentin, then, “shiner” carries an additional 
implication: that the “shine” or “lustre” of the well polished boot should be so 
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pronounced that one might be able to see one’s face in it. This, however, is 
precisely the problem: Quentin can make out his “reflection” but he is curiously 
unable to see his “face”. The re- or ef- facement harbours phenomenological 
inflections. In Totality and Infinity (1979) Emmanuel Levinas writes: 
[t]he presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a 
! presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which !looks 
! at us), and a command that commands commanding […] aroused by the 
! epiphany of the face inasmuch as it attests the presence of the third party, 
! the whole of humanity, in the eyes that look at me.76 
The “third party” to which Levinas refers connotes the collective “them” of the 
South, the absent yet “dictatorial” historical “other”: “them niggers” (SF 879) 
that racialise the whiteness of the Compsons. It is in the damaged “eye”/”I” 
that the terrifying presence of the other is made manifest. Worryingly, for 
Quentin, the black face - the “shiner” - will, by “tomorrow”, have fully 
“eclipsed” his own. As it proved for Benjy, the eye contact that brings Quentin 
face to face with his (rubbery) black other represents  an “incendiary moment” 
of mimetic connection in which a flash of danger imperils his entire being.77 
Quentin begrudgingly acknowledges the “connection” with a further visual 
simile that points once more to the “dictatorship of the they” that comes in a 
flash and governs Quentin’s racial consciousness: “[t]hey come into white 
people’s lives like that in sudden sharp black trickles that isolate white facts for 
an instant in unarguable truth like under a microscope”. (SF 1008)
The “sudden sharp” uprising of black blood, and by implication the 
mobilisation of black meaning, occasions what Theodor Adorno calls a 
“shudder of mimesis”;78 here Quentin’s “whole being is seized with dread”. His 
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”being”, to use Hegel’s terms, has “been quite unmanned, has trembled in 
every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its 
foundations.”79  “Gifted” to Quentin by an ever-willing Shreve, the basin is a 
crucible of race and it is a repository for the dialectic; it provides a meeting 
place for Quentin’s white self and his (rubbery) black other.80  The basin 
provides the means by which Quentin can quite literally reflect upon the 
blackness that provides ontological mooring for his precarious (“wobbling”) 
racial positioning within the social hierarchy of the post-bellum owning classes. 
Quentin is thus no different from many white southerners, who, in Hegel’s 
formulation, “derive their existence from, or have their essential being in, what 
is other than themselves”.81  It is in this connexion that we concur with 
Genovese in his assertion that “[t]he men who emerge from the one can be 
recognized with little difficulty as those who emerge from the other.”82
That Bland administers the punch is not an insignificant detail, and 
shores up the contention that the bruise connotes a miscegenation of vision. The 
verb “to bland” means “to mix, intermingle or blend.” (OED) Evidently, 
Quentin’s “blanding” is a catalyst for the rising of something black through 
something white and a subsequent racialized “blending”. By way of a violent 
act Quentin has been appointed the begrudging custodian of an implicit racial 
transfer. What Quentin nervously refers to as his “black eye” (SF 1011) activates 
a semantic insurgency in which a previously submerged blackness pushes 
through Quentin’s “blanded” “eye”/”I”. As Quentin peers into the bucket he 
reformulates the Hegelian dialectic: “a nigger”, he blurts, “is not so much a 
person as a form of behavior; a sort of obverse reflection of the white people he 
43
79 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, [1807] trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p.117.
80 For a discussion of gift giving see Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp.11-30.
81 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p.274.
82 Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll, p.96.
lives among.” (SF 942) As an “obverse” reflection, “a nigger” resonates, for 
Quentin, as the black “front” to a white “back”. Quentin’s “obverse” propagates 
a link between black and white, yet it simultaneously assumes their 
interdependence: only one side of the “coin”, as it were, can be seen at one time. 
For Quentin at least, white culture and black “behavior” face in opposite 
directions; they do not “mix, intermingle or blend”, nor do they look each other 
in the “eye”/”I”. The basin thus explodes the racialised distinctions that 
Quentin seeks to affirm. The incendiary moment of mimetic connection brings 
Quentin face to face not with his black surface - here a blanded eye - but his 
black inner. Levinas’ discussions on exteriority might help us discover how. 
“The surface”, as a metaphorical place for an emergent black can, Levinas 
writes, 
be transformed into an interior: one can melt the metal of things to 
! make new objects of them, utilize the wood of a box to make a table out 
! of it by chopping, sawing, planing: the hidden becomes open and the 
! open becomes hidden [….] It would seem that !between the different 
! surfaces there exists a more profound difference: that of the obverse 
! and the reverse. One surface is offered to the gaze, and one can turn 
! over the garment, as one remints a coin [….] The obverse would be the 
! essence of the thing whose servitudes are supported by the reverse, 
! where the threads are invisible.83 
Recast through Levinas, the metallic inferences of “obverse” monetize 
Quentin’s metaphor, linking the “face” of the (absent, yet intimate[d]) black to 
the economic forms which linger as the ontological heritage of post-bellum 
modes of production. Suggestively, Levinas‘ judgements provide a conceptual 
ontology that render dialectical Quentin’s notion of black as the “obverse 
reflection” of white. In this moment of “conflicted intimacy” Quentin’s 
whiteness, drowning in its own opacity, mingles with the blob that is the 
colonial other. Like the “metal of things” that can be smelted down to be 
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reformed - or reminted - Quentin’s notion of self is made fluid, essentially 
amorphous. Nihilated by a basin, his “eye”/“I” is miscegenated, mixing with 
and overwhelmed by the “eye”/”I” of the black that forms the essence and 
centre of his whiteness. Brought face to face with the colonial other, Quentin‘s 
whiteness is overwhelmed by the appearance of the (absent, fading) black, a 
presence without which Quentin’s whiteness could not obtain. White only on 
the outside, Quentin is a black in whiteface.
JASON COMPSON: BLACKING OUT 
The intersection of vision and race represents a particularly potent brew in the 
narrative of Jason Compson. Whereas sight and blackness, for the first two 
narrators, collude in a “flashing moment of mimetic connection”, the racing of 
vision, for Jason, is less abrupt, perhaps less spectacular, and part of an ongoing 
process of semantic accretion.84  The miscegenation of vision does not proceed 
via a decisive “eye-minded” narrative flashback, as it did for Benjy, nor via the 
sharp shock of a “blanding” fist, as it did for Quentin, but issues instead from 
the steady building of racially invested pressure. For Jason, this pressure builds 
behind the eyes, and finds physical expression in the form of blinding (rather 
than “blanding”) headaches. 
The frequency with which Jason suffers neural pain is a source of anxiety 
for the hypochondriac Caroline Compson. Her son, she claims, is afflicted by 
“these headaches too often”. (SF 1068) It is less the frequency of these attacks 
than their sheer velocity that stuns Jason, however. As he states at a moment of 
intensity: “I couldn’t think about anything except my head”. (1062) These 
headaches are a quotidian affair, shadowing Jason wherever he goes: “[i]t felt 
like somebody was inside with a hammer, beating on it” (1060). Jason’s 
workmanlike metaphor is appropriate, establishing a connotative appeal to 
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black labour. The invidious labour of this “hammer[ing]” imperils the smooth 
running of Jason’s mental faculties. Most immediately, it is his vision that is 
endangered. Indeed, the pain is of such intensity that often Jason “could not see 
very well” (1114). Suggestively, these headaches threaten to take Jason into 
blackout.85  The term “blackout” provides yet another instant within Faulkner’s 
novel in which race and vision clash and cross. 
Like the word “blackguard” did in the preceding section, the word 
“blackout” carries a distinct, if implicitly drawn, racial accent. And, like 
“blackguard”, “blackout” unlocks a rush of black blood that rises through the 
head or face of a Compson. The pain in Jason’s head, like the pain in Quentin’s 
eye, is consequent of the building and subsequent release of (black) blood. The 
implied connection between a paroxysm in the head and a racially inflected 
(absent) signifier, is perilous. Even less than in Quentin’s section does racial 
meaning dominate the centre ground. Consequently, any attempt to locate a 
central importance for raced meaning in this section is problematised by the 
lack of a referent. Unlike the term “blackguard”, then, which appears numerous 
times in Quentin’s narrative, the term “blackout” never appears in Jason’s text. 
I will argue here that this missing signifier connotes an instructive absence 
rather than an unyielding textual problem. Indeed the non-appearance of the 
term is entirely in keeping with the novel’s tendency to obviate potentially 
difficult semantic meaning. As Sundquist has observed, “Faulkner’s obsession 
with the unnameable, the inexpressible, is his own greatest hazard, and The 
Sound and the Fury is its most intricate expression.”86 Jason’s (black)guardedness 
with regard to enunciating this term is precisely to the point. Critics have noted 
that Jason uses words so that he does not have to say. As Polk observes, Jason’s 
words “don’t have to make sense as long as they make noise; what he cannot 
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bear is the silence in which his real topic might articulate itself”.87  Handily, for 
Jason, the noisome nature of his words drown out peripheral voices, allowing 
him to avoid speaking of the black. The “intensely, loudly, desperately, 
gloriously oral” nature of Jason’s narrative operates “so that he won’t have to 
listen to the voices that threaten him.”88  Jason remains tight lipped with regard 
to “blackout” because to speak this term would be to prize open the floodgates, 
to carve out a semantically generative space through which psychologically 
damaging racial current might subsequently flow. Such an admission would 
necessarily lead to further pains in Jason’s head. In Judith Butler’s formulation, 
Jason’s narration connotes “[t]he kind of speaking that takes place on the 
borders of the unsayable.”89  The term “blackout” is the “unsayable” term 
within Jason’s lexicon. It is unsayable, I will now suggest, because it connotes 
the loss of the labour upon which Jason and, by extension the South, materially 
depend. 
As was Quentin’s, Jason’s use of metaphor is racially aggregated. Jason 
reinvokes the rubbery visage of the balloon as a means of referring indirectly to 
the corporeality of his own head: “I kept thinking every time my head would go 
on and burst”. (SF 1063, italics added) The expulsive nature of Jason’s rubbery 
metaphor is instructive. By conflating his head with an excessively inflated 
“balloon”, Jason sets in train his metaphorical race-change. As it was for 
Quentin, the “balloon” looms large as a signifier of an elastic and distended 
corporeality. Given Jason’s inability to stop talking, it is richly ironic that he 
berates black labour for talking back: as he states with regard to his house 
servants, “them niggers” give “a little more lip and a little more lip” (1070) at 
the first opportunity. Jason’s racist stereotype proves pliable. Indeed, the 
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inferred rubbery status of the “slick-headed jellybea[n]” (1018) stretches beyond 
an immediate physicality. Even black speech, for Jason, is a little balloony: “I 
never found a nigger yet that didn’t have an airtight alibi for whatever he 
did” (1044, emphasis added). Jason’s equating of “black” and “balloon” is 
wretched, yet the metaphor is informative. The “balloon”, that which threatens 
to “explode” provides a means by which Jason racialises his own head. Vis-a-vis 
the rubber metaphor, Jason is blackened; his head “flashes” or “flares up” as a 
proxy “balloon”.
Jason’s employment of the “balloon” metaphor not only creates a link 
between his head and the head of the black but it provides the means through 
which Jason racialises the cotton market itself. The cotton market, he spouts, is 
constantly “on the point of blowing its head off” (1065, emphasis added). Jason 
commits to localised variations upon this central rubbery metaphor - one that 
nominates a bursting: “bang” (1057); “blow” (1051); “blowing […] blowing […] 
blowing” (1063); “burst” (1063); “explode”, (1058; 1062); “pump” (1063); “pump 
[…] pump” (1064).90  These inflations, or economic “balloonings”, terrify Jason. 
Yet what seems worse than the rupture is the silence with which the rupture 
might proceed: “[t]he whole dam top could blow off and we'd not know it” (1051, 
emphasis added). Excessively inflated, cotton stocks could conceivably “blow 
off”, occasioning a shock that, unknown, was no shock at all. 
When it comes to finance, another “Head” dominates the foreground of 
Jason’s consciousness: Herbert Head, the chief - or “head” - of the local bank 
and erstwhile suitor to the ostracised Caddy Compson. Proficient enough at 
arithmetic to have calculated that Caddy’s child, Quentin, could not possibly be 
his own, Herbert Head has since disappeared (perhaps like a “fading balloon”), 
leaving Quentin in the tyrannical stewardship of her uncle, Jason. Prior to the 
revelation of Quentin’s illegitimacy, and by implication, Caddy’s “blackness”, 
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Head had promised Jason a chance to work in his bank as a clerk; Jason, keen to 
point the finger of blame, holds Caddy culpable for ruining his chance of 
developing a remunerative career in finance. Jason holds Caddy’s “whiteness” 
as the security for his fledgling career as a money man. Caddy’s sexual doings, 
and her subsequent severance from the (white) community thus accrue 
economic significance for Jason. Unable to cash in on the promise to which 
Caddy’s sexual capital referred, Jason takes his money via another route: by 
siphoning and embezzling money that is intended for his niece. For Jason the 
money markets conjure a doubled sense of “heads”, then, not just through the 
racist epithet of the balloon-faced nigger but through the monetized symbol, 
Herbert Head.
The deflation of a rubber tire reinforces the relation between Jason’s 
pressurised “head”, the distended head of the black “balloon” and the tenuous 
state of the cotton “market” (1044). In hot pursuit of his sexually fluid niece, a 
“dam little slut” (1019) that, in her uncle’s term is “going on like a nigger 
wench” (1022), Jason drives toward Jefferson. A shuddering headache forces 
Jason to stop the car and momentarily quit his tracking of Quentin. As Jason’s 
attentions (re)turn to his head, Miss Quentin “slip[s] around” (1022) the back of 
Jason’s motor, loosening the valve of a tire, thus relieving its pressure. Cannily, 
Quentin also removes the pump to prevent its re-inflation. The audacity of the 
act leaves Jason seething, although not, of course, speechless. Of the sabotage 
Jason blathers: “[t]hey never even had guts enough to puncture it, to jab a hole 
in it. They just let the air out.” (1063) This letting out is enough to stall Jason; 
more, it is suggestive with regard to the metaphoricity that accrues around 
(black) heads. 
Driven toward thoughts of rubber, Jason’s attentions duly turn from a 
slack(ened) tire to the perceived laxity of his black house servants, who Jason 
blames for not equipping his car with a spare tire. Rubber and black labour 
converge. Standing idly to accuse others of physical inactivity, Jason puffs: “I 
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just stood there for a while, thinking about that kitchen full of niggers and not 
one of them had time to lift a tire onto the rack and screw up a couple of bolts. It 
was kind of funny because even she [Quentin] couldn’t have seen far enough 
ahead to take the pump out on purpose, unless she thought about it whilst she 
was letting out the air maybe.” (1063, italics added.) Jason’s racist aspersions as 
to the “slackness” of black labour confirm this “letting out” as a sort of “letting 
in”. As air passes through the valve of a deflating rubber tire, racial meaning 
passes into Jason’s consciousness. Succumbing to what Sartre refers to as “a 
sinking in”, the expulsion of air from Jason’s tire is analogous to the pressure 
within his own head, a pressure which he cannot seem to release.91  Yet the 
expulsion of air commands a broader sociality. Rubber, in short, gets Jason to 
thinking about race. More exactingly, the flat rubber tire connotes an analogous 
“letting out”: one that entails a leaking of black labour from the American 
South.
! Two linked words implicate Jason, and specifically his achingly raced 
head, into the broader sociality to which I refer. They are “migraine” and 
“migrate”. These homophonically proximate terms are semantically twinned, 
inasmuch as they both infer a leaking and a leaving, a trickling out and a 
moving away. With a first dictionary entry dated to 1899, (Jason is six) the term 
“migraine” refers to a “paroxysmal pain in the eye or temple”. By 1937, the 
term had come to stipulate “fierce migraine-like black-outs”. The very next 
dictionary entry is “migrate”, and is cited this way: “to pass from one place to 
another; to change one’s place of abode to another country, etc; to change 
habitat according to the season; to move (as parasites, as phagocytes, etc) to 
another part of the body.” If “head”, in its various semantic manifestations, is 
the primary source of Jason’s pain, and if his concern over this pain, articulated 
via a metaphor that is as “silent as rubber” (SF 980), links him to the stereotype 
of the black balloon face, then linkages between the circulation of blood (the 
50
91 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.88.
migraine) and the circulation of blacks (the migration) gain semantic traction. 
Despite his intractable laziness, a “black trait” in the eyes of the “white South”, 
Jason’s thinking on the question of labor is decisive, and clear-cut: “[w]hat this 
country needs”, he spouts, “is white labor. Let these dam trifling niggers starve 
for a couple of years, then they’d see what a soft thing they have.” (SF 1023) 
Jason’s desire to see the expulsion of black labour meshes with his perennial 
thinking on “heads”; subsequently he is linked to black work: “[a]nd then a 
Yankee will talk your head off about niggers getting ahead. Get them ahead, 
what I say. Get them so far ahead you can’t find one south of Louisville with a 
blood hound.” (SF 1054-5) The irony of Jason’s compulsive, incessantly noisy 
critique of abolitionist chatter is clear. Less clear, perhaps, is how Jason’s 
contortions and variations on the term “head” semanticize his outburst. By 
riffing on the term “head”, Jason compounds (or “hammers” home) his ongoing 
difficulty with “heads”, and, more, what “heads” might mean. If “head”, takes 
us to “migraine” or “blackout”; “ahead” is drawn to “migrate”, that is “black: 
out”. The unspeakable word “migraine” gives rise to a means by which Jason 
can invest his own head with historical meaning. The pain connotes more than 
“[j]ust a headache” (1059), however. Like Quentin’s eye, Jason Compson’s head 
is a crucible of race, a corporeal location that is attuned to economic and social 
imperatives. If the unspeakable term “blackout” is a key by which the reader 
can unlock hidden racial meaning, blacks, out! works the limits of Jason 
Compson’s distinctive brand of white supremacy. Fittingly, “migraine” routes 
us back into the concerns with which this chapter began: black migration from 
the South in the wake of black Emancipation. By getting out of the South, blacks 
intensify not only the headache that traumatises Jason Compson but the 
headache that traumatises the white South.
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CHAPTER TWO 
“I”, 
OR,
SPLITTING THE EYE IN AS I LAY DYING.
In my first chapter I explored a number of moments at which The Sound and the 
Fury proved unable to bear the terrible historical freight of the pronominal 
marker “them”. In this chapter I shift my focus to a different text, As I Lay Dying 
(1930) and to a different pronoun: “I”. My decision to move from the third to 
the first person is not arbitrary. The modification of pronominal emphasis 
advances the present study in two significant directions. Firstly, by 
interrogating the workings of the pronoun in the context of a second novel, we 
can begin to build a more comprehensive case for the pronoun as a semantically 
constitutive component within a broader textual economy. The Sound and the 
Fury is not, as this chapter will show, the only one of Faulkner’s novels to draw 
upon the pronoun as a source of textual capital. Secondly, the shift from “third” 
to “first” demonstrates the versatility of the pronoun or “shifter” as an agent of 
semantic value. That Faulkner exploits the workings of the pronoun across 
numerous texts is not to say that the specific class of pronoun remains the same 
from one novel to the next. As we shall see in this, and finally in a third chapter, 
the three novels that Faulkner produced between 1929 and 1931 are inclined or 
weighted toward a different pronominal reference. Faulkner provides each of 
these texts with a designated grammar, one that centres, in turn, on the 
proliferation of a dominant pronoun. In each case the selection of pronoun is 
wilful and it is imposed, I believe, so that Faulkner might meet specific, and 
specifically semantic ends. In short: Faulkner modifies his grammar because he 
seeks to modify his meaning. 
The first person singular nominative pronoun “I” is the “compacted 
doctrine” of As I Lay Dying.92  This pronoun functions as the primary 
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grammatical agent by which Faulkner’s fifth novel generates or - to return to a 
previous term - “com[es] into meaning”. Much valuable scholarship testifies to 
the opacities that subtend the Faulknerian “first person”, yet these opacities 
have occasioned significant critical strife. From Vickery to Volpe, some of 
Faulkner’s keenest readers have withered in the face of the complex 
epistemological economies that constitute the middle fictions.93  Given the 
historical dependencies that undercut the broader sociality of the postbellum 
South, the notion of a “self” autonomous from an “other” is problematic. 
Indeed, Stephen M. Ross goes as far as to suggest that the “I” is the “most 
problematical of all shifters” in Faulkner’s work.94 
As I Lay Dying constitutes Faulkner’s pre-eminently existential text. To 
state as much is to state nothing new. Indeed, the existential case has been made 
before, yet it has been made gropingly and without close attention to 
Faulknerian grammar. Daniel J. Singal is one reader to have advanced the 
existential credentials of Faulkner’s novel. As I Lay Dying, Singal submits, 
can be viewed as an existential drama akin to the most advanced works 
of Gide, Malraux, or Beckett - its plot a minimalist quest to preserve 
identity under the most trying conditions conceivable. The Bundrens, 
unsophisticated though they may be, are caught up in the typical 
twentieth-century dilemma of defining themselves in the midst of an 
indifferent cosmos, of fashioning a basis of being in the midst of 
nothingness.95 
As a means of mapping the broad phenomenological contours of Faulkner’s 
novel, Singal’s account is intuitive. As I Lay Dying certainly invokes the tragi-
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comic inflections of Beckett, for example, dealing as it does with the cruel and 
bizarre category of the “I”, a fraught frame of reference which survives despite 
attempts to die. When it comes to specifying the “conditions” under which the 
“I” travails, however, Singal’s account proves insufficient, succumbing to a set 
of rather loose generalities (“typical”; “most trying conditions”) that add little 
to the critical pile. In lieu of the coming discussions, I seek to sharpen up one  or 
two of Singal’s woolly terms. For “indifferent cosmos” I propose “industrial 
modernity”; for “trying conditions”, I would offer “reification and alienation”. 
To adjust Singal’s terminology is not to denude Faulkner’s text of its existential 
inflections; it is, as I seek to show, to intensify them. In As I Lay Dying, the 
“dilemma” of existence, while indeed tied to notions of the self, traverses social 
fault lines. The fragmentation and alienation of the “I” is an outgrowth of and 
response to what Matthews dubs the “lurch toward modernity”.96  As a means 
toward this end, I engage, first, with how the problematic “I” manifests at the 
level of Faulkner’s text. 
The “I” that Faulkner embeds in the title of his novel ostensibly refers to 
Addie Bundren. Wife to Anse (a likely truncation of “Anselm”) and mother to 
five children, Addie is the subject of and, latterly, the object toward which much 
of the discussion on being and existence gravitates.97  It might reasonably be 
assumed that Addie Bundren, first, as a dying mother and wife and, later, as a 
cargo or “thing” transported to burial, functions as the ontological degree zero 
of Faulkner’s novel. Addie’s death (or more exactingly, her dying) provides the 
standard against which the “being” of the living can be judged. There are two 
reasons, however, why we should cast Addie aside, at least presently, as the 
cardinal exponent for the problematic “I”. The first concerns chronology. Addie 
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spends relatively little time as an “I”; for the majority of the novel she is not an 
“I” at all but a was, a “not-I”. Addie “dies” - and thus relinquishes her “I-ness” 
on page 32 of Faulkner’s text. Addie’s early death thus bars her from 
discussions of “being”. Dying, to draw from a Sartrean lexicon, has “nihilated” 
Addie’s “for itself”. Evidently, it is not Addie but those who remain that have to 
deal with the crushing weight of the “I”. A second reason issues from the first 
and concerns the infrequency of Addie’s narration. Throughout the novel, 
Addie “speaks” but once, and does so after her death, in a post “I” incarnation: 
as a was. Only one of As I Lay Dying’s fifteen narrators satisfies both of the 
criteria to which Addie falls shy: Darl Burdren. Darl is not only the novel’s most 
vital narrator, inasmuch as he tackles the thorny notion of being with the most 
gusto, but he is its most frequent one, representing the most familiar textual 
“I”/”eye”. Narrating nineteen of the fifty nine “chapters” - almost a third - 
Darl’s allocation is almost double that of the second most prolific textual voice, 
Vardaman, who narrates on ten occasions.98  It is to Darl, then, as the novel’s 
most astute and most practiced “I”, that our attentions duly turn.
DARL: BECOMING THIRD
The notion of an “I” poses significant problems for Darl Bundren. In distinction 
to many of his peers, who have neither the time nor the inclination for extended 
philosophising, Darl displays an acute sensitivity to questions of self and being. 
The ontological exercises to which Darl commits imperil what is an already 
shaky (self-)consciousness. Indeed, Darl holds the dubious distinction of having 
“the most precarious identity” of all the Bundrens.99  What Singal dubs 
“precarious”, Sartre terms “fragile”. The word “fragile”, as understood by 
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Sartre, provides a key by which Darl’s “I” might be unlocked. Sartre postulates 
that “[a] being is fragile if it carries in its being a definite possibility of non-
being.”100  Aside from Addie, for whom “negations” are a constant fixture of 
being, Darl is the only “I” in As I Lay Dying that “carries”, and is thus haunted 
by, this grave load of “non-being.” Put differently, he is the only narrator who 
consciously debates the notion of his consciousness (as fragile, as a carrier of 
non-being). The following passage, taken from early in the novel, demarcates 
Darl’s - and by association, the novel’s - fullest engagement with the 
problematic “I”. In it, Darl attempts to control, and subsequently understand, 
the vicissitudes of an especially slippery phenomenology: 
In a strange room you must empty yourself for sleep. And before you are 
emptied for sleep, what are you. And when you are emptied for sleep, 
you are not. And when you are filled with sleep, you never were. I don’t 
know what I am. I don’t know if I am or not. Jewel knows he is, because 
he does not know that he does not know whether he is or not. He cannot 
empty himself for sleep because he is not what he is and he is what he is 
not. Beyond the unlamped wall I can hear the rain shaping the wagon 
that is ours, the load that is no longer theirs that felled and sawed it nor 
yet theirs that bought it and which is not ours either, lie on our wagon 
though it does, since only the wind and the rain shape it only to Jewel 
and me, that are not asleep. And since sleep is is-not and rain and wind 
are was, it is not. Yet the wagon is, because when the wagon is was, Addie 
Bundren will not be. And Jewel is, so Addie Bundren must be. And then I 
must be, or I could not empty myself for sleep in a strange room. And so 
if I am not emptied yet, I am is. 
How often have I lain beneath rain on a strange roof, thinking of 
home.  ! ! ! !     
  (AILD 52, italics in original.)
In this dazzling, if beguiling eschatological set piece, the first person pronoun 
“I” acts as a sounding board for the amplification of intently existential 
reverberations. Situated on the edge of sleep and occasioned by the imminent 
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death of his (m)other, Darl gets to thinking through the nature of his being: of 
what it is to be is. Despite the intensity of this “ontological inquiry” - or perhaps 
because of it - Darl struggles, in Heidegger’s phrasing, “to clarify the special 
problem of “I”-hood”.101  Passing through and subsequently passing beyond 
what Maurice Natanson dubs “[i]ntimately related stages of ontological 
metamorphosis”, Darl’s contorted syntax traces a circuitous route toward an 
evaluation of the self.102  Beginning and ending with a survey of his own “I-
hood”, the passage elicits from Darl a commentary on four linked ises: first, Darl 
ponders his is; second, he considers the is of Vardaman; third, the is of the 
wagon; fourth, the is of his (now dead) mother; finally, Darl sets to theorise how 
these myriad ises reflect on his own “I”.
The first phase of Darl’s “inquiry” splits along two lines. First, Darl 
ponders the what of his “I”; he attempts, that is, to get to grips with the 
phenomenological substance that constitutes his being. Unsurprisingly, the 
“what-ness” of the “I” proves elusive. Like the “wall” that stands between him 
and the world, Darl’s sense of self is “unlamped”, murky, and thereby difficult 
to discern. Lacking the “luminous detail”103  of an operative epistemology, Darl 
states, “I don’t know what I am.” Darl’s “I don’t know” is instructive; moreover, 
it is existentially derived. Sartre suggests that this kind of not knowing affirms 
ones situatedness as a “non-thetic” subject. Upon Darl’s gloomy being Sartre 
sheds some light: the “non-thetic consciousness” he writes “is not to know”.104 
Yet Darl’s situatedness as a “non-thetic” subject is improbably thetic. That is to 
say that his “I don’t know” involves its own kind of knowing. As Sartre points 
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out, “emptiness is emptiness of something”.105  If Darl knows nothing else, he 
knows this much: that he does not know what he is. The effects of this “flagrant 
contradiction” will achieve sharper focus when we explore the “not knowing” 
that clings to Darl’s half brother, Jewel, in a moment.106 
Secondly, and perhaps more pressingly, Darl probes the if of his “I”; he 
queries, that is, his position as an “I” within the phenomenal world: “I don’t 
know if I am or not.” Darl, then, not only questions the condition - the what - of 
his being but he disputes his basic position as a viable empirical subject. As Darl 
questions the facticity of his “I” - its concrete detail - he contests the Cartesian 
metaphysics of the self; the relation, that is, between the notion of an “am” and 
its “I”. That Darl’s “I” is alienated from his “am” does not mean that he loses 
his I-ness. Following Hegel, Darl’s “I” should be read “not as Nothing, but as a 
determinate Nothing”.107  As Hegel stresses, the “tarrying with the negative is 
the magical power that converts it into being.”108
Together, Darl’s “what” and his “if” raise what Robert Hemenway calls 
“insoluble epistemological questions” to which Darl seems unable to decisively 
respond.109  The ambivalence with which Darl greets the facticity of his own “I” 
is less significant that the fact that he disputes it in the first place. Again, Sartre 
proves useful in this connexion: “[f]or man to be able to question” Sartre writes, 
“he must be capable of being his own nothingness; that is, he can be at the 
origin of non-being in being only if his being - in himself and by himself - is 
paralyzed with nothingness.”110 In spite of the chronic opacities that issue from 
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this ontological blackout, Darl proves able, by the end of his reverie to state “I 
am is” and by so doing, figure a more concrete sense of being. The transition 
from ambivalence (“I don’t know what I am”) through indeterminacy (“I don’t 
know if I am or not”) and into positive assertion (“I am is”) hauls the reader 
across some treacherous philosophical terrain, the negotiation of which 
involves careful explication. 
Heidegger provides a fitting means of scrutinising in more detail the 
workings of Darl’s loquacious yet simultaneously absent “I”. “The word ‘I’”, 
Heidegger writes, 
is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator, 
indicating something which may perhaps reveal itself as its ‘opposite’ in 
some particular phenomenal context of being. In that case, the ‘not-I’ is 
by no means tantamount to an entity which essentially lacks ‘I-
hood’ [“Ichheit”], but is rather a definite kind of Being which the ‘I’ itself 
possesses, such as having lost itself.111 
For Heidegger, as it seems for Darl, the “not-I” (a position that Darl confirms 
with his phrasing “I don’t know if I am or not”) does not preclude the presence 
of “I-hood”. It does, however, interfere with it. Darl can “be” and simultaneously 
be “not-I”, yet the close proximity of “don’t know what” and “don’t know 
if” (the two constitutive phases that push Darl toward an unlikely “is”) provide 
this ontological inquiry with dialectical coloration. If the “what I am” works to 
unsettle the notion of being, the “if I am” stamps the imprimatur of “not-being” 
onto Darl’s elaborately and negatively charged “is”. 
In effect, Darl’s “am not I” opens up a weird space within which 
epistemological, ontological and corporeal uncertainties clash and cross. Under 
Darl’s jurisdiction, the “I” is an imperilled category of reference, a marker of a 
“fragile” phenomenology. Despite these difficulties, one thing is certain: 
Faulkner’s use of the “I”, in the curious case of Darl Bundren, is far from stable. 
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Darl’s aloof, volatile, and capricious signifier connotes a shifting personhood, 
an “I-hood” subject to negation and modification. Expressed simply, Darl’s “I” 
holds to no firm position as regards either to his dasein (his “essential inner”) or 
to his ichheit or “I-hood” (that which brings the dasein into focus). The 
fluctuations that attend Darl’s “I” thus render his personhood “non-committal” 
in the sense demarcated by Heidegger. 
Darl might not know the what - or even the if - of his “I” but he appears, 
somehow, to know the ontological constitution of his half (br)other Jewel. To 
this he can commit. For Darl, Jewel is. More, Jewel “knows that he is”. 
Paradoxically - and thus entirely in keeping with the “dialectical flip-flops”of 
the passage - Jewel’s “knowing” emerges from an abundance of not knowing.112 
Jewel must be, Darl figures, because he “knows that he does not know that he 
does not know whether he is or not.” This extended - and immensely 
frustrating - chain of negative clauses constitutes more than syntagmatic 
horseplay. Its value lies in its status as a site of contradiction. Compacted 
though it is, some elements of Darl’s conceivably Rumsfeldian syntax are 
discernible.113 First, the seemingly absurd claim that “knowledge” can function 
outside of or perhaps even in spite of itself offers a toe-hold if not a leg-up to 
semantic meaning. Jewel can know that he doesn’t know that he knows (that he 
is). Carole Haynes-Curtis points out that “[t]here is for Sartre a sense in which I 
can know without knowing that I know”.114  To wit: “knowing” can issue from, 
or better yet can survive as a constituent (yet submerged and conceivably 
unconscious) part of not knowing that one knows. To know something, then, 
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for Sartre at least, does not demand that one must know that one knows. We 
might or might not agree with Sartre’s proposition: we are free to choose either 
way, yet we must remind ourselves that while Darl’s utterance extracts 
“knowing” from “not knowing”, it does not assume that Jewel knows by not 
knowing that he knows but by not knowing that he does not know (whether he is 
or not). While this point might seem, to some, to constitute no more than 
semantic nit-picking, the difference is crucial to current concerns. Jewel’s 
“knowing” emanates not from his ignorance of his knowing, as the Sartrean 
mode sets out, but from an ignorance of an ignorance (of that knowing). Jewel 
therefore comes into knowledge because of an ignorance of an ignorance. 
Again, though, we run aground: to be ignorant of one’s ignorance is clearly not 
the same as to know. A tribesman in the Putumayo may be ignorant of his 
ignorance of I.T. networks in industrial societies but this does not amount to his 
knowledge of I.T. networks in industrial societies. Unlike grammatical “double 
negatives”, through, which positive meaning emerges, these two embattled 
epistemological clauses do not cancel other out. In fact, they add to each other’s 
intensity. How, then, might we solve the impasse, if it is at all solvable? Darl’s 
final clause, “whether he is or not,” resolves - by scrambling one more time - the 
epistemological framing within which he can locate Jewel’s knowable, yet 
implacable “I”. To the very end of this pronouncement Darl is constantly 
revising the terms by which he communicates what should otherwise be a 
rather simple fact: that Jewel knows that he is. Darl’s “whether he is or not” 
propounds the not knowing, turning a double revision into a triple one. Darl 
not only effaces Jewel’s not knowing once but twice. Having casually affirmed 
Jewel’s “being-in-itself” (which, more properly speaking, is a “being for Darl”), 
as an “original nihilation”, Darl gloriously proceeds toward what Sartre calls 
“the intuitive apprehension of a double nihilation”.115  In summation, Jewel’s 
“knowing”, issues from three linked moments of opacity. Thus impacted, Darl’s 
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semantic densities prove insoluble. Inconceivably, the “inner 
contradiction” (that knowing is not knowing) contradicts its own contradiction. 
According to Sartre, there are three dimensions - or ekstases - to 
“nihilation”: first, not to be what one is; second, to be what one is not; and third, 
to be what one is not and simultaneously not be what one is.116 Jewel, under 
Darl’s auspices, fits neatly into this third branch of ekstasis: he “is not what he is 
and he is what he is not”, Darl reports. Negations such as these are not entirely 
unfamiliar to Jewel. Addie, we note, sought “to negative Jewel” (AILD 119), the 
product of an adulterous yet liberating relation with Reverend Whitfield. The 
attempted negation of Jewel manifests in an act of reproduction, specifically, in 
Addie’s giving birth to Dewey Dell who, in turn, is motivated by her desire to 
abort - or “nihilate” - her own illegitimate conception. Given Addie’s act of 
“negation”, in which Jewel’s “isness” is affirmed and at the same time 
destroyed by the “is-ness” of his sister, it is fitting that Darl evaluates Jewel’s 
consciousness along similar lines. Jewel is the negated or “nihilated” subject 
both at the filial and at the epistemological level. Nevertheless, and however it is 
formulated, Jewel’s ichheit is that which brings Darl’s own “I” into being. Darl is 
because Jewel is. In Elza Adamowicz’s terms, Darl’s “search for the self - who 
am I? - is constantly displaced by the search for the other - whom do I 
haunt?”117  Part of a commentary on “masking” as it informs Surrealist praxis, a 
mode to which we shall turn below, Adamowicz’s supposition pertains in 
suggestive ways to the ontological somersaults to which Darl commits: “the self 
as a stable and coherent unity is replaced”, she writes, “by the notion of a 
fluctuating identity, where the personal (‘qui suis-je’) is traversed and 
constructed by transpersonal factors (‘qui je “haute’)”.118 
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The above discussions attempt to tease out some of the ontological 
threads that run through, thus problematising the “I” of Darl Bundren, As I Lay 
Dying’s most prominent textual presence. These threads often tangle, 
frustrating the reader’s attempts to draw meaning from the text. In this 
connexion Hemenway is right to assert that “Darl Bundren’s reverie is one of 
the most difficult passages in all the Faulkner canon, and is probably the most 
difficult single paragraph in As I Lay Dying.”119  The knotty problem of an “I” is 
not limited to philosophical inquiry, however. Indeed, such epistemological 
peristalses problematise the structural aspect of Faulkner’s text. 
The existential uncertainty that attends Darl’s sense of self is aggravated 
by the frequency with which he is required to offer narration. Given the 
excessive demands that Faulkner places on Darl as a textual “I”/“eye” it is 
perhaps unsurprising that his sense of self deteriorates as the novel develops. In 
fact, by the end of the novel Darl’s sense of selfhood has entirely corroded. 
Referring to himself in the third person, Darl displays his total alienation from 
the “I”. He narrates: “Darl has gone to Jackson. They put him on the train, 
laughing, down the long car laughing, the heads turning like the heads of owls 
when he passed.” (AILD 172) Darl has become “third”. What better way than 
this to expunge the traces of a problematic “I”? Darl’s transition from “first” to 
“third” is symptomatic of a text that can only expect to come to grief as it 
attempts to deal with it own narrative “I”.
THE AESTHETICS OF “I-HOOD”: SERIALITY AND SURREALITY
Whereas The Sound and the Fury splits the narrative “I” into four discreet (sub)
sections, As I Lay Dying apportions the narrative labours fifteen different ways. 
This “radical segmentation of perceptions,” in the idiom of Arthur Kinney, is 
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the novel’s most striking textual feature.120 Faulkner’s insistent displacement of 
the narrative “I”/“eye” generates an abundant narrative community that 
dwarfs The Sound and the Fury’s relatively compact narrative constituency. This 
eminently “dialogic” text is, following Bakhtin, “populated - overpopulated - 
with the intentions of others”.121  That As I Lay Dying sustains an eminently 
“polyphonic” load has become a standard judgement within Faulkner 
scholarship.122  Ross’s work on narrative voice in Faulkner, for instance, 
copiously exemplifies the “paralinguistic context” within which As I Lay Dying 
is located. This “context”, Ross maintains, allows one textual voice to become 
saturated with the inflections of another.123 The point is germane to the present 
inquiry, yet what concerns me here is less the density of As I Lay Dying’s 
narrative community - its numerical supremacy per se - than the organisational 
principles by which these narratives are arranged.
In The Sound and the Fury each narrative section follows consecutively: 
Benjy, the novel’s first narrator (its first “first person”, or “I”) passes the 
figurative baton to Quentin (its second “first person”), who hands over to Jason 
(its third) who, begrudgingly - and as such, entirely in character - yields to a 
fourth (the novel’s first “third person”). The novel’s first three “chapters” begin, 
mature, and reach their respective termini before the next “chapter” 
commences. Having completed his narrative in its entirety, each brother 
recedes, exhausted, into the textual background, where he resides for the 
remainder of the novel. As I Lay Dying maintains an entirely different textual 
etiquette. Its narrators refuse, or prove otherwise unable, to wait for one 
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narrative phase - say the story of Darl - to reach “completion” before 
embarking upon the next. In contrast to the four consecutive, protracted textual 
sessions of The Sound and the Fury, As I Lay Dying provides fifty-nine episodic 
narrations that intersect, drop off and - in the majority of cases - rejoin the 
narrative “queue” at a later stage. Seven of the fifteen narrators report only once 
and therefore do not rejoin the “queue”, yet even these most marginal narrators, 
shoved off to the text’s periphery, constitute a formative part of what Jameson 
refers to as the “serial situation”.124 The concept of the “queue” is existentially 
weighted; more, its treatment allows us to consolidate our claims that 
Faulkner’s text problematises, via the first person pronoun, the conception of 
the self. 
The broad organisational logic of As I Lay Dying accords to the Sartrean 
notion of the series. In the first volume of Critique of Dialectical Reason Sartre 
proposes that the serial situation arises when a collective population are 
passively drawn together by an event, a phenomena or experience within the 
social life of a given community.125  Sartre’s most famous “everyday example”126 
comes as he describes those that wait for a bus.127  Each member of the queue 
has a “common interest” - here, catching the bus - yet this commonality is an 
anti-social one: each waits in sequence without integrating with - or even 
viewing themselves as part of - the collective gathering. In short, “[t]he bus they 
wait for unites them” but it does not allow for their integration.128  Sartre’s 
conception of the “queue” proves instructive as a means by which we might 
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begin to theorise the fractured, contested and competing impulses that 
constitute Faulkner’s serially alienated novel. 
The “formula of the series”, Sartre writes, “is a dynamic scheme which 
determines each through all and all through each”.129  For Sartre, those that 
constitute the queue are bound by a single event, be it waiting for a bus or one’s 
parole, listening to the shipping forecast, waiting to bury one’s mother. At the 
same time, however, those who constitute the queue maintain a relational 
interdependence. On the queue Sartre notes: “we are concerned here with a 
plurality of isolations: these people do not care about or speak to each other 
and, in general, they do not look at one another; they exist side by side alongside 
a bus stop.”130  Sartre’s “a plurality of isolations” provides astute commentary 
on the formal syntax of As I Lay Dying. With the possible exception of 
Vardaman and Darl, who share an intimate narrative relationship, Faulkner 
permits scant interaction between members of the textual queue; figuratively 
speaking, these queueing “Is” turn their backs on the “Is” that surround them. 
Rarely in As I Lay Dying does one textual “I” provoke a response in the next.131 
Autonomy-within-the-series is the novel’s idée fixe. On arriving at the front of 
the textual queue, each narrator, eschewing both the diversity and the sociality 
of those with whom he queues, articulates (a portion of) what needs to be 
articulated and then rejoins the back of the queue. This perpetually shifting 
narrative positioning gives As I Lay Dying its central, agitated rhythm. 
Faulkner’s novel constantly evolves, or better yet revolves, creating new and 
surprising formal juxtapositions. As Jameson notes, the “Sartrean system” is 
“not a form fixed once and for all, but a process of rotating or revolving thirds, 
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in which everyone in turn serves as the unifier of the other members.”132  It is in 
the “serial situation” that the reciprocal relation between “first” and “third” 
comes into relief.133  Ironically, however, the pronouncedness of the first person 
(here a first person to the power of fifteen) dislocates, thus undermining, the 
autonomy of the “I”. The novel is thus democratic at the same time as it is 
private, a means of unification yet simultaneously the cause for separation. In 
the queue “everyone is equally a member, or a third” yet the overabundance of 
individuals means that the individual loses his or her sense of self.134 
Interchangeability, agitation, and substitution are the watchwords of the serial 
situation. 
FROM SERIALITY TO SURREALITY: FAULKNER’S EXQUISITE CORPSE
The organisational principles of As I Lay Dying are not only serialistically but 
surrealistically inflected. Specifically, the compositional principles that underpin 
Faulkner’s novel, principles that serialise the alienation of the “I”, find a 
structural analogue in the Bretonian practice known as the cadaver exquis, or 
exquisite corpse (fig. 1). I shall explore the problematic materiality of the corpse 
itself in the next section. First, I want to attend to how the cadaver exquis informs 
the aesthetics of Faulkner’s text. Initiated in Paris by Andre Breton in 1924 - the 
year before Faulkner’s first French sojourn - the cadaver exquis, in its first 
incarnation, connoted a language game that issued from the juxtaposition of 
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seemingly incongruous lexical clauses.135  The conjunction of incompatibles 
allows for chance encounters (meeting on the bus, sharing a cell, tuning into a 
radio broadcast) to reconfigure the text, to play with readerly positions and, 
ultimately, to challenge the notion of the “I”. Breton described the genesis of 
this corpsing in the following terms:
When the conversation—on the day's events or proposals of amusing or 
scandalous intervention in the life of the times—began to pall, we would 
turn to games; written games at first, contrived so that elements of 
language attacked each other in the most paradoxical manner possible, and so 
that human communication, misled from the start, was thrown into the 
mood most amenable to adventure. From then on no unfavorable 
prejudice (in fact, quite the contrary) was shown against childhood 
games, for which we were rediscovering the old enthusiasm, although 
considerably amplified. Thus, when later we came to give an account of 
what had sometimes seemed upsetting to us about our encounters in this 
domain, we had no difficulty in agreeing that the Exquisite Corpse 
method did not visibly differ from that of 'consequences'. Surely nothing 
was easier than to transpose this method to drawing, by using the same 
system of folding and concealing.136
Only later would the cadavre exquis become a visual game in which 
dismembered body parts would come into congress, attacking each other. It was 
in this later variant that the head of a woman might, for example, find itself 
atop of the body of a duck. Breton’s “system of folding and concealing” finds a 
structural analogue in As I Lay Dying, a novel that embraces the repeated 
narrative folding that was central to the forms and syntax of French avant-
gardes. In As I Lay Dying one narrator “folds” under (or folds to) the narrative 
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authority of the next narrator.137  Essentially episodic in character, Faulkner’s 
text implements “[r]adical editing as a means of subverting established 
narratives”.138  Faulkner’s narrative system is thus analogous to the “written 
games” forwarded by Breton in 1924.  
                   
                         Figure 1, “Revelation Cruelle” (circa 1924).
Breton’s juxtapositions connote a “semantic overturn” which reinvigorates the 
literary text: old meanings are cut away from their original contexts and 
reorganised so that new meanings may emerge. Faulkner’s formalism is not 
dissimilar to the cutting and splicing that is a central tenet of the aestheticism of 
the cadavre exquis. As Faulkner’s collage novel, As I Lay Dying is the work in 
which the “I” is broken up most fully. Indeed, “[t]he systematic estrangement 
69
137  The verb “to fold” is suggestive in a third sense, meaning “to file for bankruptcy”. That so 
many businesses were folding at the time might have given extra incentive to Faulkner in 
making a novel by committing to so many “folds”.
138 Adamowicz, Surrealist Collage, p.99.
and coupling of disparate elements in collage” is perhaps the key mode of 
alienation by which Faulkner’s novel plays with readerly positions. At the level 
of the work as a whole, Faulkner enacts the logic of the corpse, yet the corpse is 
not just structurally mediated. In fact, the forms and syntax of the cadavre exquis 
wriggle into the individual component-parts of Faulkner’s aesthetic design. In 
the coming section I seek to explore a number of these designs and trace how 
the processes of modernist making informs the notion of an “I”. 
! The most prominent example of the vexed alignment of aesthetic and 
material forms emerges as a surrealistically inflected list supplied by Cash, 
denoting the structural principles of coffin construction. Evoking in 
concentrated form the narrative segmentation that governs the novel as a 
whole, Cash’s list looks like this:
(AILD 53)
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Determined to keep the textual “seams and joints” square and true, Faulkner 
affixes a pre-numerical “cramp” to its top left hand corner:
                                                
     
  
Staunchly vertical, Cash’s oversized pronominal marker intersects with a 
pronouncedly horizontal assertion of making. This (con)junction secures - 
bracing like a “crosstie” - the numerical portion of his text, preventing it from 
slipping, or becoming slant: it “makes a neater job.” Duly cramped or “gripp
[ed]” by a prominent marker of selfhood, the (aesthetic) construction can begin. 
Fittingly, Cash’s thirteen point list, in turn, “cramps up” as a result of a tension 
between aesthetic and material imperatives. The episode reaches forward, 
evoking the manifestoes of aesthetic modernity, yet it simultaneously reaches 
backwards, toward a past of use value and unified labour practices that are 
fundamentally incompatible with the ideological underpinnings of industrial 
modernity. The tension between going forward and going back is a generative 
one throughout Faulkner. As Matthews writes “it’s precisely in the friction 
between a backward social order and a progressive aesthetics that Faulkner gets 
imaginative traction on the world that has produced him”.139  Clearly, the 
dynamism of form and the recalcitrance of a bevel also “grips” Cash, who 
seems trapped between tradition and modernity. The time-consuming addition 
of a bevelled edge to his mother’s coffin exemplifies a form of making that is 
entirely incommensurate with the acceleration, standardisation and 
massification that would rip through production in the teens and twenties.140  A 
bespoke edge is therefore politically resonant, providing the “gripping surface” 
upon which an act of resistance to the encroachment of technological modernity 
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can gain traction. Given the holistic approach that Cash brings to his carpentry, 
the rationalised formalism of the exchange is jarring. Caught between modern 
and premodern impulses, this surrealistically formatted, artisano-futurist tract 
invokes, in Susan Sontag’s term, “an aesthetics which yearns to be a politics.”141
!  Only three pages later Cash’s coffin is shorn of its tactility. In place of 
labour comes an icon:
!     (AILD 56)
Cruelly, given Cash’s painstaking creation of “joint and seam” (AILD 53), his 
addition of a “bevelled” edge and the integration of side slats with end pieces, 
Vardaman’s representational practice reduces Addie’s coffin to a flat, two-
dimensional state. The “iconicity” of “ ” dematerialises, figuratively 
burying Cash’s labour, rendering opaque that which is produced from the 
(preindustrial) processes of its production. Stripped of its self consciously 
“worked” dimensions, Cash’s labour has been reduced to an entirely 
symmetrical, geometric design. “ ”, is the shape of Cash’s labour. 
! Tull’s iconic abstraction not only drains Cash’s coffin of its labour but it 
strips it of its use values. The depthlessness of this icon, now a prism rather 
than a box, precludes the job for which it was initially conceived. The 
depthlessness of Tull’s icon multiplies the deathly connotations that “coffin” 
initialises. Within this iconic space one can only stifle. The dematerialisation 
reaches a third stage as the coffin icon, a stifling repository for Addie’s I-ness, 
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dematerialises further. Morphing into a blank textual space that Addie equates 
to the dimensions of her vagina, “ ” loses all of its dimensionality:
! (AILD 117)
 
The vacant space that Faulkner uses to refer to Addie’s (now ruinous) virginity - 
demands that we attend to what Wolfgang Iser dubs “the aesthetic relevance of 
the blank”.142  In literary discourse, blanks, Iser suggests, “are nothing in 
themselves, and yet as a “nothing” they are a vital propellant for initiating 
communication.”143 Addie’s, “         “, like Darl’s “I”, is a “determinate nothing”, 
a blank which tacitly admits Addie’s inability to come to terms with her not-I. 
Wrecked by the phallic intrusions of Anse, Addie’s vagina - referred to and thus 
aestheticised by a blank space in a text - is a negatively semanticized, yet 
copiously referential region within which the impossibility of Addie’s “I” comes 
into relief. Like her son, Darl, Addie is a “nihilated” subject, nihilated in this 
extract by a textual space which refers to what she later dubs “the process of 
becoming unalone”. Exploiting what Hugh Kenner refers to as the “principle of 
omission”144  Addie’s  blank “work[s] against our normal expectations of 
dialogue in so far as the focal point is not what is said, but what is unsaid.”145 
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Faulkner’s gapping thus enacts a process of “semantic indirection” in which 
“textual space serves as a principal of organization for making signs out of 
linguistic items that may not be meaningful otherwise”.146 
! As a negatively charged absence Addie’s “lack” accrues metaphoricity in 
the sense set out by Ricoeur.147 The blank is a “work in miniature”, a significant 
dematerialisation that is suggestive of wider erosions. The coming pages seek to 
map out a set of “lacks” or empty locations inside of the Bundrens that remain. 
AS I DIE BUYING: FAULKNER’S COMMODITY AESTHETICS 
The first two sections of this chapter examine the existential and the aesthetic 
credentials of the Faulknerian first person as it manifests in As I Lay Dying. In 
the coming pages I place the fractured “I” within a concrete social context. The 
existential and aesthetic opacities that subtend As I Lay Dying are historically 
derived. The alienations that subtend the “I” - be it the problematic “I” of Darl, 
the impossible “I” of Addie, or the fragmented “I” of the text itself - are 
consequences of a wider set of social alienations that are particular to 
Faulkner’s South. 
! In the Introduction to the Modern Library edition of Sanctuary, 
published in 1932, Faulkner would make telling reference not to his most 
recent, and most notorious novel, but to one that had appeared in the Autumn 
of the previous year: As I Lay Dying.148  The introduction provided a fictitious 
framing within which Faulkner could situate the genesis of his fifth prose 
production. Faulkner remembers it this way:
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That was the summer of 1929. I got a job in the power plant, on the night 
shift, from 6 P.M. to 6 A.M., as a coal passer. I shovelled coal from the 
bunker into a wheelbarrow and wheeled it in and dumped it where the 
fireman could put it into the boiler. About 11 o’clock the people would be 
going to bed, and so it did not take so much steam. Then we could rest, 
the fireman and I. He would sit in a chair and doze. I had invented a 
table out of a wheelbarrow in the coal bunker, just beyond a wall where 
the dynamo ran. It made a deep, constant humming noise. There was no 
more work to do until about 4 A.M., when we would have to clean the 
fires and get up steam again. On these nights, between 12 and 4, I wrote 
As I Lay Dying in six weeks, without changing a word. I sent it to Smith 
and wrote him that by it I would stand or fall.149 
The place of novelistic construction: “just beyond a wall where the dynamo 
ran”. The time of its construction: “between 12 and 4”, during a lull in energy 
consumption. A fitting context for what many critics consider Faulkner’s most 
avant-garde prose text.150  Sitting in a “coal bunker” at an upturned 
wheelbarrow and flanked - perhaps even encouraged by - the steady throb of 
the dynamo, Faulkner would forge his fifth novel.151  This, at least, is how 
Faulkner places the generative moments of the work. For those familiar with 
Faulkner’s tendency toward self mythologizing, however, it will come as no 
surprise to learn that the scene-setting is somewhat misleading. Like all good 
conceits, this one issues from a seed of truth. Faulkner indeed worked nights in 
Oxford’s power plant for a brief period during the summer months of 1929.152 
Yet a number of Faulkner’s subsequent claims are patent fabrications. As 
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Atkinson notes, “[r]iddled with inaccuracies and trademark embellishments, 
the introduction is yet another illustration of Faulkner’s disregard for facts 
when constructing the events of his life and work.”153  Polk’s researches on 
Faulkner’s manuscripts prove invaluable in this connection and demystify As I 
Lay Dying’s compositional chronology. First, Polk’s studies show that despite 
writing at “white heat” during the late twenties and early thirties Faulkner’s 
“six week” boast is disingenuous.154  Notwithstanding Faulkner’s astonishing 
literary productivity during this period - a level that he would sustain until the 
completion of Light in August in February, 1932 - the novel would take its time 
to emerge. Faulkner worked for a period of nine weeks, from October 25 and 
December 29 1929, on holograph version of the novel; he would spend another 
three weeks preparing the carbon typescript, finishing on January 12, 1930. The 
lack of a proof copy means that we may never be able to assert with finality the 
duration of As I Lay Dying’s composition, yet from the dates on Faulkner’s 
holograph and his carbon it is clear that the compositional framework within 
which As I Lay Dying emerged constitutes a lengthier period than Faulkner was 
willing to admit.
Faulkner’s claim that he wrote As I Lay Dying “without changing a 
word” is also a fabrication. That many of the manuscript pages bear multiple 
page numbers demonstrates that Faulkner reworked and revised his novel 
between its drafting and its publication. Harrison Smith might well have made 
“very few” changes to Faulkner’s text, yet the compositional history of the 
novel was far from seamless. The journey from “blank sheet” to published 
novel was, like the torturous, protracted journey that provides its thematic 
centre, peppered with ruptures, changes of direction, and breaks in continuity.
Faulkner’s claim that he began writing As I Lay Dying “in the summer of 
1929” fails to tally with evidence from biographical sources. According to 
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Joseph Blotner, a man to whom Faulkner would yield much, Faulkner did not 
start work on As I Lay Dying until the end of October. Conflicting with 
Faulkner’s account, Blotner’s runs as follows: "[o]n October 25, 1929, the day 
after panic broke out on Wall Street, [Faulkner] took one of these [onion] sheets, 
unscrewed the cap from his fountain pen, and wrote at the top in blue ink, 'As I 
Lay Dying.' Then he underlined it twice and wrote the date in the upper right-
hand corner".155  In and of itself, the discrepancy between Faulkner’s and 
Blotner’s account - a discrepancy that, in essence, pits “summer” against 
“October” - might seem slight. Given the historical specificity of “October 25, 
1929,” however, the few months’ slippage is instructive. If Faulkner is right, and 
As I Lay Dying materialized in “six weeks”, without need for revision, the novel 
would have been completed before Blotner dates Faulkner’s inaugural efforts at 
composition. If Blotner is correct, however, and Faulkner did not begin writing 
until “the day after” the collapse of the stock market, then the text takes on an 
altogether different aspect. In light of Faulkner’s previous with regard to self-
mythologizing and given his later efforts to warp the compositional history of 
Absalom, Absalom! (1936) and A Fable (1950), his self declared “magnum o”, the 
archival evidence of Polk and Blotner seems more reliable than the anecdotal, 
retrospective testimony of the “public” Faulkner. But why, we might ask, would 
Faulkner lie and, more, continue to lie - he would die lying - about the 
compositional history of his fifth novel? Willful in its orientation, Faulkner’s 
misremembering is, I suggest, driven by a desire to wrench his text free from 
any inferred social, historical, or political moorings. Put differently, Faulkner’s 
fudging was spurred by an attempt to drive a wedge between two linked 
realities: that of his text and that of his nation. As I seek now to show, these two 
realities prove ultimately unwedgeable. Faulkner’s attempt to estrange his 
novel from the generative historical context within which it was composed is 
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undermined by the close proximity between the (inadmissible) “beginnings” of 
Faulkner’s text and the (inadmissible) “beginnings” of a new phase of 
American capitalism. Composed in the immediate wake of this national egg 
laying, As I Lay Dying manifests as Faulkner’s signal response to the crisis of 
modernity and the onset of the Great Depression. It is, in Matthews’ phrasing, 
“Faulkner’s most probing exploration of the effects of modernization on the 
rural poor”.156 
As I Lay Dying charts the movements of the Bundren family, poor white 
tenant farmers, on a forty-mile death drag to burial grounds in Jefferson. 
Punctured by broken bones, acts of arson, date rape, and mental breakdown, 
the stated objective of “this funereal steeplechase” is to inter the body of the 
recently deceased mother, Addie, alongside kindred corpses.157 I shall unearth a 
coextensive motivation for the journey in a few pages, one that locates the 
deathly procession of the Bundrens as a means to explicitly mercantile ends. 
Suffice it to say here that at the literal level, “burial” is the novel’s driving force; 
“to bury” is its active verb. The burial of Addie’s body - as a permanent, 
enduring act of hiding - is, however, a metaphor for a larger interment. As 
Jessica Baldanzi and Kyle Schlabach note, the “stench of the decaying body 
serves as a metaphor for the family’s unspoken histories that have been pushed 
aside but stubbornly refuse burial.”158  One in a number of “other buried 
narratives of family, regional, and national significance”, Addie’s body 
appropriates a “text” inasmuch as it provides a surface upon which specific 
social traumas might figuratively be inscribed.159  More exactingly, the 
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Bundrens’ movement from farm to town is an extended metaphor for the 
historically determined shift from agrarian to capitalist modes of production. In 
Lester’s words, Faulkner’s novel
allegorizes this collective upheaval of traditional rural life by setting the 
hapless Bundren family on a journey to town. As the family moves 
toward the unfamiliar landscape and community of Jefferson and toward 
new social identities, they are compelled to respond to pressures and 
limits that emerge in the context of new settings and social relations.160 
The metaphorical road from farm to town infers a rough ride for the grieving 
poor. Indeed, Atkinson is right to locate “As I Lay Dying, [as] the story of a 
harrowing journey toward an uncertain and ominous horizon.”161  The pages 
that follow trace this “journey”.
RURAL I-HOOD: RELOCATIONS
In the early 1930s, the identity of rural America - its I-hood, perhaps - was in a 
state of flux. What people did, and where they did it was changing. Ted Ownby 
points out that “[t]he percentage of the Mississippi population defined by the 
U.S. census as rural decreased from 97 in 1880 to 86.6 in 1920 and 83.1 in 
1930.”162  As Faulkner wrote As I Lay Dying, Mississippi remained 
predominantly rural, yet recent and significant interstate migration would see 
many Mississippians swap the farm for the town. By 1930, the Southern 
economy had entered an important new phase. Paralysed by the recent collapse 
of the cotton markets, Mississippi was becoming what Jack Temple Kirby might 
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call “town oriented”.163 Ownby provides a useful, two-pronged back history to 
Mississippi’s rural depopulation: “For the first time in the state’s history”, he 
writes, “the number of people living and working on farms decreased in the 
period from 1910 to 1920 and it increased only slightly in the 1920s.”164 
Mississippi’s rural communities would continue to constitute a greater part of 
the state demographic, yet by 1930 the first phase of urbanisation had been set 
in train.165  Discomfited by the prospect of continual back breaking labour and 
curious to taste the fruits of consumer culture, Mississippians like the Bundrens, 
were being drawn from rural settings and relocating in urban ones. The 
transplantation of farming families into nascent urban centres swelled the ranks 
of Southern towns, signifying the first phase in a shift from premodern to 
capitalist modes of production. On its own, of course, “being there” was not 
enough to constitute a significant challenge to the forms and customs of the Old 
South. A deeper commitment than mere present-ness was necessary if 
capitalism was to be cemented as the dominant ideology of the emergent South. 
It was imperative that those who came had the means to consume. As Wofgang 
Haug has asserted “[t]he working class exist in relation to capital not only as 
those who are exploited in the production process, as the creator of all values, 
even of those which are the sources of all forms of profit and social surplus: to 
the sectors of social capital which provide the necessities of life, they are also a 
mass market of buyers.”166  Only by turning producers into consumers could the 
circuits of exchange upon which Southern capitalism had come to depend 
perpetuate. 
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The implementation of money wages provided the requisite conditions 
under which the South could embrace the shift from use value to exchange 
value and, by extension, acquiesce to the shift from premodern to capitalist 
modes of accumulation. Again, Ownby helps us to map the change: “the 
number of [Mississippi] people earning wages increased from 5,827 in 1880 to 
57,560 by 1920, and total wages in that period went from slightly over $1 
million to $51 million.”167  For a growing section of the rural South, the 
staggering, fifty-fold increase in money wages represented an alluring 
alternative to the hardly pulse-raising subsistence modes of pre- or proto-
modern Souths. Not only were Mississippians becoming urban but they were, 
by way of money wages, being opted into a entirely new system of exchange. 
Rural populations were thus unified, in Jackson Lears’ term, by “the centrifugal 
forces unleashed by the market.”168 
As a precis for the coming discussion of the Bundrens’ post bereavement 
expenditures, I seek briefly to situate the growth of commodity culture in the 
rural South in a national context. With reference to national economic trends, 
William Leach notes that “the rapid shift of American capitalism from its 
agrarian base in the early nineteenth century to industrial manufacturing […] 
generated a great abundance of commodities for the domestic market and 
created unprecedented distributive requirements. In the short space of just 
thirty years, from 1890 to 1920, “American society had established the 
institutional basis for a consumer society.”169  The situation in the rural South 
was altogether different. Notwithstanding America’s “rapid shift” from agri- to 
commodity- culture, modernisation would come slowly to many parts of the 
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American South. Thomas Schlereth is right to assert that “the level and scope of 
rural consumption was rising by the turn of the twentieth century”, yet these 
trends did not apply to vast swathes of the postbellum South.170 
As late as 1950, in fact, significant portions of the rural population were 
yet to experience the sweep of commodification, yet to herald the arrival of 
modern communications, goods and services, and yet to experience the division 
of labour, an event without which industrial modernity would cease to 
function. As economically marginal figures, the hill-farming Bundrens provide 
a pertinent example of a population at a distance, physically and figuratively, 
from the logic of market relations.171  Kirby notes that in 1930 “[t]he remote 
highland South was the most “backward” part of rural America, dramatically 
lacking - even in comparison within the South - the infrastructures and 
amenities of farm and business life.”172 Whether one considers these premodern 
regions as pockets of resistance within which extant social formations could 
brace themselves against the scarring winds of market capitalism, or as zones of 
primitivism defined by a cultural blindness to the liberating potential of 
modern living, the point remains: many rurally situated Americans escaped (in 
the first case) or missed out on (in the second), modernity’s consumer driven 
entitlements. Hindered no doubt by what Wiener dubs “the ideological and 
cultural heritage of slavery”, Mississippi proved sluggish in the transition from 
“old” to “new” South.173  Providing perhaps the pre-eminent example of the 
molasses quick advance toward modernisation and modernity, Mississippi
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ranked last in the country in the percentage of its people with radios and 
telephones in their homes, last in the proportion of people with motor 
vehicle registrations and homes wired for electricity. In 1937, less than 
one percent of the farms in the state had electricity. The state ranked last 
in the country in per capita wealth, with less than half the national 
average. Even more dramatically, Mississippi was last in the country in 
per capita retail sales, with a figure 34 percent of the national average.174
Given the material lag that separated rural Mississippians from many 
differently situated Southerners, it is perhaps no wonder that the Bundrens - the 
embodiment, perhaps, of a South within a South - seem determined to get to 
“town”. (AILD 13; 28; 92) Anse is perhaps more concerned than his children that 
the trip reaches its (commodified) end: “‘Just going to town. Bent on it”, he 
manfully declares. (AILD 92) Anse’s desire to fulfil his potential as a consumer 
of manufactured goods is no doubt heightened by the fact that it has, as the 
more geographically fluid Peabody disbelievingly states, been “twelve years” 
since Anse last visited “town”. If we trust in Peabody’s chronology - and 
Faulkner gives us no reason not to do so - Anse has been an absentee from town 
cultures since about the mid teens.175
Stuart Ewen’s work on interwar commercialism in the United States 
provides a useful framework within which we can historicise Anse’s extended 
period of exile. “In the 1920s”, Ewen writes, “the consumer ethic was projected 
to sectors of the population whose fidelity was seen to be necessary, but in the 
process much of the American populace was ignored. Ads of the twenties, like 
the mass consumer market itself, were not generally directed toward the 
poorest sectors of the population.”176  Given the exclusionary tactics of the 
marketplace in the twenties, we might fairly speculate that Anse’s last visit to 
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town, circa 1915, constituted an unpleasant lesson in the discriminatory 
etiquette of consumerism. Notwithstanding the slim chance that Anse would 
have had much of a wage to spend on this previous sojourn, working class 
identity would likely have disqualified him from partaking in “the fun and 
potential romance of consumer spending”.177  As of the teens, at least, Anse 
Bundren was not a target upon which the crosshairs of Southern commercialism 
chose to affix. Fast-forward “twelve years”, however, and what Ewen calls the 
“logic of consumption” had shifted.178  First time as tragedy and second time as 
farce, Anse squares up to the “town” under more favourable conditions in the 
dying moments of the twenties. Fun times and not a little romance beckon for 
Anse Bundren. Willis is right to assert that the Bundrens “participate only 
partially” in the logic of consumption, yet the fact that they do so at all is 
historically pertinent.179 Certainly, this was no gaudy spree, yet as the thirties 
approached, the tentacles of commodity culture would start to wrap themselves 
around the very poorest members of society. Even hill-peasants like the 
Bundrens would have access to a growing array of mass-produced goods: the 
bananas that Dewey Dell munches on the buckboard, the false teeth that instil a 
manic desire in Anse, and the record player that Cash enjoys on returning to the 
farm. In short, as Faulkner wrote As I Lay Dying, the fruits of commodity culture 
were beginning to stretch beyond the middle classes.180 For Anse, the timing of 
Addie’s death could not have been better. Coinciding with the opening up of 
the market to the urban poor, Addie’s death represents the perfect subterfuge 
for a trip to the shops.
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Having hinted that the Bundrens’ journey to town is the outward 
expression of a inner (that is, “buried”) desire to consume, I seek to probe how a 
number of individual acts of expenditure accrue symbolic value at the level of 
Faulkner’s text. The booty differs for each of the Bundrens. For Anse, “town” 
means a new pair of false teeth (AILD 12; 25; 35; 71) and, as we discover at the 
novel’s end, a new wife. For Vardaman, town means a shiny red train (170). For 
Cash, it yields “one of them little graphophones” (177) that plays pre-recorded 
music that the Bundrens subsequently purchase via “mail order” (178). Dewey 
Dell goes to town to buy an abortifacient with which to terminate (or 
“negative”) an unwanted pregnancy (164-169). Aside from Addie, then, who is 
too dead to consume, and Darl, who is too “mad” to, Jewel Bundren appears 
the only child not dazzled by the “new enchantment” of commodity culture.181 
Despite the variety of forms in which it manifests, the desire to buy unifies the 
Bundrens, barring Jewel, under the shared logic of capitalism. Ownby is quick 
to find an airy spot within the seemingly strangulated space of commodity 
culture. The Bundrens, he claims, enjoy “a sense of freedom in shopping” that 
they do not experience in their life on the farm.182  Consumption, in effect, 
refreshes the parts that other (social) acts cannot reach. As Ownby puts it in 
another text, “Anse and Cash Bundren find common, and actually sympathetic 
ground in the appeal of consumer pleasures.’’183  I would like to complicate 
Ownby’s responses to the Bundrens’ consumptive urges. For Faulkner the 
“freedom” of consumption doubles up as a kind of death. Problematised by the 
spectres of production, each act of consumption is more complicated than 
Ownby gives credit. Whatever commodity it is that Faulkner evokes - be it 
“train”, “teeth”, “phonograph” or “banana” - these goods are “shape[s] to fill a 
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lack”. More, they are objects that seek to obfuscate the buried reality of 
capitalist modes of production. Of all the Bundren family, Vardaman is the one 
who falls most spectacularly through the trapdoor of capital. He thus provides 
a pertinent point of departure for our final set of discussions.
VARDAMAN: THE EROTICS OF CONSUMPTION
Vardaman’s longing for situatedness in the world of things manifests as a 
burning desire for a red toy train, that “shines” behind the plate glass window 
of a store in Jefferson. (AILD 43) Vardaman first hears of the train, thus its 
“being-in-the-world” of commodities from Dewey Dell who, unlike her farm-
bound father, has recently witnessed the “wonder” of mass-produced goods. 
Vardaman’s desire to consume is aroused not by modern adverting, then, but 
by a more traditional means, by word of mouth: “it is red on the track behind 
the glass. The track goes shining round and round. Dewey Dell says so.” (AILD 
142) Vardaman’s desire for “train” pulls him toward Jefferson; his excitement is 
palpable yet it is coupled with a reassurance that this commodity will “reserve” 
itself for him: “[w]e are going to town. Dewey Dell says it wont be sold because 
it belongs to Santa Claus and he taken it back with him until next Christmas. 
Then it will be behind the glass again, shining with waiting.” (AILD 65) The 
ruse is apparent enough to us but it eludes young Vardaman: having been 
bought by some other (richer) boy, the processes of labour are set in train to 
replenish the store windows in time for Christmas.184  As if by magic, the 
commodity, produced en masse but masquerading as unique, returns from the 
grotto of labor to cast “loving glances” at Vardaman.185 As the family get closer 
“to town” Vardaman’s desire intensifies. Indeed, the potency of “train” as an 
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object to be possessed is almost too much for Vardaman to bear. “It was behind 
the window, red on the track, the track shining round and round. It made my 
heart hurt.” (AILD 145) It made my heart hurt: perhaps the single most freighted 
line in Faulkner’s novel. Certainly, it reveals much with regard to the libidinal 
economies of the text. The “unleashed commodity” demonstrates how 
Vardaman’s “human sensuality is moulded by commodity aesthetics”.186 
The notion of “sensuality” returns us to the surrealist notion of the self.  In 
Franklin Rosemont’s words, Vardaman’s desire testifies to an “[e]roticism, 
which touches the very heart of the surrealist message.”187 As a desiring “I” or 
“eye” Vardaman glimpses in “train” a new world, a world opened to the 
possibility of desire. He does not know it yet but this is desire that must be left 
unfulfilled. Ownership is so near but yet so far for Vardaman. In effect, 
Vardaman is the one “shining with waiting”; “waiting” that is, for the “train” 
that never arrives. What does “arrive”, in place of consumption (and the social 
mobility it encapsulates) is the fetish. Willis maps this particular terrain:
If the commodity is by definition a fetishized object, containing the hidden 
social relationships of its producers, we have only to extrapolate from its 
production to its use to understand how the commodity conveniently fills 
the gaps in broken and alienated social relationships. Under twentieth-
century capitalism, consumption becomes a means for replacing 
relationships between people and deflecting emotional responses which 
might otherwise be painful and hard to manage.188
Under capitalism, then, labour acquires what Georg Lukács refers to as a 
“phantom objectivity”; that is, a relation between people transforms itself into a 
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relation between things.189  The commodity, as the object of capitalist modes 
becomes, in a familiar idiom, “a shape to fill a lack” (AILD 116). We might want 
to resist being so hard on Vardaman; his “I” is not the only one filled with 
commodities. Indeed, his pulmonary reaction to “train” provides a cogent 
metaphor for the growing sense of wonder at the plethora of products that 
represented a bold, often colourful, and patently surrealistic new world that 
sought to compensate for, if not fully to displace, the degraded, knackered and 
jaded lives of the rural poor. “And yet with all this”, Du Bois lamented at the 
turn of the century, “there was something sordid, something forced, - a certain 
feverish unrest and recklessness; for was not all this show and tinsel built upon 
a groan?”190  Kirby follows the Du Boisian line, noting that “[t]he [reified] 
products and the cash required to buy them must have struck important if 
unmeasurable blows against local cultures and premodern economies.”191
The appeal of “shining” (AILD 145) new products not only represents an 
alternative to the mundane life on the farm but it also, in the self-referential 
sense typical of capitalist production, represents an alternative to the more 
familiar commodities with which Vardaman has previous experience. For 
Vardaman the conundra of consumption infers a toss up between a train and a 
banana. Again, Dewey Dell is the conduit between the desire to consume and 
its realisation. The alternative to train seems, for Vardaman, less than satisfying:
Dewey Dell said that we will get some bananas. The train is behind the 
glass, red on the track. When it runs the truck shines on and off. Pa said 
flour and sugar and coffee costs so much. Because I am a country boy 
because boys in town. Bicycles. Why do flour and sugar and coffee cost 
so much when he is a country boy. “Wouldn’t you ruther have some 
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bananas instead?” Bananas are gone, eaten. Gone. When it runs on the 
track shines again. “Why ain’t I a town boy, pa?” (AILD 43)
The cross cuttings and derailments of Vardaman’s syntax issue from an 
ideological struggle between two antagonistic commodities: “train” and 
“banana”. These two products are in dynamic tension, “incessant interaction or 
conflict” to use Volosinov’s term.192  Yet for Vardaman, the choice is clear. 
Despite its relative exoticism, “banana” cannot displace “train” as the pre-
eminent object of his desire. The hidden and attenuated processes of production 
re-situates “train” to the store window; Vardaman’s syntax reaffirms “train” at 
the forefront of his desiring “eye”/”I”.
GETTING A GRIP: ANSE BUNDREN AND “THEM TEETH”
For Anse Bundren, the journey from farm to town is an unmitigated success. 
Despite the humiliations that subtend his low-budget funeral arrangements, 
despite the fetid odour that issues from his rotting other half, and despite the 
serial alienations that threaten to break apart the tenuous connections that link 
Anse to his family, the two main objectives of the journey find successful 
realisation. For the full, ten-day, duration of the Bundrens’ journey, Anse has 
been lustily looking forward to burying his stinking wife and getting himself a 
pair of false teeth (AILD 12; 25; 35; 71; 177). These artificial dentures prove key 
to a proper understanding of the commodity aesthetics that bereave the 
Bundrens and, by association, bereave Faulkner’s text. Given the changing 
demographic of consumer markets during the latter part of the 1920s it is not 
entirely surprising that Anse is able to consummate this particular transaction. 
Desire, mediated by an exchange of capital (or perhaps, an agreement “on 
installment” [AILD 176]), secures “them teeth” (AILD 71) which subsequently 
plug (into) a hole (or, lack) within the paternal face. Less predictable than the 
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acquisition itself is the pulling power of such monstrous dentures. Anse’s 
“mouth bling” in Matthews’ street term, wows a woman whose only function, 
it seems, is to replace the defunct model of womanhood - the “old” Mrs 
Bundren - with a more modern version.193  This grim parody of part exchange 
(the second of its sort) sees Anse trade a corpse for a woman shaped like a 
“duck”, who comes (and perhaps as a makeweight for her duck-ness) with a 
“graphophone” as a dowry.194  The down payment needed to secure Addie’s 
replacement may have been no more than a flashing-white-smile from the 
newly dentured Anse (and the promise of the safe return of the tools that he 
borrowed to bury the first “Mrs Bundren”), yet despite his “badly splayed feet, 
his toes cramped and bent and warped” (AILD 8), despite his hunched back, 
despite his laziness and despite a lack of his own teeth, Anse has wended his 
way to a full set of disposable goods: teeth, duck, and portable home 
entertainment system, replete with “grip”.195  Along with his new teeth, then, 
Anse acquires a new, “duck shaped” (AILD 177) wife, a woman who 
subsequently takes to the task of domestic life effortlessly, shall we say. These 
acquisitions render Anse practically unrecognizable to his sons, as a final, and 
properly surrealistic passage demonstrates:
! ! “Who’s that?”
! ! Then we see it wasn’t the grip that made him look 
different; it was his face, and Jewel says, “He got them teeth.”
It was a fact. It made him look a foot taller, kind of holding his 
head up, hangdog and proud too, and then we see her behind him, 
carrying the other grip - a kind of duck shaped woman all dressed up, 
with them kind of hard looking eyes like she was daring ere a man to say 
nothing. And there we set watching him, with Dewey Dell’s and 
Vardaman’s mouth half open and half-et bananas in their hands and her 
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coming around from behind pa, looking at us like she dared ere a man 
[....]
“It’s Cash and Jewel and Vardaman and Dewey Dell,” pa says, 
kind of hangdog and proud too, with his teeth and all, even if he 
wouldn’t look at us. “Meet Mrs Bundren,” he says. (AILD 177)
Functioning as little more than a grotesque display cabinet for a set of strangely 
animated teeth, Anse’s face is transformed into a “monstrous burlesque of all 
bereavement” (AILD 50). The reified symbol of Anse’s dead wife is thus kept in 
the mouth of Anse for future smilings at Addie’s replacement body, the new, 
hideously resurrected “Mrs Bundren”. Entombed within the mouth, Anse’s new 
gnashers function as a pristine plastic memorial to the death and dispatch of the 
old Mrs Bundren. With a mouth like a graveyard and a duck-for-a-wife, death 
and slapstick merge. Bakhtin proposes that “the most important of all human 
features for the grotesque is the mouth. It dominates all else. The grotesque face 
is actually reduced to the gaping mouth; the other features are only a frame 
encasing this wide-open bodily abyss.”196  “Domination” is a key term on two 
levels. First, the teeth loom over the Bundrens as a physical object that alters the 
face of a (previously) well-known member of the family.  Making Anse “look a 
foot taller”, these false teeth are agents of the uncanny. Anse, as an “I” that the 
Bundrens thought they knew, is somehow altered. His teeth invoke a Poe-like 
charge. In “Berenice” (1835), Poe’s narrator provides a scene that compliments 
the one committed to by Faulkner:
The teeth! - the teeth! - they were here, and there, and everywhere, and 
visibly and palpably before me; long, narrow, and excessively white, 
with the pale lips writhing about them, as in the very moment of their 
first terrible development. Then came the full fury of my monomania 
and I struggled in vain against [their] strange and irresistible influence. 
In the multiplied objects of the external world I had no thought but for 
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the teeth. For these I longed with a frenzied desire. All other matters and 
all different interests became absorbed in their single contemplation. 
They - they alone were present to the mental eye, and they, in their sole 
individuality, became the essence of my mental life.197  
Poe’s narration offers a fitting epitaph for Anse’s trip to town. We would miss a 
trick, though, if we remained tethered to Bakhtin’s notion of the grotesque. 
While Anse’s teeth are verifiably “strange and irresistible” in their “influence”, 
they are more than a location for the gothic. The real horror of Anse’s 
transformation is rooted in the horrors of commodification, horrors which 
alienate the very notion of an “I”. Indeed, we note the power of the teeth to 
perpetuate the consumption for which they stand as a synecdoche. By enabling 
further consumption, Anse’s teeth resonate as the commodity par excellence, 
metaphorically evoking the journey toward a fully-fledged consumer culture. 
Anse does his best to mask the exchange value that teeth imply under a flimsy 
veil of use. The consumption that teeth allow is, Anse weakly argues, a right 
that he should not be denied: “me without a tooth in my head, hoping to get 
ahead enough so I could get my mouth fixed where I could eat God’s own 
victuals as a man should”. (AILD 25) Despite Anse’s effort to “make natural” 
the role of consumer goods, to claim for their always-thereness, his part in the 
logic of the marketplace “comes to the surface”. As the “redness” of the train 
obfuscates the congealed labour that worms its way into in commodities, 
Anse’s teeth contain, and subsequently seek to expunge, a whole history of 
buried productive labor. 
As “train” shapes Vardaman’s “I-hood”, then, (or the shortcomings of it) 
false teeth shape the I-hood of Anse. He, like the narrator of Berenice, has “no 
thought but for the teeth”. Testifying to Anse’s powerlessness in an artificial 
world, “teeth” are the location of Anse’s “freedom”. His raison d’etre and a 
reminder of his uselessness, “teeth” are as was “train”: a “shape to fill a lack”. 
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The frequency of their mention evinces Anse’s desperation with regard to 
consummating the transaction. Yet something weird happens to Anse as this 
consummation is realised: as he plugs into commodity culture, he becomes 
“indentured”, that is “beholden” to his dentures. They, with the magnetic 
power of commodities, have lured Anse away from his farm. It is they that plug 
him into the cash nexus, into the gawping face of capital, into what Taussig dubs 
the “maw of the modern”.198  Driving a wedge between farm and town cultures, 
“them teeth” speak of an ill-fitting and alienating transition from production to 
consumption. By implication these artefacts of consumptive desire bring into 
relief the artifice, the concealments and the defacements that occupy and 
semanticize the commodified centre of Faulkner’s novel. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
“IT” 
OR, 
SANCTUARY’S REVERSIBLE BODIES. 
The opening chapter of this thesis argued that The Sound and the Fury 
semanticizes around the collective pronoun “them”. The word, it was 
suggested, functions as the “compacted doctrine” that terrorises the racial 
subjectivity of the Compson brothers.199  A second chapter built upon the 
assumptions of the first, attending to Faulkner’s treatment of the first person 
singular pronoun, the “I”, as it manifests in As I Lay Dying. Passed through 
numerous narrative consciousnesses, Faulkner’s application of this pronominal 
marker leads to a textual fragmentation that, in turn, imperils the coherence of 
the self. The present chapter narrows its focus for a final time, scrutinising how 
Faulkner extracts meaning from the smallest of textual markers. More 
exactingly, the arguments that follow seek to give a precise textual location to 
Sanctuary’s problematic materiality by exploring the workings of the third 
person singular neuter pronoun - “it.”200 Through an extended close reading, I 
argue that the pronoun “it” is the pre-eminent place of semantic conflict in the 
novel, and more, that the novel’s employment of this specific type of pronoun 
characterises Faulkner’s grammar as a place of violence. The grammatical 
violence that I investigate in this chapter stems, of course, from a material 
violation. As Diane Roberts asserts, “Sanctuary is about rape. Stated baldly, the 
point seems as obvious as daylight.”201  Specifically, the novel is about the rape 
of Temple Drake, a seventeen year-old virgin, with a corn-cob, in a disused 
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barn. Temple’s penetration provides the kernel or ur-scene out of which the 
novel grew.202 As Faulkner famously commented in 1957, “I thought of the most 
horrific idea I could think of and wrote it.”203 While rape is the novel’s central 
preoccupation, it also constitutes its central silence. As T. H. Adamowski notes, 
the reader is prevented from gaining access to “that cob rape which we might, 
at first, suspect to be the privileged space of obscenity in the novel”.204 Instead, 
the process of recognition proceeds by inference; its realisations are arrived at in 
instalments: “[t]hat famous episode is never shown to us. Popeye [Vitelli] 
materializes in the corncrib; we learn of Temple’s anxiety, and then we see her 
bleeding in the car.”205  Providing the novel with its ur-scene and with its dirty 
secret, rape is the elephant in the room, both the event from which the novel 
grew and the one which it refuses to sufficiently address. As Matthews notes, 
“vague diction, vacancies in syntax, breakages in thought and utterance, and 
violations of place, time and character conspire to blur the presentation of the 
novel’s crucial event.”206  Despite these ruptures and displacements, however, 
the threat that the novel poses is never far from exposing itself. It is, in 
Faulkner’s terms, “hidden and secret yet nearby”. (S 181) That Temple’s rape 
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remains un- (or, better, “under”-) articulated is significant and will provide a 
point of departure for the coming arguments. 
Temple’s rape occurs at the end of chapter XIII, yet passes with the barest 
of mention. The reader is notified that “[s]omething is happening” to Temple, 
although the nature of this “something” is ultimately withheld, rendered mute. 
As Temple remarks, “it was as though sound and silence had become inverted”. 
(S 250)207 The violence of this “[s]omething” stuns the next five chapters into a 
“bright silence” (idem). In fact, between chapters XIV and XVIII, Temple, whom 
one presumes is attempting to recover from the brutality of her attack, remains 
silent. This period of remission reaches a terminus in chapter XVIII. Here, 
Faulkner’s narrative rejoins Temple, providing the first material traces of her 
violation. Slumped in Popeye’s Ford awaiting imprisonment in a Memphis 
whorehouse,
Temple gazed dully forward as the road she had traversed yesterday 
began to flee backward under the wheels as onto a spool, feeling her 
blood seeping slowly inside her loins. She sat limp in the corner of the 
seat, watching the steady backward rush of the land - pines in opening 
vistas splashed with fading dogwood; sedge; fields green with new 
cotton and empty of any movement, peaceful, as though Sunday were a 
quality of atmosphere, of light and shade - sitting with her legs close 
together, listening to the hot minute seeping of her blood, saying dully to 
herself, I’m still bleeding. I’m still bleeding. (S 273-4)
The “minute seeping” of Temple’s blood is a metonym for with the novel’s 
wider tendency to muffle or offset the brutality of its central act. Despite the 
modest scale of this bleeding, however, its significance is far from slight. Not 
only does this passage provide the first material evidence of Temple’s 
penetration but it also sets up an antagonistic correspondence between going 
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forward with going back. This antagonism inflects the formal strategies of the 
novel. 
It is not until chapter XXIII - ten chapters after its occurring - that Temple 
commits to a narration of her ordeal. In her narration, the tension between 
backward and forward motion again proves a prominent feature. Sitting in a 
Memphis brothel with local lawyer Horace Benbow, Temple gradually begins to 
find the words through which she can recount the moments leading up to her 
violation. In anticipation of a close reading, I number my pronouns for the sake 
of clarity.
I thought if he’d just go on and get it [1] over with, I could go to sleep. So 
I’d say You’re a coward if you dont! and I could feel my mouth getting 
fixed to scream, and that little hot ball inside you that screams. Then it [2] 
touched me, that nasty little cold hand, fiddling around inside the coat 
where I was naked. It [3] was like alive ice and my skin started jumping 
away from it [4] like those little flying fish in front of a boat. It [5] was 
like my skin knew which way it [6] was going to go before it [7] started 
moving, and my skin would keep on jerking just ahead of it [8] like there 
wouldn’t be anything there when the hand got there.
Then it [9] got down to where my insides began, and I hadn’t 
eaten since yesterday at dinner and my insides started bubbling and 
going on and the shucks began to make so much noise it [10] was like 
laughing. I’d think they were laughing at me because all the time his 
hand was going inside the top of my knickers and I hadn’t changed into 
a boy yet. (S 330-1)
In this relatively short extract “it” is the dominant term, featuring ten times.208 
The density with which Temple applies the pronoun is noteworthy. Nowhere 
else in the novel do so many third person pronouns mean so many different 
things within such a short space of time. Yet it is less the frequency of the 
pronoun than the rhythms of its movement that concerns me here. By listing the 
referents of Temple’s pronoun in quick succession, one can begin to decipher 
the logic behind such rhythms. Temple’s chain of pronouns run as follows: 
97
208 Sanctuary is saturated with the impersonal pronoun “it”, featuring 1,129 times in 217 pages.
“it” [1] refers to a sex act, (which, as I will discuss below, culminates in Temple’s 
rape); “it” [2], [3], and [4] refer - in different stages of realisation - to Popeye’s 
offending hand; “it” [5] appears, at least on first impressions, to be an inert or 
“dummy” signifier (in other words, the reader is not really sure what this one 
might mean); “it” [6] and “it” [7] are seemingly interchangeable, both of them 
referring either to Temple’s skin or to Popeye’s hand; “it” [8] and “it” [9] return 
to the hand; “it” [10] refers to the noise of “the shucks”, which Temple likens to 
a kind of “laughing”. A series of ten “its”, then, move to the following pattern: 
rape (or, more exactly, the threat of rape), hand, hand, hand, blank, skin or 
hand, skin or hand, hand, hand, laughter. 
Having isolated Temple’s pronouns and located them in this chain of 
signification, it is clear that the term “it” functions as an indeterminate and 
highly volatile lexical unit. Neither stable nor singular in its meaning, Temple’s 
pronoun constantly threatens to vacate one meaning and take up occupancy in 
another. Of course, “it” remains the same word all the way through, but as the 
above compression demonstrates “it” - whilst under Temple’s jurisdiction at 
least - provides a forum for semantic ambiguity. Temple’s linguistic varieties 
and contortions of the pronoun “it”, beginning as the threat of rape and 
finishing as “laughter”, cover considerable semantic ground. The Marxist 
linguist  Volosinov - a contemporary of Faulkner - might have cited this 
tendency to move as evidence of the “multivocal” essence of language. That 
language is essentially “multivocal” (and in the present context the assertion 
surely holds) does not mean that its various semantic possibilities are arrived at 
arbitrarily. Nor does it mean that the pronoun operates solely as a textual event; 
on the contrary, Temple’s “it” has a specific material imperative. In an attempt 
to classify the nature of this imperative, I will pull apart the chain of pronouns 
and ponder each one in greater detail. 
“It” [1] refers to the novel’s generative event: Temple’s rape by Popeye in 
the Old Frenchman barn. The meaning of this first pronoun is communicated by 
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inference rather than direct address. Temple does not say “my rape”, yet the 
context within which Temple speaks the pronoun confirms such meaning as 
irrefutable. (The prospect of Temple suffering a rape has been one of the text’s 
only constant features; in fact, Temple’s penetration has seemed likely ever 
since she made her first foray into the Old Frenchman barn, at Chapter VI.) 
Temple’s inaugural “it” constitutes what linguists refer to as a “deictic” 
pronoun. The term “deixis”, as John Lyons suggests, “comes from a Greek word 
meaning “pointing” or “indicating”’ [and] is now used in linguistics to refer to 
the function of personal and demonstrative pronouns, of tense and of a variety 
of other grammatical and lexical features which relate utterances to the spatio-
temporal co-ordinates of the act of utterance.”209 Put simply, the deictic pronoun 
indicates the meaning of a thing or an object that the text fails to directly name. 
As a condition of its working, the deictic pronoun requires contextual support if 
its meaning is to be fully understood. Such context is provided by a glut of 
surrounding terms: a “he” is doing something that Temple hopes might pass 
quickly (Temple implores Popeye to “go on and get it over with”);210  more, the 
‘it’ involves a “fiddling”, “it” happens late at night (“I could go to sleep”), and 
Temple is “naked” whilst “it” is taking place. Providing context, these terms 
inform the reader that the “it” is sexual in kind and that Temple has not invited, 
nor is enjoying, such attention.
Temple’s deictic first pronoun is employed to absorb the shock of literal 
meaning. Through the rape a corporeal barrier has been breached. Through the 
telling, another rupture threatens. This rupture must come (or we have no 
novel) yet Temple fears a direct retelling and so defers it - with “it” [1]. Simply, 
the pronoun provides Temple with a means of referring to her rape without 
reprising it. “Rape” is locked into the crypt of Temple’s pronoun; what emerges, 
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as a semantic byproduct of the encryption, generates what Abraham and Torok 
call “a poetics of hiding”.211  As an “it” rather than a concrete event, “my rape” 
effectively becomes “that thing”; as such, the rape is easier to cope with. This 
verbal strategy, Temple hopes, will impose a fictitious distance between her 
“insides” and Popeye’s “cob”. Figuratively speaking, the deictic “it” [1] reverses 
Temple’s body back into virginity. However, Temple’s effort to dematerialise 
her body into text - her attempt to become “a printed object”perhaps - proves 
impossible.212
As the chain of pronouns progresses, the restorative ambition of “it” [1] 
is ruined by the sheer physicality of “it” [2]. Grammatically speaking, Temple’s 
second pronoun shifts out of the deictic form and into the “anaphoric”, our 
second means of pronominal reference. Unlike the deictic pronoun, which 
cannot be understood without recourse to contextual information, the 
anaphoric pronoun stands in for that object or thing that has already appeared 
(or in some cases is about to appear) in the text. Problematically, Temple’s 
second pronoun undermines “it” [1]’s attempt to eke out a neutral zone 
between her body and its traumatic history. That this second pronoun, a 
forward-looking anaphoric pronoun, seems to acquire an impossible physical 
agency (“it touched me”, Temple claims) only compounds the sense of dread 
with which “it” [2] nominates a part of Popeye’s body: specifically, his “nasty 
little cold hand”. If “it” [1] is the reinstatement of the hymen, then, “it” [2] is the 
“hand” that ultimately breaks it (one recalls: due to Popeye’s impotence he uses 
his hand to rape Temple). 
The semantic value of this second pronoun (its value as “hand”) is not 
immediately available to the reader, however, but is subject to a deferral. This 
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deferral complicates the rhythms of the first two pronouns. At the precise 
moment of “it” [2]’s reading, the pronoun is lacking concrete semantic 
affiliation. Gazing “dully forward” (S 273) in vague expectation of finding an 
attribution, this second pronoun is, as Lear’s fool might contend, “an o without 
a figure”.213  Soon, however, the “empty” second pronoun is drawn to a 
meaning. Feeding into a qualifying clause (“that nasty little cold hand”) the 
epistemological impasse appears resolved. On discovering meaning further 
down the line, the reader feels subsequently obliged to revisit (or move 
backward), and inscribe this retrospectively acquired meaning - “hand” - onto 
what was a temporarily empty signifier. Having passed through and then 
reversed back into “it” [2] we now know that “it” [2] nominates a physical part 
of Popeye’s body: “hand”. With this new knowledge of “hand” (a knowledge 
that was prohibited when we first encountered “it” [2]) we are associatively 
taken - or slapped -  backwards again, back to “it” [1]. At the mercy of Temple’s 
erratic pronoun, the reader has been bounced back and forward between a rape 
and a hand. This semantic backtracking (which, if we are to continue reading, 
necessarily infers a returning move forward) implicates the rhythms of reading 
with the rhythms of rape.214  These rhythms are duly complicated by the 
remaining pronouns.
From “it” [3] through “it” [10], Temple’s pronouns appear to follow a 
more sedate course. Certainly, the coming “its” repeat neither the semantic nor 
the material gyrations that were enacted by “its” [1] and [2]. In fact, “it” [3] 
reverses (out of) the unusual “forward-looking” anaphoric tendency of “it” [2] 
and by so doing sets in motion a more traditional means of lexical reference. 
“It” [3] is a “backward-looking” anaphoric pronoun, in that it follows rather 
than anticipates the object to which it is semantically anchored. Not only does 
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“it” [3] follow its referent - and by doing satisfy the rules of a traditional 
grammar - but it also recycles the meaning of the previous pronoun. In short, 
“it” [3] uses “it” [2] as a pre-established reference and by so doing endorses 
“it” [2]’s meaning. “It” [3], then, means what “it” [2] (eventually) meant: “that 
nasty little cold hand”. 
“It” [4] continues the pattern established by “it” [3], and recalls Popeye’s 
“hand”. That the fourth pronoun grows out of the third (which grew, in turn, 
out of the second) is significant. By reaffirming, rather than redirecting 
meaning, “its” [3] and [4] bring a greater fluidity to Temple’s syntax. These two 
pronouns do not need contextual support (as did “it” [1]), nor do they need to 
reach forward for meaning (as did “it” [2]). Moving incrementally rather than in 
staccato fashion, “its” [3] and [4] seem to fulfil the demands of a useable (and 
for Temple, liveable) grammar. More, the rhythms of rape that materialise as a 
result of the semantic back and fore appear to have abated. Temple seems to 
have wrested some kind of control of her language. Certainly, the third and 
fourth pronouns suggest a more instantaneous - and perhaps more effective - 
semantic transmission. This is not to say that their rhythms pose no threat to 
Temple. In fact, “it” [3] and “it” [4], by repeating the mention of Popeye’s 
“hand”, bracket off a period of intense trauma. Temple’s use of the pronoun 
may have afforded her syntax a greater fluidity, yet it simultaneously re-
inscribes the presence of the “hand” that raped her. As if chanting “his hand, his 
hand” in a concussive series, Temple’s third and fourth pronouns demonstrate 
her inability to remove herself from the terrifying memory of Popeye’s “hand”.
As Temple’s fourth pronoun slides into a fifth, however, the impetus of 
Popeye’s “hand” is suddenly halted. “It” [5] is what linguists refer to as a 
“dummy” or “neuter” pronoun. The “dummy” pronoun, linguists maintain, 
does not have a referential duty but is transparent and essentially passive in its 
workings; its only function is to make the sentence “grammatical”. On one 
level, this claim holds. Temple’s fifth “it” works like the “it” in the declarative 
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phrase it’s raining; one understands this utterance without needing to ask what 
is raining. In addition to satisfying the demands of a generative grammar, this 
particular pronoun possesses a more radical intent. Specifically - and uniquely, 
given the semantic inclinations of the pronoun so far - “it” [5] generates 
meaning through its resistance toward meaning. Given the problematic 
inflections of the previous pronouns, the fact that this pronoun doesn’t mean - 
specifically it doesn’t mean “hand” or “rape” - is a pertinent detail. Up to this 
point in the pronominal sequence, the term “it” has carried terrifying 
implications for Temple, referring each time to a moment of violence. This 
particular pronoun, however, is different, and suggests a kind of semantic clear-
out. “It” [5] contests, in a bid to invert, the usefulness of words as functional 
semantic entities. This pronoun doesn’t, as is the case with the previous four, 
enact a process of “avoiding” but of “voiding”. Specifically, “it” [5] begins 
Temple’s campaign of “voiding the words like hot silent bubbles” (S 250) or, in 
our terms, of emptying them of traumatic literal meaning. “It” [5] is important, 
then, not as a presence but as a silence, an empty space. “It” [5] may be immune 
to linguistic affiliation, but it is not free from semantic meaning. Rather “it” [5] 
means by not meaning, which is not the same as being “meaningless”. The “hot 
silen[ce]” of “it” [5] thus offers Temple brief respite from the trauma that 
attended previous “its”. Given the pronouns’ previous with regard to the 
absorption of literal meaning “it” [5] is unique. Temple’s fifth pronoun parries 
the semantic advances to which the four previous pronouns succumbed. 
Mercifully, for Temple, “it” [5] connotes a (syntagmatic) hole that cannot be 
filled. Would that her body offer the same resilience, the same impenetrability. 
Tragically, Temple’s body - like her text - is essentially porous. Until “it” [5] at 
least, both Temple’s “body” and her “text” prove eminently pluggable: the 
former is filled with a “cob”, the latter with a pronoun. As a moment of pure 
opacity, however, “it” [5] has nothing to do with Temple’s rape. Given the 
velocity with which the other nine pronouns drive the memory of “rape” back 
103
into Temple, this lack of attribution is welcome. Properly speaking, then, “it” [5] 
is not free from meaning, but means by not meaning. This “it” resonates as what 
Bhabha might refer to as the “ineradicable sign of negative difference.”215 
Countering “it” [5]’s resilience to the absorption of the literal, “it” [6] 
symbolises a return to “positive” meaning. That is to say, the pronouns, from 
“it” [6] through to “it” {10], resume their role as the shock absorbers of Temple’s 
text. In fact, “it” [6] and “it” [7] accommodate not one but two meanings - and 
thus two kinds of shock. Semantically ambivalent, Temple’s sixth and seventh 
pronoun prevent the reader from ascertaining, with any degree of certainty, 
whether “it” means “skin” or “hand”. These two pronouns are open to the 
possibility of both assignations. We can do better than “ambivalence”, however. 
“It” [6] is what I want to term a semantically ambidextrous pronoun.216 Inasmuch 
as it is “[m]ore than usually dextrous or clever” (OED) Temple’s sixth pronoun 
pushes in two different directions at the same time. “It” [6] accommodates 
“hand” - that which reaches toward Temple’s vagina  - and it denotes Temple’s 
exposed “skin”, that which “jump[s] away” from Popeye’s insistent hand. For 
the first time, then, the pronoun refers to two things at once. Strikingly, it 
connotes two things that are in direct conflict. Demonstrating what Bakhtin 
calls the “internal dialogism of the word”, “it” [6] is the first of two polyvalent 
or “double voiced” pronouns that provide suitable housing for a brace of 
antagonistic semantic inflections.217 That Temple’s sixth pronoun runs together, 
and thus makes a compound of, these two competing referents is intentional: 
“hand” and skin” are the body parts that Sanctuary brings into distressing 
congress. Here, two meanings reside within a single word and operate in 
macabre tension. If we couldn’t state it already we surely can’t fail to now: the 
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pronoun is a place of violence - a place, that is, in which semantic clash 
translates into material clash. No new “information” comes between “it” [6] and 
[7] to alter, reverse or deflect the direction in which Temple’s meaning travels. 
Indeed, “it” [7] reiterates the poly-valences of “it” [6], attaching to the same two 
referents. Given the anaphoric returns of Temple’s text and given the associative 
logic that figuratively grafts “skin” to “hand”, one can reasonably suspect that 
“it” [7], like “it” [6], indicates both, bringing the relation between hand and skin 
into focus.
“It” [8] and “it” [9] ditch the double meaning and by so doing provide 
grim syncopation for the countdown to (the narrative recollection of) Temple’s 
fantasy penetration. Like [6] and [7], which replicated each other’s (dual) 
meanings, [8] and [9] are semantically twinned. Notably, however, a singular 
source - “hand” - dictates the reference point for these two pronouns. That 
Temple’s mind is stuck on this particular body part is hardly surprising. As 
Popeye’s “nasty little cold hand” descends down the length of her torso, a 
penetration threatens; it is thus logical that Popeye’s “hand” is the only thing 
about which Temple can think. In an attempt to maintain the distance between 
Popeye’s “hand” and her “insides”, Temple redoubles her efforts to 
dematerialise that which threatens her. Temple thus deploys an eighth pronoun 
to neuter the advances of Popeye’s “hand”.
This linguistic depletion, the eighth in a series of ten, not only delays the 
arrival of Popeye’s “hand” but it also marks the disappearance of the body part 
to which Popeye is drawn. As a last-ditch attempt to avoid the telling of the 
rape, “it” [8] oversees an amazing vanishing trick: Temple’s “skin would keep 
on jerking just ahead of it [8] like there wouldn’t be anything there when the 
hand got there.” Here, then, an absent hand attempts to grope at an amount of 
“skin” that no longer exists. The withdrawal of “hand”, through an 
intentionally obstructive grammar, and “skin”, by catachresis, annuls the 
likelihood of a rape. Temple’s “insides” seem, at “it” [8], at least, just out of 
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Popeye’s reach. In the portion of text so far explored, Temple refers, indirectly, 
and by way of a pronoun, to Popeye’s “hand” six times. Only once, however, 
does she refer to it by name. The protracted imprecision of Temple’s syntax 
means that by [8], “hand” has become a distant signifier.
 “It” [9] affirms the meaning of “it” [8], referring, for a final time, to 
Popeye’s “hand”. If “it” [8] labours to remain one step ahead of Popeye’s 
descending hand, “it” [9] suggests that the borders of Temple’s body are 
essentially indefensible. The attempted dematerialisation of Temple’s cringing 
body (“there wasn’t anything there”) is short-lived. Realising full contact with 
Temple’s  “insides” - a euphemism for “vagina” - “it” [9] ruins the defensive 
work of previous pronouns, which attempted alternatively to freeze (see “alive 
alice”) or cramp (see “jerking”) the movement of Popeye’s “hand”. Instead of 
arresting the motion of Popeye’s “hand” Temple appears, by “it” [9], to be 
enjoying the touch that it provides.218 The “bubbling” is a reference to Popeye’s 
agitated masturbating of Temple. Keen to denude this particular noise of its 
sexual connotations, Temple maintains that the “bubbling” emanates not from a 
stimulated clitoris but from a hungry stomach. The displacement tenders yet 
another example of the subterfuge - the “semantic indirection”, in Riffaterre’s 
terms - that typifies Temple’s counter-narrative.219 
“It” [10] acts as a coda or summation for this extended period of abuse, 
drawing to a close Temple’s intensive pronominal dependency. This final 
pronoun denotes the noise of the “shucks” that fill the mattress upon which 
Temple’s molestation takes place. Disturbed by the “jerking” of Popeye’s 
“hand”, these bits of loose matter provide a homophonic counterpart for the 
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“bubbling” to which “it” [9] referred. Temple believes that the corn shucks are 
“laughing at” her because, in her terms, she “hadn’t changed into a boy yet”. 
Mocked by her mattress, Temple is impelled to accelerate her transformation.    
*
Moving beyond this passage to one that follows only a page later, Temple’s 
attempt to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding her rape enters a second 
narrative phase. Here, Temple’s employment of the pronoun undergoes a 
substantial revision. Instead of using the pronoun “it” as a means of indirectly 
referring to an act that she finds unspeakable, Temple now uses the term as 
lexical material out of which she will form a material defence to her rape. 
Temple’s “it” now aims not only to repel or defend from Popeye’s advances but 
to directly punish him: 
I’d lie there with the shucks laughing at me and me jerking away in front 
of his hand and I’d think what I’d say to him. I’d talk to him like the 
teacher in school, and then I was a teacher in school and it was a little 
black thing like a nigger boy, kind of, and I was the teacher [...] I was 
telling it what I’d do, and it kind of drawing up and drawing up like it 
could already see the switch. 
Then I said That wont do. I ought to be a man. So I was an old 
man, with a long white beard, and then the little black man got littler and 
littler and I was saying Now. You see now. I’m a man now. Then I 
thought about being a man, and as soon as I thought it, it happened. It 
made a kind of plopping sound, like blowing a little rubber tube wrong-side 
outward. It felt cold, like the inside of your mouth when you hold it open. 
I could feel it, and I lay right still to keep from laughing about how 
surprised he was going to be. I could feel the jerking going on inside my 
knickers ahead of his hand and me lying there trying not to laugh about 
how surprised he was going to be in about a minute. 
 (S 330-1, italics added.)
Temple’s “it” no longer works to deaden or blunt the memory of her recently 
traumatic past but to match Popeye’s violence with one of her own. This 
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“intersecting of making and telling”, as Hale states it, allows Temple to re-
appropriate the pronoun as a weapon to attack Popeye.220  Newly configured, 
the term “it” refers not to Popeye’s but to Temple’s penis: specifically, this “it” 
connotes “a little rubber tube”.221  On the literal level, of course, Temple’s 
account is a fantasy, a charade of otherness. At no point in the passage (and at 
no other point in the novel) does Temple anthropomorphise into a “nigger 
boy”. She never becomes “a teacher in school”, a dead “bride” (as she claims in 
the next paragraph), nor does she get “to be a man”. Despite the technical 
implausibility of her becoming “other”, Temple’s “cryptofantasy” in Abraham 
and Torok’s, term - carries a very real incentive: the “switch”, as Temple calls it, 
allows her to displace and thus evade the terrifying implications of literal 
meaning.222  Appropriating what Freud termed “incorporation”, Temple 
figuratively ingests the bodies of others, taking them inside, so that they - rather 
than she - might absorb the trauma of a rape.223  Temple’s summoning of the 
Other - her “psychosymbolic shape shiftings”, in Charmaine Eddy’s phrasing - 
thus offers Temple a means of sampling the benefits of inhabiting other - indeed 
“Othered” - bodies.224  Only by sampling such bodies can Temple make an 
informed judgement upon which one is most likely to deter Popeye’s “cob”. 
The information will prove essential to the shoring up of Temple’s “insides”, a 
region that Popeye’s cobbed “hand” seeks to reduce to ruins. The “switch”, 
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then, not only allows Temple a means of opting out of her own problematic 
body but it provides her with the equipment (specifically a “little rubber tube”) 
with which she is able to mount a counter attack: she can fabricate a proxy body 
and rape Popeye back. 
Temple, of course, does not have a “cob” of her own with which she 
might enforce this punitive reversal; subsequently she must “borrow” one from 
elsewhere. In an attempt to recruit the most effective repellent, Temple moves 
into - and subsequently reverses out the other side of - a weighty folio of 
“undesirable” (that is, sexually untenable) bodies: a dead bride, a spinsterish 
teacher, a rural black child, and finally a hirsute old man. None of these 
borrowings fully satisfy Temple’s present needs. After rejecting the pedagogical 
austerity of the female “teacher in school” (presumably on the grounds of 
practicality) Temple appoints the “little black thing” of the “nigger boy”. 
Temple refuses this “black thing”, interestingly, for its lack of size. On one level, 
Temple’s phrase “little black thing” mobilises a phallic reduction which, by 
implication, disables a prevailing racist stereotype: that a black man has a larger 
penis than a white man. Yet the preliminary diminishment of black sexual 
prominence offered by “little black thing” is immediately problematised by the 
paternalistic inflection within Temple’s term ‘boy’. Born out of a heritage of 
paternalism and white-black racism, this “demeaning designation”, in John N. 
Duvall’s terms, initialises a return to stereotype and thus cancels the good work 
of the diminutive “little black thing”.225  Temple’s phrase is a site of 
contradiction, liberating the body of the black from a racist stereotype only as it 
shrinks, or belittles black presence at the level of the text.
Practically speaking, the “little black thing” proves insufficient in 
fending off the advances of the “black man” who threatens rape. Blackness, 
Temple asserts, “wont do”. “I ought to be a man”, an “old man, with a long 
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white beard”. It is this (white) incarnation, Temple hopes, that will really 
“surpris[e]” Popeye, will really “Pop” his “eyes”. Yet,  the “old white “man” 
maintains only a brief supremacy over the recently dismissed black “boy”. The 
inferred whiteness of “man” (which counters the tacit blackness of “boy”) is 
shortly contested by the sudden expulsive (re)appearance of the black via 
Temple’s psychosexual inflation of the “little rubber tube”. For Temple, the 
“switch” (in which corn is exchanged for rubber) is immediate: “as soon as I 
thought it, it happened. It made a kind of plopping sound like blowing a little 
rubber tube wrong-side outward.”226  The “plopping sound” is thus suggestive 
of an outward move, inasmuch as it nominates the “emergence” of a combative 
“rubber tube” by which Temple aims to land a pre-emptive penetration and 
thus thwart Popeye’s attempt at rape. Temple’s declarative clause occasions the 
emergence of a rubbery (and thus black) penis; the protuberance materialises as 
Temple inflates her clitoris, or, as she euphemistically terms it, that “little hot 
ball that screams”. This is an emergence which aims to land a pre-emptive 
penetration of Popeye, thwarting his planned rape of Temple. The move out, 
however, muffles an additional move in. Given the dialogic resonances of 
Temple’s earlier “its”, grammatical forms which denote both the act of rape and 
the “hand” that commits it, one might reasonably claim that the phrase “[t]hen 
it happened” also describes the moment of Temple’s rape. Immediately 
following the “happen[ing]” comes the sound of Temple’s penetration: “It made 
a kind of plopping sound”. Semantically ambivalent, this “plopping”, like the 
“little black thing of the nigger boy” moves in two directions. The case can be 
stated simply: whether Temple means to or not she emits a black rubber tube 
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from her vagina as a means of confronting Popeye’s “cob”.227  Countering 
Popeye’s “cob” (that which goes in) to Temple’s “knob”228  (that which comes 
out), rubber materialises as a black rubber phallus that Temple, in suitably 
sexual slang, “blow[s]” “wrong-side out” to greet Popeye’s invading “cob”.229 
By doing, rubber makes possible what Dawn Trouard and Edwin T. Arnold 
refer to as the “reverse rape of Popeye”.230 
The imagined inflation of the “little rubber tube” not only reverses 
Temple out of her gender but it reverses her out of her race. Specifically, black 
rubber returns Temple to the fantasy of miscegenation that was interrupted by 
her move out of the body of the “nigger boy” and into the “old white man”. By 
way of the rubber image Temple moves back to black. The racial inflections of 
the rubber tube are worth pondering here. In the first instance the reference to a 
“little rubber tube” is analogous to a condom. During the teens and twenties the 
condom would have been fashioned from dark brown or grey latex.231  This 
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coloration invokes a visual link between sex and blackness and, by extension, 
reinforces traditional stereotypes about black sexuality.232  Complicating the 
resemblance between the “little rubber tube” and the darkly coloured condom 
is a racist epithet that we discussed in chapter 1, the “balloon face of the 
nigger”. Temple does not pump up a balloon face but a balloon penis, yet the 
affinity between the (imagined) “rubber tube” and the (imagined) black penis 
surely holds. Racialised by Temple’s narrative, rubber “flashes up at a moment 
of danger”233, thus signalling the difficult emergence of black through white. 
Like a hideous hour-glass turned on its head, Temple is an inverted Bovary. 
Indeed, “that black stuff that ran out of Bovary’s mouth” (S 184) as Benbow 
describes it, is here reversed as black discharge that emerges from Temple’s 
vagina. In short, rubber acts as a proxy for an emergent blackness that, under 
strict instruction and activated on demand, “rises” to counter Popeye’s “nasty 
little cold hand”. Providing echoes of Quentin Compson’s “blanding” in The 
Sound and the Fury, the rubber image initiates a semantic insurgency through 
which the social dependency of black white-relations in the American South 
achieves metaphoric figuration. 
That Temple, a white southern “belle” becomes “black” in order to 
prevent her penetration at the hand of a “black man” (S 207; 212; 255) is rooted 
in a wider historical frame. Temple’s recourse to the (perceived) sexual prowess 
of the black male body should not be read as an ahistorical mutation. Rather, 
this “explicit moment of racechange”, in Duvall’s terms, codifies a (problematic) 
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system of racial dependency that delivered the shattering psychological 
realisation that white and black were two parts of a conjoined social body.234 
Temple’s problematic blackness whispers toward wider, insistently historical 
problems. In the wake of Reconstruction, as Williamson has written, the 
splitting of black from white traumatised the psychological character of the 
South. Temple, for sure, has ceased to be what she had been, yet it is at the 
historical level that her ordeal achieves resonance. The reversibility of Temple’s 
body, an act that places at its centre a (reversible) black penis, demonstrates the 
problematic, and often silently erotic, intersections of black and white that 
permeated the fabric of the American South. If Sanctuary is about rape, then, it 
is also about race. Much historiography cogently argues that rape is inextricably 
tied in with racist assumptions of black bestiality. Susan Estrich attests to the 
link: “Between 1930 and 1967”, she notes, “89% of the men executed for rape in 
[the United States] were black.”235 To consider the rape of a white woman, in 
the 1920s, in the south, without considering the black body (if only as a racist, 
“balloon-face” stereotype), is inconceivable.
So far in this chapter I have considered how the movement of the 
pronoun informs the movement of Temple Drake’s body. Broadly speaking, I 
have argued that Temple’s use of the pronoun offers her a means through 
which she can distort and reconfigure the violence of her terrifying past. More 
specifically, I have suggested that Temple’s pronoun attempts to swerve and 
evade the potency of literal meaning. Evidently, the word “it”, as Sanctuary’s 
“compacted doctrine”, proves the sounding board by which “discreet whispers 
of flesh” (S 279) become audible.236  In a second passage, I examined how a 
modification at the level of Temple’s pronoun provides a means of enacting a 
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modification at the level of her physical body. I have argued that Temple’s 
retaliative act is made possible by a co-opting of the black body. In the space 
that remains I propose to shore up these grammatical urges with a look to a 
final passage, in which we see a similar kind of mobility, a similar predilection 
for the pronoun, and, I will suggest, a similar trauma at the level of (black) 
history.
Chapter XXIII is not, then, the only point in the novel at which the 
pronoun and the body enter into congress. Providing an early indication of the 
extraordinary plasticity of Temple Drake’s body comes an extract from chapter 
VIII. As if it were a signpost for the grim contortions of chapter XXIII, 
! Temple’s head began to move. It turned slowly, as if she were following 
! the passage of someone beyond the wall. It turned on to an excruciating 
! degree, though no other muscle moved, like one of those papier-mâché 
! Easter toys filled with candy, and became motionless in that reverted 
! position. Then it turned back, slowly, as though pacing invisible feet 
! beyond the wall, back to the chair against the door and became 
! motionless there for a moment. Then she faced forward and Tommy 
! watched her take a tiny watch from the top of her stocking and look at it. 
! With the watch in her hand she lifted her head and looked directly at 
! him, her eyes calm and empty as two holes. After a while she looked 
! down at the watch again and returned it to her stocking. 
         (S 226)
Moving one way, pausing, and then reversing in the direction from which it 
came, Temple’s head performs “an excruciating” regime of move and 
countermove, of turn and re-turn. Inspired by the terrifying “masculine 
sounds” (S 216) from “beyond the wall” (226) this appalling - almost 
superhuman - show of dexterity sees Temple’s head, (or more accurately her 
“it”) rotate; her body, however, remains “rigid” (223; 288), even “erect” (226). 
The regressive turn of Temple’s “head”/”it” embodies that most Faulknerian of 
tensions, situating Temple in an unliveable place between rigidity and 
mobilisation. As William Rossky has written, ‘‘Temple seems almost constantly 
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in motion [but] yet remains terrifyingly fixed”.237 Her body, to cite a term from 
Absalom, Absalom! (1936), is a place of “fierce dynamic rigidity”.238  The (con)
torsion - and the contradiction that subsequently issues - is contextually 
appropriate: Temple is quite literally scared stiff (pun intended) yet she is 
similarly determined to get a better view of the threats that surround her, even 
though they remain hidden, “beyond the wall”. At the local (literal) level, the 
striking turn of Temple’s head indicates an immediate fear of rape. 
Metaphorically, however, this torturous head-turn does more than highlight a 
personal threat. I would like to conclude with the suggestion that this “turn” 
and “re-turn” speaks silently of wider historical anxieties, concerns with 
looking back. Contorted thus, Temple’s head acts as a symbolic repository - a 
“hive of subtlety” - within which Faulkner can encrypt broader social 
anxieties.239  Throughout this chapter I have traced some of these efforts to 
return or to revise, yet a final example should solidify my point. The threat of 
rape forces Temple’s head to turn, forces her to look back. Induced to “move” in 
this regressive fashion, Temple’s head pauses, becoming “motionless in that 
reverted position”; on its return forward, Temple’s appearance seems somewhat 
altered. Her eyes, “calm and empty as two holes” have witnessed a trauma 
outside of the “walls” of her room. The trauma that Temple perceives “beyond 
the walls” testifies to the South’s problematic relationship to its (black) history. 
Temple’s turn is a synecdoche for what Sundquist calls the “gratuitous 
contortions” of the Old South.240  Temple carries this traumatic historical 
sediment with her throughout the novel, so much so that the anxiety of 
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backwardness provided by Faulkner subsequently (dis)colours her attempt to 
move forward, to forget her history, to split from blackness. Yet these operations 
ultimately prove futile. However reversible the novel’s bodies might be, they 
remain unable to fully expunge the traces of a violence that permeates the 
grammar of Temple Drake and the grammar of the South.
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PART TWO: 
FORM, VISION, AND HISTORY IN JOHN DOS PASSOS’ U.S.A.
Tending toward the opaque, Faulkner’s fictions of the 1929-1931 period are 
symptomatic of sustained and repeated attempts to occlude, block, or violate 
the efficacy of the eye. Each novel differs in how it formalises, or gives shape to, 
this preoccupation. In The Sound and the Fury, the eye is transfigured, beaten, or 
on the point of collapse; in all instances it is blackened. In As I Lay Dying, the eye 
is ripped from its representational sockets, detached, and thus alienated from its 
phenomenological context. In Sanctuary, the eye is jaundiced, impotent, and 
roams obliquely from one dark room to the next. Semantically inefficient and 
begrudging with regard to the release of historically freighted meaning, the 
Faulknerian “eye”/”I” occasions what I dub a problem of throughness. Put 
differently, I have suggested that Faulkner’s texts, petrified by their own 
historicity, seek to retain meaning within cramped grammatical locations, thus 
preventing semantic leakage. They are exercises in hiddenness. The problem of 
throughness causes significant problems at the textual level. These textual 
“problems”, however, issue from a staunchly historical source. Faulkner’s 
textual (de)formations are, in short, responses to prior historical (de)formations. 
Wilfully opaque, Faulkner’s textual practice is part of a dedicated campaign of 
obfuscation through which historical meaning is suppressed, buried, hidden 
from view. As it has been argued, the challenges that issue from Faulkner’s 
formal practice are numerous.      Despite these difficulties, one thing is clear: 
each novel brokers a problematic, because historically sedimented, relationship 
between narrative and “seeing”. The above discussions anchor Faulkner’s 
textual opacity to three grammatical locations: the pronouns “them”, “I” and 
finally “it”. Faulkner’s three novels exploit their respective pronouns as a 
means by which they might enact what Jay calls “the dethronement of the 
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eye.”241                    
               If Faulkner’s “trilogy” generates its meaning by contesting - and 
ultimately by repealing - the primacy of (historical) vision, as I have insisted 
that it does, Dos Passos’ trilogy U.S.A. (1930; 1932; 1936 [1938]) generates its 
meaning by reinstating the eye to a position of authority.242 The second half of 
this thesis investigates the conditions under which this kind of “authority” 
becomes manifest. In U.S.A., the eye is neither deficient nor faulty - as it was in 
Faulkner - but is instead a viable, reliable and ultimately efficient organ. That the 
Dos Passosian “eye” is more efficient than the Faulknerian one is hardly 
surprising. As we shall see over the course of the coming pages, this visual 
efficiency is the product of the implementation of mechanical modes. I refer, of 
course, to the textual operations of the Camera Eye, the pre-eminent place of 
visual efficiency in Dos Passos’ prose fiction. It is to the efficient and abundant 
semantic proliferations of The Camera Eye that I shall now turn.
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CHAPTER FOUR  
MACHINING MEANING: U.S.A.
It is February 1930. Stamped, bound, and uniformly cut to size, first editions of 
Dos Passos’ fifth novel, The 42nd Parallel roll off the production line at Harpers 
and Brothers, New York. This work, the first instalment of what, eight years 
later, becomes the U.S.A. trilogy, attests to Dos Passos’ implementation of an 
entirely new textual apparatus.243  Hyper-efficient in its operations, the new 
textual “system” is geared to outstrip the semantic capabilities of Dos Passos’ 
previous aesthetic machinery. In U.S.A. words work harder, move at greater 
speed and with the minimum of effort. Meaning is machined; energy is saved; 
waste, strain, and fatigue are things of the past. 
! In a bid to maximise the productive output of literary language U.S.A. 
invokes what Siegfried Giedion calls “new methods of organization”.244 
Significantly, Dos Passos refers to U.S.A. as “my four-way conveyor system”.245 
Dos Passos’ “conveyor system” metaphor approximates to what Ricoeur, in his 
discussion of Aristotelian poesis, terms a “good metaphor”. For Aristotle, 
Ricoeur argues, “the gift of making good metaphors relies on the capacity to 
contemplate similarities. Moreover, the vividness of “good” [perhaps 
“efficient”] metaphors consists in their ability to “set before the eyes” the sense 
that they display. What is suggested here is a kind of pictorial dimension, which 
can be called the picturing function of metaphorical meaning.”246  The eidetic 
intuition of Dos Passos’ metaphor - its “picturing function” - sets in motion a 
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“system” of semantic (over)productivity in which “similarities” between 
”textual” and “industrial” forms of conveyance achieve realisation. Meaning is 
a product of the assembly line. Dos Passos’ conception of U.S.A. as a “four-way 
conveyor system” mobilises what Ricoeur calls “an inquiry into the capacity of 
metaphor to provide untranslatable information, and, accordingly, into 
metaphor’s claim to yield some true insight about reality”.247  The “reality” that 
emerges from Dos Passos’ metaphor is historically anchored and, more 
specifically, is predicated on seismic shifts in American modes of industrial 
production. 
!   As Martha Banta notes, the first third of the twentieth century was “an 
era during which management methods for efficient production were inspiring, 
and complicating, every phase of diurnal experience.”248  The “management 
method” to which Dos Passos’ metaphor refers is the assembly-line. 
Inaugurated by Henry Ford in 1914 and implemented in his (state-funded) river 
Rouge plant from 1917, assembly-line technologies would revolutionise 
production in the United States, at least above the Mason-Dixon line.249  As 
David Harvey points out, “by flowing the work to a stationary worker [Ford] 
achieved dramatic gains in productivity”. Consequently, “labour productivity 
could be radically increased by breaking down each labour process into 
component motions and organizing fragmented work tasks according to 
rigorous standards of time and motions study”.250  Regulated by little except 
what Marx calls “the boundless thirst for surplus labour” the assembly-line 
would enshrine overproduction as the sine qua non of American 
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industrialism.251  Given the rapid rise of Fordism as urban America’s dominant 
mode of production it seems fitting that Dos Passos uses a machine-based 
metaphor as a means of describing his textual practice. 
! Through metaphorical association, then, Dos Passos pins his most 
successful writing to the workings of the assembly-line and by so doing 
provides a specific location within which his “writerly technologies”, in Caren 
Irr’s phrasing - might be situated.252  As Banta suggests, “[m]odern industrial 
life requires the creation of appropriate narrative structures, expressive forms as 
‘scientific’ as the conditions they set out to represent. The scientific account, 
neither melodrama nor the realist novel, is the proper genre for the times.”253 
Thus the assembly-line proved, in Evelyn Cobley’s terms, “the appropriate 
metaphor for an unassailable objective reality”.254  The machine, and by 
extension, the ideological apparatus of late capital thus provided a semantic 
reference by which Dos Passos’ literary mode of production, his “modern word 
conveyors” in the idiom of the journalist and inventor Bob Brown, could 
semanticise the emergence, first via Taylor, and later Ford, of a regulated, 
rationalised, and standardised mode of (prose) production. Part “self-mockery” 
part double-bluff, Dos Passos’ machine-based metaphor pulls on the verb “to 
convey” and by so doing subjects literary language to the operations of the 
Fordist economy. 
! Given the intensification of Dos Passos leftism, however, his metaphoric 
comparisons are problematic. More, they cut against his frequent attacks on 
modern modes of production. In a biography from The Big Money entitled “Tin 
Lizzie”, Dos Passos satirises the ills of standardisation and the concomitant 
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drive to extract surplus from the (newly sedentary) body of labour: 
! At Ford’s production was improving all the time; less 
! waste, more ! spotters, strawbosses, stoolpigeons (fifteen 
! minutes for lunch, three minutes to go to the toilet, the 
! Taylorized speedup everywhere, reach under, adjust 
! washer, screw down bolt, shove in cotterpin, reachunder 
! adjustwasher, screwdown bolt, reachunderadjustscrew-
! downreachunderadjust until every ounce of life was 
! sucked off into production and at night the workmen 
! went home grey shaking husks). (TBM 812-3)
Such an exchange is awkwardly situated, providing a denunciation of the 
Fordized processes to which U.S.A., as a “four-way conveyor system”, is 
formally committed. We will examine the effects of this tension in the coming 
arguments. Suffice it to say here that by appropriating Fordism as a formal 
reference, Dos Passos prose renders as obsolete his previous prose productions. 
With recourse to an explicitly optical analogy, Dos Passos expresses the 
distinction this way: “Three Soldiers and Manhattan Transfer had been single 
panels; now, somewhat as the Mexican painters felt compelled to paint their 
walls, I felt compelled to start on a narrative panorama to which I saw no 
end.”255  The figurative journey from “panel” to “panorama” provides a visual 
lexicon by which we can start to theorise U.S.A.’s abundant semantic 
projections. 
! Dos Passos’ term “panorama” taps into the visual prehistory of emergent 
modernity. Patented by Robert Barker in 1787, the “panorama,” or La Nature à 
coup d’ Oeil (“nature at a glance”), as it was originally marketed, refers to a 
“picture of a landscape or other scene, either arranged on the inside of a 
cylindrical surface round the spectator as a centre (a cyclorama), or unrolled 
and unfolded and made to pass before him, so as to show the various parts in 
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succession” (OED). The “narrative panorama” to which Dos Passos saw “no 
end” is “arranged” in a similar fashion to the contraption devised by Barker; it 
also, of course, evokes the movements of the assembly line. The “various parts” 
of the text - The Camera Eye, Newsreel, biographies and prose narratives - are 
“made to pass before” the reader; they are “rolled out” in succession. 
! It is no small concern that as “panel” became “panorama”, Dos Passos’ 
political identity moved from the singular to the collective. The deepening of 
Dos Passos’ historical consciousness would place under considerable strain his 
metaphoric comparisons, the first of which mechanises his prose practise, the 
second which sees it stretching into the infinite. By satirising industrial modes, 
Dos Passos comes perilously close to condoning them. Indeed, the flip tenor of 
Dos Passos’ “conveyor system” analogy jars with a number of more sanguine 
judgements as to the dehumanising effects of capitalist modes of production. In 
a review of Hemingway’s novel A Farewell to Arms (1929) Dos Passos provides 
chronologically pertinent evidence of a vehement, if embattled opposition to 
the division of labour, an ideological “event” to which his “conveyor system” 
metaphor explicitly refers. Published in the New Masses in December 1929, Dos 
Passos‘ laudatory review cuts across - and thus problematises - his account of 
U.S.A. as a textual mechanism driven by four Fordized “conveyor[s]”. 
Commending Hemingway on the grounds of his perceived intolerance of 
modern modes of production, Dos Passos states that the novel represents “a 
firstrate piece of craftsmanship by a man who knows his job. It gives you the 
sort of pleasure line by line that you get handling a piece of wellfinished 
carpenter’s work”.256  Strikingly, given his predilection for technological 
analogies, Dos Passos engages only briefly with Hemingway’s text before he 
segues into an extended critique on the ornery perquisites of modern 
industrialism. “After all,” Dos Passos insists,
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craftsmanship is a damn fine thing, one of the few human functions a 
man can unstintedly admire. The drift of the Fordized world seems all 
against it. Rationalization and subdivision of labor in industry tend more 
and more to wipe it out. It’s getting to be almost unthinkable that you 
should take pleasure in your work, that a man should enjoy doing a 
piece of work for the sake of doing it as well as he damn well can. What 
we still have is the mechanic’s or the motorman’s pleasure in a 
smoothrunning machine. As the operator gets more mechanized even 
that disappears; what you get is a division of life into drudgery and 
leisure instead of into work and play. As industrial society evolves and 
the workers get control of the machines a new type of craftsmanship may 
work out. For the present you only get opportunity for craftsmanship, 
which ought to be the privilege of any workman, in novelwriting and the 
painting of easelpictures and in a few of the machinebuilding trades that 
are hangovers from the period of individual manufacture that is just 
closing. 
Notwithstanding the soft-pedalled “may” that qualifies - and thus weakens - 
Dos Passos’ belief in socialism as a viable alternative to American capital, these 
rhetorical investments bring Dos Passos into line with an orthodox Marxism, of 
which Lukács, in his twenties “phase” at least, stood as the pre-eminent 
example. Dos Passos’ idiomatic phrase “the drift of the Fordized world” sits 
flush with the Lukácsian complaint as regards the commodification and 
reification of labour. In History and Class Consciousness (1923) Lukács complains 
that “the mechanical disintegration of the process of production into its 
components destroys those bonds that had bound individuals to a community 
in the days when production was still organic.”257 The Dos Passos of the New 
Masses article would surely have lamented, in concert with Lukács, that “the 
division of labour”, an imperative fixture of capitalist systems of accumulation, 
“disrupts every organically unified process of work and life and breaks it down 
into its components.”258  That Dos Passos decries “rationalization and 
subdivision in industry” three months before he institutes “rationalization and 
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subdivision” as a structural imperative of his fiction (and, moreover, an 
imperative “to which [he] saw no end”) flags up the signal contradiction of the 
mature aesthetic. Engaging with - and simultaneously distancing himself from - 
the operational conceits of modern American industrialism, Dos Passos‘ 
“literary” product is locked into an impossible epistemology. The contradiction, 
which sees Dos Passos‘ formalism wedged between critique and appropriation, 
does not derogate from the trilogy’s value as a literary text, however, but points 
to its signal virtue. It points, that is, to its dialectic. The interaction of 
antagonistic intuitions generates the driving force by which Dos Passos’ text 
establishes new and potentially revolutionary meaning. As we shall see over the 
course of the coming chapters, this meaning would fluctuate both in its amount 
and in its quality, yet The Camera Eye is the only place in U.S.A. in which a 
tension between modern(ist) textual practice and historical memory becomes 
manifest as a dialectical imperative. This chapter focuses on two interlinked 
strands of this “imperative”. In a few pages I will draw out, with reference to 
Dos Passos’ text, an antagonism between form, as a lurch forward, and history, 
as a reference to the past. First, however, and as a means of theorising how Dos 
Passos deals with the proliferation of abundant historical meaning, I seek to 
draw out an antagonism between use and surplus.
FIGURATIONS OF SURPLUS 
Routed into a Fordized aesthetic, The Camera Eye facilitates an abundance of 
prose product. Crucially, it is also the means by which these proliferations 
might be controlled. In an interview of July 1962 Dos Passos would provide a 
succinct prehistory for The Camera Eyes. “I was trying,” he writes, 
to develop what I had started, possibly somewhat unconsciously, in 
Manhattan Transfer. By that time I was really taken with the idea of 
montage. I had tried it out in Manhattan Transfer – using pieces of 
popular songs. By the time it evolved into such compartments as the 
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camera eye of the U.S.A trilogy it served a useful function – which in that 
case was to distil my subjective feelings about the incidents and people 
described. My hope was to achieve the objective approach of a Fielding, 
or a Flaubert, particularly as one sees it in Flaubert’s letters, which are 
remarkable. In the biographies, in the Newreeels and even the narrative, 
I aimed at total objectivity by giving conflicting views – using the camera 
eye as a safety valve for my own subjective feelings. It made objectivity 
in the rest of the book much easier.259
These fifty-one “compartments” - more than half of which are crammed into 
The 42nd Parallel - free up the textual space within which Dos Passos can pug 
away his “subjective feelings” and, by doing, alleviate the semantic pressure 
that might affect the trilogy’s other textual parts, or “components”, in the 
Lukácsian register. In Dos Passos’ terms, The Camera Eye functions as a “safety 
valve” through which he can “distil” or “convey” subjective meaning away 
from the rest of the text. In this sense, The Camera Eyes do not generate semantic 
meaning so much as they facilitate the efficient management of its flows. They  are 
not the source of production but the means by which production might be 
governed and, by implication, its values appropriated. They do not produce but 
they control. Yet, and almost impossibly, The Camera Eyes, by siphoning off 
superfluous (read: “subjective”) literary matter, yield “use values”. That is to 
say, they serve, as Dos Passos’ claims, a “useful function”. These prose 
compartments constitute semantic gutters through which U.S.A.’s unwanted 
(subjective) meaning can be channelled. As designated “control systems” The 
Camera Eyes regulate the textual “flows” and, by so doing, guarantee the 
solvency of the prose “system”.260  In short, “objectivity” is the condition to 
which the (literary) text strives; the (camera) text is the agent in that striving. To 
employ a Derridean formulation, objectivity is the “gift” which, bestowed on 
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the rest of the “system”, appears to seek nothing in return. This act of giving, 
rooted as it is in systems of exchange, does, as we shall see, indeed demand 
reciprocity. The abstractedness of this particular act of giving - in which one 
piece of text gives itself to another - does not indign Derrida’s notion of the gift 
as a pertinent frame of reference. As Derrida writes, “[t]his “something” [the 
gift] may not be a thing in the common sense of the word but rather a symbolic 
object; and, like the donor, the donee may be a collective subject; but in any case 
A gives B to C.”261  Following Derrida we might locate The Camera Eye as the 
“donor” (A) that gives “objectivity”, a “symbolic object” (B), to the other three 
narrative “belts”, or “collective subject” (C). Dos Passos’ own observations lend 
support to such a bid. In an interview of 1968 Dos Passos insisted that 
“objectivity” not only conditioned U.S.A. but sat at the centre of his entire 
oeuvre. He reports, somewhat defensively, that
[m]y system has always been to try to do it objectively. That’s why I put 
the Camera Eye things in U.S.A.; it was a way of draining off the 
subjective by directly getting in little bits of my own experience.262
Inasmuch as they jointly assume the beneficence of “objectively” rendered 
prose, our two most recently indented citations are linked by a common 
function: to drain off subjective liquidity. So far, the “gift” seems unproblematic 
and centred upon “use”; Dos Passos’ textual “compartments” are the 
authorised outlets within which his “subjective feelings” can safely accumulate. 
The primary duty of The Camera Eye is thus to hold - that is, to hoard - rejected or 
superfluous subjective meaning, making the text safe for objectivity. As they 
make it safe, however, The Camera Eyes foster the conditions under which tacitly 
dialectical reverberations receive amplification. The dialectic centres on the 
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valences of two linked terms: “distil” and “draining off”. These terms are 
crucial in an attempt to unpack and subsequently theorise The Camera Eye’s 
conceptual ontology. 
According to the O.E.D. the verb “distil” carries a number of connotative 
and denotative inflections. In the first instance it can connote “[t]o trickle down 
or fall in minute drops” or “[to] extract the quintessence of; to concentrate [or] 
purify”. The proximate verb “to drain” follows similar semantic coordinates, 
meaning “to draw off or away (a liquid) gradually, or in small quantities, by 
means of a conduit or carry off or away by means of a drain.” Routed into a 
common vernacular, “distil” and “drain” infer the “extraction” and subsequent 
appropriation, in increments, and for some useful purpose, of specifically 
desired liquidities. They infer a sort of essence. By “draining off the subjective” 
The Camera Eye thus affirms its status as a “use-value”. That is to say, it fulfils a 
job deemed essential to the “health” of the textual “system”. Paradoxically, 
though, the “use-value” of The Camera Eye is predicated on its status as a 
figuration of “surplus”. Inasmuch as The Camera Eyes are not, as Sinclair 
attested, essential to the “story”, they connote a reserve or fund of semantic 
value from which one might later draw. The flows that are channelled into these 
textual locations represent a textual product that is over and above the 
immediate demands of the textual “economy.” In effect, The Camera Eyes hold 
the flows that have been “withdrawn from the stream of circulation”, in Marx’s 
terms.263  As the means by which Dos Passos redirects extruded textual matter 
away from the metabolism, The Camera Eyes are essential to the workings of the 
system yet at the same time they are superfluous to it. Thus The Camera Eye 
becomes, in Sohn-Rethel’s idiomatic phrase, “an object of use-value estranged 
from its use”.264  The Camera Eyes are the drainage and they are the drained. 
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Throughout the trilogy, The Camera Eye remains unable to reconcile this 
implicitly dialectical tension between use and surplus. 
Closer attention to the notion of surplus sheds further light on Dos 
Passos’ prose proliferations. In the Marxian economy “surplus” functions as the 
lifeblood of capitalist accumulation; its extraction and subsequent embodiment 
as exchange value - value which congeals in commodities - constitutes what 
Lukács calls the “central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its 
aspects”.265  In Social Justice and the City (1973) Harvey, following Marx, offers a 
useful and concise way of approaching the theoretically freighted notion of 
“surplus” as it informs Marx’s theory of political economy. “Surplus value”, he 
states, “is that part of the total value of production which is left over after 
constant capital (which includes the means of production, raw materials and 
instruments of labour) and variable capital (labour power) have been accounted 
for.”266  Surplus, Harvey counsels, can take two forms. The first he dubs “social 
surplus”, which is described as “an amount of material product (over and 
above that which is necessary to reproduce society in its existing state) that is set 
aside to promote improvements in human welfare.”267  Alternatively, surplus 
“may be regarded as an estranged or alienated version of the first: it appears as 
a quantity of material resources that is appropriated for the benefit of one segment 
of society at the expense of another.”268 The textual “surpluses” that issue from the 
camera’s eye connote a variant strain of the two forms of social surplus alluded 
to by Harvey. While these stockpiles of textual capital are not “set aside to 
promote improvements in human welfare” they do “promote” what we might 
call the “textual welfare”. As per Dos Passos’ claim, The Camera Eye exists not 
for its own sake but for the benefit of the other parts of the “system”. Its 
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liquidities are duly “appropriated”, not for “the benefit of one segment of 
society”, but for three. Despite its alienation from the other “segments” of the 
(textual) community, then, The Camera Eye gifts itself widely, affirming a 
broader sociality. 
As locations within which Dos Passos holds and stores the “visual 
capital” that is generated by the subdivision and rationalisation of the “literary” 
text, these compartments constitute the hoards of the textual economy.269 In the 
second volume of Capital Marx writes that “the form of the hoard is simply the 
form of money not in circulation, money that is interrupted in its circulation 
and is therefore preserved in its money form.”270  “Money”, or, more exactingly, 
the exchange-value that is embodied by useable gold is, while in circulation, 
fluid; hoarded, it comes to a halt.271  Hoarded money, for Marx, is money at a 
standstill, money that is “immobilised”.272  Dos Passos’ textual economy 
responds in significant measure to the Marxian schema; “circulation”, 
“interrupted” and “”preserved” are the key terms by which Dos Passos’ textual 
practice underscores its Marxian commitments. First, the notion of “circulation” 
links the monetary hoard to the “textual” one. The fluidities of the literary text 
approximate the sloughed off values from the monetary economy. To be in The 
Camera Eye is to be outside of circulation. If “circulation” provides a first key 
term, “interruption”, its anachronism, provides a second. Indeed, The Camera 
Eyes are agents of interruption inasmuch as they situate themselves between 
other bits of text. Positioned thus, these episodes interrupt the textual flux and 
thus denote breaks in its circulation. Connected to but separate from the rest of 
the textual metabolism, the textual flows that gather in The Camera Eye connote 
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liquidities that are effectively withdrawn from the textual economy. Integral to 
the operations of the “system” yet removed from it, these sclerotic deposits of 
subjective value are awkwardly positioned between “use” and “surplus”.
As stockpiles of reserve meaning that can be drawn upon at moments of 
need, The Camera Eyes are deployed as a means of meeting the specific - and 
often fluctuating - demands of the textual “economy”. The hoard achieves 
capitalisation by drawing on (or “draining” from) what Marx, in the Critique, 
calls the “social metabolism”.273 Stripped of their sociality, Dos Passos’ hoarded 
narratives constitute stockpiles of visual capital that have been “smuggled 
away from society”.274 Removed from the social life that inf(l)ects the rest of the 
trilogy, these private - or better yet privatised - memories register as moments of 
“holding and storing up”, in Marx’s term.275 “Holding” in that they operate to 
maintain the balance in the textual “system”; “storing”, in that they can be 
utilised whenever the text needs controlling, easing, or adjustment. As the 
“safety valves” that channel overproduced  textual meaning, The Camera Eyes 
thus resonate as the hoards of the textual economy and thus play a central role 
in what Marx, in his discussion of surplus value, calls “[t]he vascular system of 
production”.276  Structurally analogous to hoards, then, The Camera Eyes 
constitute reserves of surplus value upon which the remainder of the text can 
conceivably draw. The money hoard, as employed in the capitalistic economy 
and The Camera Eye as employed in U.S.A. are linked mechanisms; both seek to 
stabilise or “balance” respectively fragile - and inherently imbalanced - systems 
of accumulation.
The above discussions provide, in condensed form, a general theory, 
based on the principles of a scientific Marxism, under which the rationalised 
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affinities of the Camera Eye can be grouped.
Drawn to the tension between use and surplus, described above, comes a 
second strand of the dialectic, and concerns an antagonism between modernist 
form, as a lurch forward, and history, as a retreat into the past. As stridently 
historical narratives, that is to say, as episodes that interrupt to historical flow of 
the other three “conveyors”, The Camera Eyes connote interlinked exercises in 
looking back. Spanning a period from 1902 to 1931, these fifty one prose belts 
thus occasion what Jameson, in his most recent work, has dubbed an 
“unremitting confrontation” between form and history.277  In short, as form 
proposes a move forward, history parries, proposing one back. Neither of these 
forces cancels out the other yet the antagonism is a generative one. These 
episodes constitute what Taussig, following Benjamin, refers to as “dialectic at a 
standstill.”278  The tensile relation between movement and historicity is not 
arbitrary. In fact, and in the idiom of Gallagher and Greenblatt, seeks “to show 
the relation between a culture’s obviously dynamic elements and its seemingly 
static ones.”279 In Michael North’s wording, “an intended meaning of speed and 
progress [clashes] with the confession of repetition and regress.”280 I seek now 
to show how this branch of the dialectic, predisposed toward antagonism and 
“semantic clash” manifests at the level of Dos Passos’ prose form.
! The suspension of punctuation is The Camera Eye’s most durable - and 
most visible - formal characteristic. The measure is enforced almost without 
exception across the trilogy; the period halts none of U.S.A.’s fifty-one Camera 
Eyes; the comma restrains the text on only five occasions; the semi-colon 
appears once. [See APPENDIX, D] Aside from these anomalous moments, the 
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text does not, grammatically speaking, come to a “standstill” anywhere in the 
trilogy.281  Neither, importantly, does the reader’s eye. By opting out of a 
governing grammar The Camera Eye bypasses the formal traffic that would 
hinder a more traditionally “grammatical” prose form. In stark contrast to the 
clotted semantic articles of Faulkner, then, language has been subjected to the 
assembly line and rendered fluid and fast. An “emphatic rapid-transit 
structure” that bypasses traditional formal grammars, The Camera Eye engineers 
what Cecilia Tichi calls “a poetics of efficiency”.282  The streamlining of literary 
language comes as standard in each of The Camera Eyes. One opens the text at 
any Camera Eye and the result will be the same. The Camera Eye (17) offers a 
pertinent example of the rebellious, freedom-loving, yet problematically 
unregulated formal syntax of the prose conveyor. It is May 18th, 1910; Dos 
Passos (then John Madison) is in his final term at Choate school, Connecticut, 
and awaits the arrival of Halley’s comet.283 The reader passes her eye across the 
following standardised, streamlined prose material:
        and not in church and Skinny said if you’d never been 
baptized you couldn’t be confirmed and you went and told 
Mr. Greenleaf  and  he  looked  very  chilly  and  said you’d 
better not go to confirmation class any more  and  after that 
you had to  go  to  church  Sundays  but  you could go to ei-
ther  one  you  liked  so  sometimes you went to the Congre-
gational and sometimes to the Episcopalian and the Sunday 
the   bishop  came  you  couldn’t   see  Halley’s  Comet  any 
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more  and you saw the others being confirmed and it lasted 
for  hours  because  there  were  a lot of little girls being con-
firmed  too  and  all  you  could  hear  was mumble mumble
this thy child mumble mumble this thy child and you  won-
dered  if   you’d   be   alive  next  time  Halley’s Comet came 
round !(42P 183)
Favouring the fluid, continuous ebb of connectives - “and”, “but”, and “so” - 
over the ponderous (and potentially terminal) deliberations of a period, Dos 
Passos’ streamlined syntax invokes an aesthetics of the production-line. The 
suspension of punctuation propels the text forward, setting in motion the drive 
toward a fully efficient textual epistemology. By stripping the text of its 
punctuation Dos Passos clears his syntax of grammatical clutter and expedites 
the speed of its reading. The expediency is central to the proliferation of the 
apparatus to which Dos Passos’ prose form tacitly refers. As Hart Crane writes 
in an essay on the photography of Alfred Stieglitz, “[s]peed is at the bottom of it 
all […] the hundredth of a second caught so precisely that the motion is 
continued from the picture indefinitely: the moment made eternal.”284  Only by 
stripping the text of its grammatical impediments can Dos Passos’ text become 
fast, fluid, and consequently modern. The Camera Eye privileges “the essential 
freedom of modernity - movement” above all other functions.285 Punctuation, as 
a time to “pause”, “breath”, or “rest” is a stylistic anachronism in this intensive 
new textual economy. Even the comma, as an occasion for the briefest pause, is 
incompatible with, and thus sacrificed to the progressive ambitions of a text that 
simply cannot wait, cannot delay. The comma implies an extraneous motion - 
an unnecessary twist of the syntactical wrench - to which the modern text 
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simply need not commit. 
! It is the omniscient eye of the camera that is the organ for these 
compulsory - and indeed compulsive - grammatical redundancies. Eschewing 
the ponderous deliberations of a traditional grammar, the camera-text 
implements what Sontag refers to as a “fast seeing”.286 By accelerating the prose 
text, Dos Passos “streamlines the eye”.287 Demanding fewer movements of the 
eye and thus demanding less effort in its consumption, The Camera Eye 
eradicates waste from the process of reading. Thus streamlined, the text can 
yield the maximum “value” with the minimum expenditure on behalf of the 
reader. The tag-line might read: “Text labours so you don’t have to”. An 
abundance of surplus is duly generated and siphoned off into Dos Passos’ prose 
compartments.
! Dos Passos’ camera-text exploits what Jean-Louis Baudry calls “the 
inherent mobility of the cinematic mechanism”288  and, by so doing, 
approximates the “Eye-Lingo” valorised by Brown in 1929.289  Brown’s reading 
machine works “microscopically by the new photographic process”, printing 
words “on a transparent tough tissue roll…no bigger than a typewriter ribbon”. 
Approximations of strips of celluloid, these words would unroll, in a panoramic 
sort of way, and subsequently pass “beneath a narrow strip of strong 
magnifying glass.”290  Brown’s conception of the Readies (pronounced “read-
ease”) is instructive with regard to the “literary” text that Dos Passos feeds 
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under the “magnifying eye” of his camera. Dos Passos’ conveyor-belt-cum-
kino-eye passes text under its magnifying “eye”/”I”, and does so as a means of 
making “language purely optical for the first time in history.”291 The influence 
of cinematic technique on Brownian textual practice, and by extension, on Dos 
Passos’s is unmistakeable. The cinematic apparatus solicited by Brown and 
broader advances in cinematic technique provided the impetus for a new, 
eminently modern, and conceivably democratic mode of prose production. The 
linkages between Dos Passos’ prose forms and cinema have been well 
established.292  As Dziga Vertov would diarize in 1934, “Dos Passos’ work 
involves a translation from film-vision into literary language. The terminology 
and construction are those of the kino-eye.”293  Hence cinema’s appeal to Dos 
Passos who was, as he wrote The 42nd Parallel, was not only in the thrall of 
experimental avant-gardes but increasingly committed to the causes of the 
working classes. Dos Passos, like Brown, felt that “by mimicking the movement 
of cinema”, one might “somehow short-circuit the conventional meanings of 
words and letters, allowing other, more genuine meanings immediate access to 
the eye.”294 
! Calling for new forms of attention and released from traditional syntactic 
obligations, the “eye” of the “camera” is free to move; its “rhythms” are fluid 
and forward moving; its “sentences”, if we can call them this, rush across the 
page with apparent impunity. The filmic syntax of Dos Passos cinematic text 
manifests from the very first Camera Eye. Here, the speed-up at the level of the 
text coincides with the rush of physical bodies. Rapid material transit is
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 ! ! !  easier if you hold Mother’s hand and 
hang on it that way you can kick up your toes but walking 
fast you have to tread on too  many  grassblades  the  poor
hurt green tongues shrink under your feet       maybe thats 
why those people are so angry and follow us shaking their 
fists      they’re throwing stones grownup people  throwing               
stones     She’s walking fast and we’re running (42P 13)
This “running” is both textually and materially determined. The flat speed that 
Dos Passos generates from the suspension of punctuation - his “running on” of 
words - is analogous to the expeditious pace with which the narrator is pulled 
off of his feet by his dashing mother. The syntactical fluidity of the Camera Eye 
(1) is complicit in aiding a pair of bodies in desperate need of efficient, 
streamlined propulsion. Yet there is an excess here that compromises the drive 
toward a streamlined textuality. These two bodies are made to expend 
significant energies in an attempt to keep up with a rapid prose form. 
! The accelerated movement of the Madisons is historically determined. 
Mistaken for English subjects, these bodies dart and weave across the “cobbles” 
of this Belgian or maybe “Dutch” city so that they might escape unscathed from 
violent reaction to British imperialism in South Africa, namely, the Battle of 
Bloemfontaine in March 1900, impossibly referred to by the infant Dos Passos as 
“war on the veldt”. Corresponding with the opening of the century, this Eye is 
colonially inflected; its formal syntax seeks to usher Dos Passos and his mother 
away from a decidedly political disturbance, away from the “grownup people 
throwing stones” and into the guardianship of the “nice Dutch lady who loves 
Americans”. In this opening episode, then, political asylum is dispensed in a 
clandestine manner, “under the counter”, so to speak. The “need for speed” 
dominates - although it is not limited to - the opening Eye. Indeed, the 
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breathlessness of Camera Eye (1) spills into a second; here, the “stones” of 
colonial resistance mutate into the nationalistic baubles of the world’s fair: 
       we hurry wallowing like in a boat in the musty stably-
smelling herdic cab […] 
                       hurrying to catch the cars to New York
!         and  She  was  saying Oh dolly I hope we wont be late
and Scott was waiting  with  the  ickets and  we had to run 
up  the  platform  of  the  Seventh  Street  Depot and all the
little cannons kept  falling  out  of  the  Olympia and every-
body  stooped  to  pick  them  up  and  the   conductor Alla-
board lady quick lady (42P 19)
In these two early episodes an accelerated formal syntax, tethered to what 
Rosalind Krauss refers to as the “formal premises of modernist opticality” 
contrives to provide swift and apparently safe passage for “hurrying” (read: 
inefficient) bodies across linked (both are bombarded), concourses.295 Form and 
content seem, in both of these early exchanges, to pull in the same direction. Yet 
again, the expenditure of energy (“we hurry”; “we had to run”) undermines the 
efficient movement to which Dos Passos’ formal practice refers. 
! The Camera Eye (10) provides perhaps the clearest evidence of an 
antagonistic relation between form and history in The 42nd Parallel and is thus 
worth pondering in some detail. Like it did in The Camera Eye (1), the language 
of The Camera Eye (10) retains its syntactical fluidity; unlike it, however, the 
memory that this syntax transmits is beginning to congeal. In stark contrast to 
the brisk tempo of earlier Camera Eyes, this camera-text exemplifies a material 
heaviness. [APPENDIX: A] The “eye speed” that Dos Passos generates by the 
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withdrawal of punctuation stalls in the face of a turgid - and potentially 
nauseous - historical memory. Documenting a day trip to Washington D.C. circa 
1907, this remembrance of things past is dominated by a sense of stasis and 
fatigue. The youthful quickstep of the opening pair of Eyes is replaced by the 
laboured plodding of Dos Passos (here probably aged about eight or nine) and 
the weary “old major”. For the first time in The 42nd Parallel, the camera-text 
exemplifies what Anson Rabinbach calls “a poetics of fatigue”.296  Having 
traipsed through “long corridors full of the dead air” the young Dos Passos and 
“the old major” “walk very slowly through the flat sunlight” that provides 
weak illumination within the strangely lifeless “Botanical Gardens”. Dos 
Passos’ “legs would get very tired”, exhausted even at the thought of the 
“Corcoran art gallery full of columns and steps”. The suffocating atmosphere 
that attends this historical memory evokes an almost unbearable sense of 
depthlessness. From the “flat sunlight” of the “Botanical Gardens”, to the 
incongruously “flat air of the rotunda”; from the “flat red” of the Senate 
chamber to the statue of “Caesar in purple fallen flat,” The Camera Eye (10) is - 
apart from the inconceivably “fat” robins on the lawn, totally void of buoyancy. 
All of the life appears to have escaped from the scene; its narrator gasps for 
breath as he labours along the stifling, “long corridors full of the dead air”. In 
the first instance, the “flatness” that pervades this memory is historically 
endowed, a consequence of the oppressive world of political power. Of this 
episode Westerhoven writes that “the narrator is for the first time exposed to 
the workings of the government, and they make a far from vital impression.”297 
For the nine year old Dos Passos, the contours (or “corridors”) of power and 
privilege remain imprecisely defined. Notwithstanding the irredeemable 
opacities of American jurisprudence, this Camera Eye denotes a key moment for 
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the young Dos Passos. Marking the point at which his distrust of power and 
political affiliation would start to “set”, this camera-text denotes the coalescence 
of an historical consciousness in its first articulation. 
! The flatness of The Camera Eye (10) does more than express an early 
discomfiture toward American political forms. In fact, the flatness is 
aesthetically resonant. This exchange represents the pre-eminent example, in 
the context of The 42nd Parallel, of a “photographic” formal prose. By “[e]voking 
the flat, stamped out quality of a print or photograph”298  The Camera Eye (10) 
moves further away from typically “literary” forms of representation and 
exacerbates what Stuart Culver calls the “unbridgeable gap between linguistic 
and photographic truths”.299  Compounding the suspension of punctuation, an 
anti-literary act, an imagistic flatness, which appeals to the logic of 
photography, places further strain on the “ambivalent cohabitancy” between 
the “literary” text and the visualization of history.300  The Camera Eye (10) is, in 
William Dow’s idiomatic term, “a verbal photograph”.301  This particular 
photograph however, is poorly “developed”, both with regard to the crispness 
of its impressions and with regard to the nascency of Dos Passos’ 
understanding of the adult world of American political life. 
! If The Camera Eye (10) yields no more than a motley, barely permeable 
first impression of political power, the next ten Camera Eyes provide few sharp 
insights as to the radical life that Dos Passos would come to embrace. 
Occasional references to a latent radicalism pierce the nostalgic fug but they are, 
at best, confused affirmations. It is not until The Camera Eye (20) that Dos Passos 
political orientation begins to acquire significant definition. Having provided no 
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more than “queer glimpses” of radical activity between 1907 and 1912, Dos 
Passos is privy, for the first time, to an explicit moment of industrial action, 
namely the strike of textile workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts in early 1912. 
In fact, the industrial dispute was, as Westerhoven argues, “probably Dos 
Passos’ first confrontation with labour violence” and would “indicat[e] an 
increasing awareness of the nature of life outside the privileged group of 
Harvard students.”302 
! The final eyes of The 42nd Parallel evoke what Rosen has dubbed Dos 
Passos‘ “halting development into a radical”.303 The Camera Eye (25), the first of 
the Harvard Eyes, situates Dos Passos on the (conceivably Sartrean) precipice of 
political maturity. Important decisions await Dos Passos, yet these decisions 
pose something of a dilemma for a young man trapped between two distinctive 
“spheres”, between bourgeois privilege on the one hand and the diurnal 
struggles of the working class on the other. As Virginia Spencer Carr notes, Dos 
Passos “knew he was on the cusp of something momentous and had to decide 
where he stood in relation to his personal ideology.”304 Nineteen years old and 
preparing to graduate cum laude from Harvard, Dos Passos is unable - or 
perhaps just unprepared - to remedy this twoness; he hasn’t, as he puts it, “got 
the nerve to break out of the bellglass” (42P 262) and launch into political 
activity. He can choose either to “grow cold with culture like a cup of tea 
forgotten between an incenseburner and a copy of Oscar Wilde” (262) or he can 
join the “millworkers marching with a red brass band through the streets of 
Lawrence Massachusetts”. (263) Despite his Prufrockian indecisiveness, his lack 
of “nerve” regarding active engagement in a messy world, Dos Passos 
recognises that his estrangement issues from an insistently dialectical relation, 
that is to say between the “sphere” of Harvard and the “sphere” of working 
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class struggle: “it was” he laments, “like the Magdeburg spheres the pressure 
outside sustained the vacuum within”. The relation between inside and outside 
- literally an example of class tension - brings Dos Passos, by 1930, to the 
Marxian conception of history. It is to this conception to which I shall now turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EYES, LEFT: 
   NINETEEN NINETEEN 
The publication of Nineteen Nineteen,305  U.S.A.’s middle novel, announces an 
intensification of Dos Passos’ historical consciousness. Deploying a marked 
shift in tone from The 42nd Parallel and, significantly, deploying only fifteen 
Camera Eyes - a diminution of nearly a half - Nineteen Nineteen Nineteen ushers 
Dos Passos from “muted optimism” to “anger and militance” in Rosen’s 
phrasing.306  For a number of commentators this stylistic shift was politically 
resonant. In a laudatory review of Nineteen Nineteen, published in February 
1933, Mike Gold ululated: “[w]e can now say that the Harvard aesthete in Dos 
Passos is almost dead. The spiritual malady of tourism no longer drains his 
powers. He has entered the real world. He has definitely broken with 
capitalism, and knows it is but a walking corpse. He wars upon it, and records 
its degeneration.”307  Notwithstanding his penchant for hyperbole and despite 
his inclination toward lush, vampish syntax, Gold proved too acute a reader to 
mistake Dos Passos, as of 1932, for the finished (socialist) article. Aware that 
Dos Passos had some way to go before satisfying the epistemic mandates of a 
properly materialist aesthetic, Gold qualifies his eulogy with a sober 
addendum:
!
! he has not yet found the faith of Walt Whitman in the American 
! masses. He cannot believe that they have within them the creative 
! forces for a new world. This is still his dilemma; a hangover of his 
! aristocratic past; yet this man grows like corn in the Iowa sun; his 
! education proceeds; the future will find his vast talents, his gift of epic 
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! poetry, his observation, his daring experimentalism, and personal 
! courage enlisted completely in the service of the co-operative society. 
! He does not retreat; he goes forward. Dos Passos belongs to the 
! marvellous future.308 
Gold’s corny simile was symptomatic of a hope, shared by many writers, critics 
and intellectuals,309  that Dos Passos would function as the heliotropic messiah 
of the literary left, that he would turn, like a Benjaminian flower, toward the 
warm glow of international socialism.310  Matthew Josephson was another 
prominent leftist who, like Gold, had high hopes for the political Dos Passos. In 
his essay “A Marxist Epic”, published in The Saturday Review in March 1932, 
Josephson heralded Nineteen Nineteen as an urgently and insistently historical 
prose text. “The whole work”, Josephson writes, is “unified by the author’s 
consistent view of the history he deals with: this, it is perhaps embarrassing to 
relate, is nothing less than Marx’s materialist conception of history as 
determined by the means of production.”311 In contradistinction to Gold, then, 
who considered Dos Passos’ socialism as a source of potential energy awaiting 
conversion, Josephson went so far as to suggest that Dos Passos had already, by 
1932, arrived at the Marxist position. Despite the “experimental interruptions” - 
a veiled reference to the  novel’s fifteen Camera Eyes - Nineteen Nineteen proved, 
in the eyes of Josephson, a durable enough “transmitter” through which a 
dialectical charge might pass. Numerous commentators have subsequently - 
and not a little smugly - pointed out that Dos Passos’ political “future” followed 
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a rather different path than the one enumerated by Gold and Josephson.312 
Indeed, Dos Passos was, in 1932, on the verge of turning, like a flower, toward 
the warm glow of the political right. The conservative turn, which receives 
detailed treatment in my final chapter, exemplified Dos Passos’ bitter 
misgivings about Marxism, first, as an appropriate lexicon through which a 
history of the class struggle might be articulated and, second, as a practical - 
and ultimately efficient - solution to what Barnaby Haran dubs the “inequalities 
of machine age America.”313
! Dos Passos’ suspicion with regard to the epistemological and ontological 
probity of international socialism would gather momentum during the middle 
years of the thirties. By the time of U.S.A.’s publication as a single volume in 
January 1938, this suspicion had crystallized into outright hostility toward those 
who remained under the influence of what Dos Passos would come to call, with 
appropriately mechanistic inflections, “the intricate and bloody machinery of 
the Kremlin”.314  The conservative turn lay in wait for Dos Passos. As work 
commenced on Nineteen Nineteen the disillusionment with and alienation from 
leftist praxis that proved characteristic of the post-war Dos Passos remained 
latent, “yet to bloom”, to return to Gold’s analogy. Indeed, at the decade’s 
inception, the ideological ground upon which Dos Passos stood appeared fertile 
for the cultivation of his Marxian commitments. Whether it manifested in his 
writings on industrial “terrorism” at Harlan County, Kentucky,315 in his vote for 
the Communist presidential ticket or in the composition of an insistently 
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dialectical Camera Eye, Dos Passos’ political engagements during the 1929-1932 
period furnish compelling - if fleeting - evidence of the augmentation rather 
than the attenuation of his ties to the left. Dos Passos, in Foley’s summation, 
“was a historical creature to the core and composed all his work in—and about
—the crucible of historical change.”316  This was a period in which Dos Passos 
would come, in Granville Hicks’ summation, “closer to communism than he 
had ever been - and as close as he was going to get. In his parabolic orbit, 
though he did not know it, he had reached perihelion.”317  Despite his 
subsequent lurch toward the margins of conservatism Dos Passos’ commitment 
to the ideological assumptions of the political left was, as work began on 
Nineteen Nineteen, substantial enough to confer credibility on Gold’s suggestion 
that full affiliation was a very real possibility.  
! This was also a period in which the United States encountered - and 
survived - its most significant economic adjustment since black emancipation: 
the collapse of the cash nexus.318  As a slew of critics have noted, the 
consolidation of Dos Passos’ leftism was accelerated by the crash of October 
1929 and the onset of the Great Depression.319 Having generated surpluses with 
abandon throughout the glitzy sump of the twenties, the machinery of capitalist 
production would grind to a halt by the decade’s end. By March 1932, with 
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United States’ productive output having fallen by a staggering 46.2%,320  it had 
become almost impossible to ignore the vast and deepening material chasm that 
separated those who had control over the productive machinery - a group 
within which Dos Passos, as a landlord and member of the propertied class, 
could count himself - and those who didn’t.321  A biography of the Progressive 
journalist Paxton Hibben mirrors Dos Passos’ outraged yet curiously detached 
attitude toward the raft of social and economic inequities that, having gained 
traction at the turn of the century, would push the United States toward and 
subsequently over the precipice of fiscal solvency:
!
! something was wrong 
! with the American Republic, was it the Gold Standard, Priv-
! ilege, The Interests, Wall Street?
! ! The rich were getting richer, the poor were getting poorer, small 
! farmers were being squeezed out, workingmen were working twelve 
! hours a day for a bare living; profits were for the rich, the law was for 
! the rich, the cops were for the rich (NN 511)
By the outset of the “long thirties”, economic and social disparity had become 
an embedded fact of American life. Indeed, by 1933 more than a quarter of the 
nation were out of work.322  Kazin states that “the great United States, with 
thousands of people wandering the roads looking for jobs, food, shelter, and 
with a desperately pragmatic FDR trying any stratagem to keep America 
together, was a country of punctured illusions and was virtually bankrupt.”323 
As a period of stagnation and stasis the Depression brought little in the way of 
material edibles. It did, however, provide much to feed the appetites of writers 
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on the left who, like Dos Passos, considered it their job to catalogue, or, in 
Gold’s term “record” the plight of the working poor. Dos Passos was quick to 
take up the mantle as the (bourgeois) spokesperson of the dispossessed. The 
role was self appointed and it was fraught with difficulty. Despite extending his 
condolences to America’s poor, Dos Passos would simultaneously flounder to 
square the social origins of the economic slavery under which they toiled with 
his privileged position as a member of the bourgeoisie. As the material gulf 
between the classes deepened, then, so too did Dos Passos’ sense of complicity 
in its deepening. In “Back to Red Hysteria”, an article published in The New 
Republic on July 2, 1930, Dos Passos admits as much: “I speak as a writer, and 
therefore as a middle-class liberal, whether I like it or not.”324  This double helix 
of self-promotion and belligerent absolution would generate a contradiction in 
his political thought that he would prove unable to reconcile. Dos Passos was 
blithely aware that his class positioning inferred his exemption from the 
financial hardship that rendered destitute vast numbers of the producing 
classes. “The Great Depression” he confessed, “didn’t affect me that much 
personally. I used to tell people I had been just as broke before the stockmarket 
crash as after it. It was what I saw of other people’s lives that brought home the 
failure of New Era Capitalism.” This is a rather awkward dedication. 
Constitutive of an ostensible attack on the pyrrhic realisations (the “failure”) of 
modern industrial capitalism, Dos Passos’ rhetorical adumbration is less a 
statement of class solidarity than a tacit admission of difference.325  Fixing a 
paternalistic “eye” (“[i]t was what I saw”) on the plight of the (silently) working 
poor, Dos Passos’ iteration is shot through with a muted suspicion that the 
American underclass might not be best placed to offer narration as regard their 
own relation to “New Era Capitalism”. However well intentioned Dos Passos 
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may be, he, to propound an Adornian concept, stands in for a subject that 
cannot speak for itself.326  The notion of “speaking for” (and thus instead of) 
would haunt Dos Passos’ thinking on politics, even at the height of his 
“attachment” to the left. As he would write in a lead article in the New Masses in 
August 1930, “[i]ts [sic] the job of people of all the professions in the radical 
fringe of the middle-class to try to influence this middle class . . . . We can’t affect 
the class war much, but we might possibly make it more humane.”327 
!  Notwithstanding the paternalist inflections that subtend these dubious 
recommendations, the ruinous state of the United States’ economy hardened 
Dos Passos’ belief that the time was ripe for a radical overhaul of the productive 
machinery: “[s]ome way must be found”, he would write, “by which the mass 
of citizens can keep control of the man at the switchboard.”328 As this chapter 
seeks to show, the “way” would fluctuate. The “need”, however, remained 
constant. In the first years of the thirties, at least, it was Marx that offered the 
most effective, and most timely antidote to the toxic effects of emergent 
Fordism. Blanche H. Gelfant asserts that “[t]he Marxian dynamic view of 
history and the actual signs of evolution, revolution, and counter-revolution 
gave [Dos Passos] the view that these were critical times.”329  Dos Passos’ 1932 
“Introduction” to the Modern Library reissue of Three Soldiers (1921) copiously 
exemplifies this urgency. In it, and with recourse to unambiguously Marxian 
terminology, Dos Passos writes: “[t]hose of us who have lived through have 
seen these years strip the bunting off the great illusions of our time, we must 
deal with the raw structure of history now, we must deal with it quick, before it 
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stamps us out.”330 
! Nineteen Nineteen constitutes Dos Passos’ attempt to “deal with the raw 
structure of history”. In this novel Dos Passos elicits, through the technological 
filter of The Camera Eye, a composite grammar by which the forms and syntax of 
late modernity might be understood. The first half of this chapter seeks to build 
a case for the dialectical identity of The Camera Eye (28), the first camera-text of 
Nineteen Nineteen. It will be claimed that this inaugural Camera Eye is a textual 
manifestation of Dos Passos’ relation to the Marxian position as it stood at the 
outset of the thirties and that it connotes the point at which Dos Passos’ formal 
practice, despite maintaining a structural complicity with Fordist technologies, 
absorbs what Marx in “The German Ideology” (1845-6) dubs a “practical 
consciousness”.331 The relation between “textual” and “historical” formations in 
Nineteen Nineteen is far from consistent. Despite the intensification of Dos 
Passos’ commitment to leftist politics his attempt to formalise the 
historiography of American modernity was fraught. Indeed, and in keeping 
with the political ambivalences that subtend much of the mature prose, Dos 
Passos’ acceptance of the historical “need” was partial and it was subject to 
qualification. “It seems to me”, Dos Passos would counsel in response to a 
political questionnaire of 1932
! that Marxians who attempt to junk the American tradition, that I 
! admit is full of dryrot as well as sap, like any tradition, are just 
! cutting themselves off from the continent. Somebody’s got to have the 
! size to Marxianize the American tradition before you can sell the 
! American worker on the social revolution. Or else Americanize Marx.332
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Constituting an ideological either/or, this, as of the depressed summer of 1932, 
was the political quandary with which Dos Passos was faced. The attempt to 
“deal with the raw structure of history” depended on the extent of Dos Passos’ 
fealty toward one of two (problematically linked) conceptual models: he could 
“Marxianize the American tradition” or he could “Americanize Marx”. Dos 
Passos would fidget between these two conceptual ontologies in his attempt to 
find a practical solution to the social, political and economic inequities upon 
which American capitalism was predicated. The arguments that follow seek to 
show, however, that as work continued on Nineteen Nineteen, Dos Passos slips 
from the first to the second ideological position. 
!     By situating Marxist ideologies within a modernist - specifically 
Fordist - paradigm Dos Passos sought to engineer a viable and notably efficient 
means of dealing with the proliferations of the capitalist superstructure. 
Dialectically configured, the proposed alignment of Marx and Ford was 
expressly mandated to “leaven the lump of glucose that the combination of the 
ideals of the man in the swivel-chair with decayed Puritanism has made of our 
national consciousness.”333  Extorted from labour and pugged away as 
commodities, this “lump” connoted a form of congealed social capital that, as of 
the beginning of the thirties, demanded breaking down. Given the materialist 
coloration of this historical “need”, Dos Passos formal choices are perhaps a 
little surprising. As a machined form that implements a Fordist grammar as a 
means of sloughing off - and thus concentrating - surplus textual capital into 
designated channels or hoards, The Camera Eye problematises Dos Passos’ 
attempt to “leaven the lump”. Indeed, the amalgamation of Marx and Ford 
generates supplementary semantic residues which compound rather than 
palliate the “lump”, aggravating the already fraught relation between capital 
and labour, the lumpers and the lumped. As a conduit which mediates a tension 
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between use and surplus, The Camera Eye formalises, first, the ideological 
struggle for “value” that would sit at the heart of capitalist modes of production 
and, second, the alienation that would ensue from its appropriation.
! In his 1938 essay, “John Dos Passos and 1919,” Sartre captures, perhaps 
more astutely than any other contemporary critic, the alienated agency that 
pervades U.S.A.’s middle novel:
[t]he lives he tells about are all closed in on themselves. They resemble 
those Bergsonian memories which, after the body’s death, float about, 
lifeless and full of odours and lights and cries, through some forgotten 
limbo [….] But beneath the violent colours of these beautiful, motley 
objects that Dos Passos presents there is something petrified. Their 
significance is fixed. Close your eyes and try to remember your own life, try to 
remember it that way; you will stifle. It is this unrelieved stifling that Dos 
Passos wanted to express. In capitalist society, men do not have lives, 
they have only destinies. He never says this, but he makes it felt 
throughout. He expresses it discreetly, cautiously, until we feel like 
smashing our destinies. We have become rebels; he has achieved his 
purpose.
! We are rebels behind the looking-glass.334  
Sartre’s word “petrified” is the key by which the conceptual ontology of 
Nineteen Nineteen can be unlocked. The term is also central in theorising the 
“closed-in-ness” - or “hoarded-ness” of the novel’s fifteen Camera Eyes. From 
the Greek root “petra” meaning “rock” and the Latin “facere”, or sometimes 
“factum”, meaning “to make”, “petrified” evokes “paralysed” and, by 
association, “congealed”. Located at the centre of a material(ist) process in 
which liquidities undergo concretion, growing “hard as stone”, this cluster of 
linked terms occupies the centre of present efforts to theorise, along materialist 
lines, the historical sediment that “deposits” itself in The Camera Eye. Not only 
does “petrification”, as per the Sartrean schema, encapsulate the general 
structural underpinnings of The Camera Eyes - how they form and why - but it 
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proves useful as a “keyword”, in Williams’ term, by which one might begin to 
conceptualise The Camera Eyes as individual and shifting articulations of a 
dynamic and increasingly fraught relation between historical contingency and 
the materiality of textual formations. 
DIALECTICAL DILATIONS: DECANTING MARX
The Camera Eye (28), the first of Nineteen Nineteen’s fifteen Camera Eyes and the 
only one to “report” in any significant measure from the United States, 
complicates and problematises the phenomenal fixity that Sartre describes. 
[APPENDIX: B] This Camera Eye’s first (historical) phase occurs in late April 
1915, the cruellest month of this - or perhaps any - year for the sensitive 
graduand Dos Passos, designating the moment at which he, three years into his 
study under the decidedly Sartrean “bellglass” of Harvard University, receives 
the “shock” news, disseminated via “telegram”, of the impending death of his 
mother. (Lucy Dos Passos died on the 15th of May 1915.) The second phase 
shifts focus, turning its gaze from the United States toward Europe, more 
exactingly to Madrid at the end of January 1917, and denotes the moment at 
which Dos Passos receives news, this time via the technics of a “cable” of the 
sudden death of his father. (John Randolph Dos Passos died on the 12th of 
January 1917.) A third phase traces, in its first articulation, Dos Passos’ reluctant 
return to the United States on the Espagne on the 12th of August 1918 
(“Autobiographical” 356) and, in its second, the diurnal and mundane war 
work to which Dos Passos was previously commandeered. The Camera Eye (28) 
is germane to present concerns on two linked fronts: first, it constitutes U.S.A.‘s 
preeminent prose poem; second, it constitutes the trilogy’s singular 
exemplification of a materialist conception of historical praxis. The Camera Eye 
(28) connotes, in short, the moment at which Dos Passos formalises the 
dialectic.
! In the first instance this camera-text formalises a constellation of private 
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“grief”,  zooming in on Dos Passos’ recollection of three of the defining crises - 
or “shock[s]” of his early life: the terminal illness of his mother; the sudden 
death of his father; and the “vast cancer” of (capitalist) war.335  Certainly, these 
three events fractured Dos Passos’ social experience, providing the “historical” - 
that is to say the autobiographical - materials for his fictions. While these 
personal losses were resonant for Dos Passos, they function as a guise behind 
which a different sort of “grief” achieves tacit expression. In fact, the 
“shattered” formalism of The Camera Eye (28) infers an (unspoken) response to a 
collective rather than a personal set of bereavements. Specifically, this camera-
text provides a textual analogue for the fractured sociality that attended “the 
drift of the Fordized world”. 
! Stationed only six pages from the beginning of U.S.A.’s most politically 
charged novel, The Camera Eye (28) provides an index for the shifting and 
dynamic relation between aesthetics and politics as it manifests in the 
compositional context of U.S.A. Responsive to and pursuivant of the 
crystallisation of Dos Passos’ leftism as it manifested at the inception of the long 
thirties, this Camera Eye provides the novel’s - and by extension the trilogy’s - 
singular exemplification of “consciousness open to the effects of history”, in the 
locution of Hans-Georg Gadamer.336  Tantamount to no more than a “flash” in 
Benjamin’s lexicon - and more, a “flash” that U.S.A. is destined never to repeat - 
this is the materialist moment. The “moment” is fleeting - a single expression 
within a vast folio of fifty-one Camera Eyes       - yet its brevity does not impugn 
its materialist aspect. It completes it. As Benjamin notes in the fifth thesis, “[t]he 
true picture of the past whizzes by. Only as a picture, which flashes its final 
farewell in the moment of its recognizability, is the past to be held fast 
[Stillstellung].” Properly conceived, of course, this flashing “moment” is not a 
154
335 Ludington (ed.), The Fourteenth Chronicle, p.92.
336  The translation is Ricoeur’s and is discussed in the translators’ preface to Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum, 2004), p.16.
“moment” at all but a cluster of fragmented moments that enter into a 
reciprocal relation.
! The juxtaposition of chronologically disparate memories represents a 
unique development in the context of The Camera Eye. All of U.S.A.’s fifty-one 
Camera Eyes, barring (28), focus on a single event which proceeds without 
interruption across an unbroken period “in time”. Each “event” may last a 
minute (as per Dos Passos’ dash for a train, portrayed in The Camera Eye [2]) or a 
week (as per his protracted journeying through France to Italy, portrayed in The 
Camera Eye [33]). In each case, though, and without exception, The Camera Eye 
focuses exclusively on that memory, that minute or that week. The Camera Eye 
(28) departs from this strict obeisance to a singular, unified and linear 
conception of historical time and, by so doing, infers an entirely different 
semantic protocol. Unique in its conception of historical time as a 
“constellation” of disparate moments that are brought into a reciprocal relation, 
this Camera Eye designates the only point in U.S.A. at which Dos Passos 
historicises his formal practice in strict accordance with Marxian precepts. That 
he does this, and that he does it here is heavy with consequence for the 
dialectic. As Benjamin writes in the Passagen-Werk, “[t]he destructive or critical 
moment in the materialist writing of history comes into play in that blasting 
apart of historical continuity with which, first and foremost, the historical object 
constitutes itself.”337 As a textual artefact of historical “blastedness” The Camera 
Eye (28) is without peer. Here, and for the only time in the trilogy, the 
“existential density” of The Camera Eye, underpinned, as Sartre noted, by a 
tendency toward constriction and “stifling” (see The Camera Eye [10; 25]) is 
blasted apart by the centrifugal force of dialectical materialism.338  Cutting 
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against, if not fully across, its own existential inflections and thus generating a 
dialectical tension with them, The Camera Eye (28) exhibits impeccable 
materialist credentials. Impressively, this episode exceeds “historicism”, a 
modality which, as Benjamin notes in an addendum to his essay On the Concept 
of History, “contents itself with establishing a causal nexus of various moments 
of history.” Benjamin continues his commentary in a circumspect vein:
 ! no state of affairs is, as a cause, already a historical one. It becomes this, 
! posthumously, through eventualities which may be separated from it by 
! millennia. The historian who starts from this, ceases to permit the 
! consequences of eventualities to run through the fingers like the beads of 
! a rosary. He records [erfasst] the constellation in which his own epoch 
! comes into contact with that of an earlier one. He thereby establishes a 
! concept of the present as that of the here-and-now [a jetztzeit or 
! “now-!time”] in which splinters of messianic time are shot through. !
The “various moments” that constitute Dos Passos’ camera-text, April 1915, 
January 1917 and August 1918, are not “separated from” each other by 
“millennia” but by a more modest period, a little over three years. Despite its 
compressed chronology the materialist principle holds. Apportioned into 
“petrified” or “shivered cubes” (“beads”, in Benjamin’s lexicon) this episode 
institutes a jetztzeit or “now-time” within which “splinters” of discontinuous 
(now)time (“Ahora     Now     Maintenant     [/]   Vita  Nuova”) are “shot 
through.” This is a plurality that exceeds dialogism, however. By “align[ing] 
multiple temporalities”, to use visual historian Leigh Raiford’s term, Dos Passos 
engineers a composite historiography in which pieces of (now)time interact, 
their limits or edges rubbing together, com[ing] into contact with each other. 
“History” thus formulated, and in the idiom of Volosinov, becomes a “site of 
incessant interaction and conflict.”339  Here, then, and only here, the Marxian 
notion of historical contingency gains traction and does so as a means of 
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expressing the shocks, lapses and ruptures that must, according to Benjamin, 
attend properly “historical” formations. In accordance with the materialist 
notion of historical contingency and subsumed under the principle rubric of 
modernity this temporal (re)configuration entirely refutes - that is, it explodes - 
the bourgeois conceptualisation of “history” as an intrinsically fluid process 
only rarely interrupted or punctured by turbulence. Interruption is the rule 
rather than the exception as regard this constellated Eye. The time, to cite a 
princely formula, is out of joint.
! This camera-text is not chronologic but what Volosinov/Bakhtin calls 
chronotopic. The chronotope as conceived of by Bakhtin is instructive with 
regard to the semantic economy of this constellated textual “now”. Literally 
meaning “time-space”, the designation “chronotope” refers, in Bakhtin’s 
wording, to “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships 
that are expressed in literature”.340      The velocity of the materialist “blast” 
does more than blow holes out of (or into) history. It blows holes out of (or into) 
the text itself. Representing breaches or gullies in the textual “terrain” these 
metrical vacancies segment the camera-text into discreet historical epochs; they 
entrench them. The notion of textual “entrenchment” resonates on three linked 
levels: aesthetically, historically, and ideologically. I wish to explore these in 
turn.
ENTRENCHED FORMS: AN AESTHETICS OF RUPTURE
From the French verb “trancher”, meaning to cut or slice, “entrench” implicates 
Dos Passos’ textual praxis to the “scissoring” that would gain aesthetic traction 
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as a formal component of French Surrealism.341  More exactingly, Dos Passos’ 
temporal and spatial fragmentation infers an aesthetic intimacy with surrealist 
“collage”, a process which sought, as Adamowicz writes, to “reveal the 
mechanisms of the assembling process by displaying its breaks.”342  Thus 
invested in “the overt staging of seams, material tears, semantic incoherence, 
iconographic anomalies or narrative nonsequiturs”, surrealist compositional 
practice, so set out, provides an appropriate stylistic reference point for the 
cutting and pasting to which The Camera Eye (28) commits.343 Constituted by a 
series of prose “splinters”, this materialist blasting deliberately eschews 
“semantic coherence” and “seamless narrative”; it facilitates the “appropriation 
and assemblage of disparate fragments”; it makes a feature of its “material 
tears”. A number of formal similarities thus provide reasonable grounds for an 
aesthetic comparison between surrealist and materialist positions. Indeed, if we 
consider as pertinent Benjamin’s assertion that "[t]o write history means giving 
dates their physiognomy”, the surrealistic inflections of The Camera Eye (28) 
become more pronounced.344  The inferred corporealization of the literary text 
supposes a surgical textuality. Here lies a text that, etherised upon the historicist 
table, goes under the knife. There is a significant reason, however, why we 
might hesitate in giving the green light to surrealism as the major aesthetic 
impetus. The sort of dismemberment to which Dos Passos’ camera-text refers is 
keyed into the notion of ripping up the social text. Surrealism, in contrast, “reads 
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fragmentation not in terms of social breakdown but the world opened to desire 
– a lifeworld thus disarticulated through the fetish of the desiring I/eye.”345 The 
Camera Eye (28) is less an artefact of desire than it is a formalisation of an 
antagonistic relation between individual consciousness and an ever accelerating 
means of production.346
! The dialectical montage of the Russian avant-garde film director Sergei 
Eisenstein proves a more telling aesthetic influence on Dos Passos’ formal 
practice than the “scissoring” of French Surrealism. The contact been the two 
men has been copiously mapped by Dos Passos’ biographers; I do not intend to 
rehash it here.347  Suffice it to say that Dos Passos met with Eisenstein in 
Moscow in 1928 and discussed at length the technique of montage. The meeting 
would leave a lasting impression on a literary formalism that would absorb 
“filmic” inflections.348 Justin Edwards maps the terrain: 
! Eisenstein's development of montage to incorporate Marxist ideology 
! into the structure of his art must have appealed to Dos Passos, and 
! provided the vision for the socialist employment of editing that was 
! lacking in the work of Griffith. As a result, dialectical montage became 
! a way for Dos Passos to represent the ways in which sociological forces 
! and personal experiences perpetually come into conflict with each 
! other.349
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And yet “dialectical montage”, as it manifests in The Camera Eye (28), does more 
than solicit a representational strategy by which the intersections of the “I” and 
the “we” might be captured. While the technique indeed provides Dos Passos 
with an apposite means of formalizing the crisis of modernization, it 
simultaneously opens up, as a counter-impulse, a technological space within 
which the psychic injuries inflicted by late capital might be remedied. It is in 
this way, as Buck-Morss notes, “that technological reproduction can give back to 
humanity that very capacity for experience which technological production 
threatens to take away”. Such a provision, Buck-Morss continues, is visually 
sedimented and as such, informs the “optical unconscious” of this camera-text: 
! If industrialization has caused a crisis in perception due to the 
! speeding-up of time and the fragmentation of space, film shows a 
! healing potential by slowing down time and, through montage, 
! constructing “synthetic realities” as new spatio-temporal orders, 
! wherein “fragmented images” are brought together “according to a new 
! law.350 
The “healing potential” that inheres in mechanical reproduction gathers in the 
caesura or “cuts” of The Camera Eye (28), that is, in their “trenches”. These white 
spaces, what Deleuze, in his discussion of cinema calls “internal splits”, are 
ideologically mandated, cutting against, if not fully across, the epistemic 
assumptions of the Fordist economy.351  As moments of respite from (metrical) 
“activity”, these (line) “breaks” or pauses in “output” rank as “idle time” and 
thus prove antagonistic to the operations of a textual “system” that is calibrated 
to move without interruption, breaks or delays in production. Countering what 
Irr refers to as the “brutal and often lethal pace of modern technology” these 
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vacancies in syntax gain semantic traction as pockets of resistance to the 
encroachment of technological modernity.352  Evidently, the syntax of this 
historicist “edit” reneges on the Camera Eye’s previous commitments to 
continuous prose movement. Indeed, Dos Passos eschews the fluid and 
streamlined formal grammar that characterises the other fifty Eyes, 
implementing instead what Marjorie Perloff calls a “language of rupture”.353 
The ruination of the sequential is in no way arbitrary but instigates what 
Siegfried Kracauer, in his writings on cinema, calls a “strategic interruption.”354 
Against a backdrop of otherwise constant (textual) activity, then, these channels 
resonate as corridors of (metrical) inactivity within which the industry of 
textual production must cease. By opening up - that is by engineering - a set of 
enclaves within which the incessant activity of Fordist regimes falter, this 
camera-text serves, in Ian Balfour’s formula, to “perform a history understood 
as the reach for the emergency brake.”355  In effect, these syntactical breaks/
brakes impart “drag” within an otherwise sleek and continuous prose 
mechanism; by implication, they imperil the efficiency of the prose machine. 
The incorporation of “blanks” into the textual system creates a formal entropy 
that problematises the camera-text’s (Fordist) rhythms. The efficiency of the 
prose system is thus annihilated by what Tichi, following Veblen, dubs “lag leak 
and friction”.356 The Camera Eye’s claims to “efficiency” are duly countermanded 
by a textuality that is resistant to the forms and syntax of Fordist productivity. 
Stubbornly, uniquely, and radically blank, these intervals facilitate, in Iser’s 
terms, “the release of hitherto unseen possibilities”. In sum, these ruptures 
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“come into meaning” (Bull) as enforced cessations of textual production that 
alleviate the oppressive density of the Camera Eye.357  The camera-text is thus 
downgraded from what Deleuze calls an “opaque screen of information” to a 
more porous and potentially more habitable textual site.358  There is, it seems, 
some space that exceeds the limits of capital, some space, that is, in which to 
“breath”. Albeit fleetingly, then, the “stifling” that attends the incessant 
productivity of industrial capital is suspended, resisted, broken down. Dos 
Passos’ textual practice, in this instance, offers itself as a sort of “language” or 
“practical consciousness”, in Marx’s terms, which cuts (tranches) across, thus 
resisting the formal grammar of late modernity. The resistance is fleeting, 
denoting but a glimmer of the dialectic. Yet despite the brevity of its realisation, 
this exchange resonates as the primary textual site within which the 
contradictions of capital can be thrashed out. In short, the materialist reflexes of 
The Camera Eye (28) betray what Paula Rabinowitz calls an “aesthetics of social 
significance”.359
CONTRACTIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS: RECANTING MARX
The second half of this chapter seeks to interrogate some of the ways in which 
the conceptual ontologism of two later Camera Eyes - the thirty-ninth and the 
fortieth - complicate and problematise the materialist intuitions that “flash up” 
in The Camera Eye (28). The Camera Eye (39) follows Dos Passos, now aged 
twenty-three and, in his own terms, “more red”360  than ever, as he immerses 
himself in the cultural ferment of Paris on the “first day” (NN 651) of the 
(politically radical) spring of 1919. Here, as it was in The Camera Eye (28) it is 
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“spring”, a period of regrowth in which the shoots of the new begin to emerge 
through the spent wood of the old. As an occasion for juvenescence and, by 
implication, a forum for (regime) change “spring” is an opportune moment to 
“MAKE IT NEW”.361 The Camera Eye (39) is clearly au fait with the Poundian 
idiom. Here are its “terminal” moments:
! ! ! ! ! ! !     the dates fly 
! off the calendar we’ll make everything new today is the 
! Year I       Today is the sunny morning of the first day of
! spring     We gulp our coffee splash water on us jump into
! our clothes run downstairs step out wideawake into the 
! first morning of the first day of the first year (NN 651)
Dismissive of historical precedent and peppered with claims to experiential 
“first[s]” these ebullient lines seem sufficiently equipped (or sufficiently 
blinkered) to “leaven the lump” that the “man in the swivel chair ha[d] made 
of” America’s “national consciousness”. Paradoxically, this camera-text can only 
“make everything new” by recycling the old, that is to say, by appropriating its 
own extant materials. This exchange recalls the dying moments of The Camera 
Eye (28), the anaphoric rhythms of which mark a similarly insistent desire to 
“make it new”: “tomorrow I hoped would be the first day of the first month / 
of the first year” (NN 370). The Camera Eye (39) exploits strikingly similar 
vocabulary in an attempt to delineate a “first year” or “Year I”, yet this is a call 
that has been heard somewhere before. Cut, then, from previous material and 
“zipped” into the fabric of the present exchange, this is an insistently self 
referential manoeuvre. Occasioning what Benjamin might refer to as a “deja 
vu”, these textual returns, in which The Camera Eye (28) is recast through The 
163
361  Ezra Pound, The Cantos (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), p.265. It needs noting that the 
newness Pound sought was a means of mobilizing “renovation” rather than “revolution”.
Camera Eye (39), problematise the notion of the “new” and, in addition, snuff 
out any lingering claims to textual autonomy.362  Evidently, the “new” can only 
thrive by poaching on the “old”. Filtered, or shot through “the dialectical 
“optics” of a modernity that is both ancient and new” this contradiction is 
symptomatic of an aesthetic modernity that sustains, and in turn, is sustained 
by generative tensions between dominant and emergent social forms, between 
that which is an established part of a particular cultural formation and that 
which seeks to displace it.363 As Richard W. Allen, following Adorno, notes: “[i]
nnovation appears as repetition in the images of itself modernity secretes, but 
they also reveal to the cultural historian the eternal promise of the new in the 
guise of the always already old.”364 
! The impatience with which this thirty-ninth camera-text seeks to coax 
something new from the (shell of the) old, connotes an essentially antihistorical 
impulse. Sustaining an attempt to refresh and enliven, Dos Passos’ prose-
conveyor gainsays history; better yet, it gainsays history’s history, the 
materiality of which came vibrantly - if painfully - to the fore in The Camera Eye 
(28). Dos Passos’ verb tenses, for example, reinforce the fetish that modernity 
makes of the present: “the dates fly” and “we gulp” constitute grammatical 
forms that spurn the past tense within which the majority of The Camera Eyes 
are couched.365  (The anaphorically invested phrasing “when the” that appears 
in The Camera Eye (28) provides arguably the preeminent exemplification of a 
prose vernacular that is grammatically tethered to the past tense.) Obsessive in 
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its focus on “presentness” yet residually indebted to the past, this camera-text 
incites a fetish of immediacy which presupposes energy, action and vibrancy, 
what Dos Passos called, in 1922, “vigor, force, modernity”.366  Impelled by a 
desire that his prose text might sear through the “stodgy complacency of the 
nineteenth century”, The Camera Eye (39) “burns up last year’s diagrams” (NN 
651), “leaven[ing] the lump”, as it were.367 The “antihistorical” impulse of this 
Eye gives rise to an internal contradiction, however. As Dos Passos cauterises 
the past he simultaneously reduces to cinders the context against which any 
comprehension of the “new” must ultimately depend. 
! This high-modernist reconceptualisation of the new as a now without a 
was is further problematised by Dos Passos’ inadequate treatment of political 
newness, the possibility, that is, of social revolution.368 As many commentators 
have noted, the late teens and early twenties was a period of immense social 
turbulence. Peter Nicholls stresses that “[t]he ‘Red Summer’ of 1919 was the 
spectacular but inevitable expression of the pent-up violence provoked by the 
‘Red Scare’ of the late teens and that would continue into the early twenties.“369 
Dos Passos would testify to the difficulties that many on the left faced in their 
attempt to displace industrial capitalism as a dominant ideological formation. 
As Dos Passos put it in Nineteen Nineteen, “[t]o be a red in the summer of 1919 
was worse than being a hun or a pacifist in the summer of 1917.” (NN 747) 
Despite the diurnal dangers that flanked affiliation with the left, many were 
energised toward political activity. Characterised by mass political suppressions 
and bitter class conflict, the period seemed ripe for a radical realignment of the 
means of production. As my next chapter attests, the revolution did not work 
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out as many had hoped, yet as potential “time of overturn”, 1919 was 
considered by many Marxists, especially in Europe, as the seedbed for the social 
revolution. As Dos Passos wrote in 1932, the spring of 1919 “seemed the 
beginning of the flood instead of the beginning of the ebb.”370  Given the 
incendiary political atmosphere that enveloped Paris in the spring of 1919 it is 
noteworthy that the “revolution” (NN 651) to which Dos Passos refers is 
artistically rather than politically derived.371  Couched in “la poesie of 
manifestoes” (NN 651), the “revolution round the spinning Eiffel Tower” has 
much to do with “Cezanne Picasso Modigliani” and somewhat less to do with 
Marx. Indeed, the “Paris of 1919 / paris-mutuel”, as drawn here by Dos Passos, 
proves less a space of political “turnaround” than a vortex of cultural 
consumption.372  Visually stimulated by the “sedate architecture” of the 
“Louvre” (NN 650) and aurally by the “steeplechase gravity of cellos tun-/ing 
up on the stage at the Salle Gaveau oboes and a tri-/angle” Dos Passos 
subordinates the material concerns of “the real world” to the ephemeral, 
bourgeois pleasures of the “Cirque Medrano”. The “spiritual malady of 
tourism”, to cite Gold’s idiomatic phrasing, seems to have wriggled its way 
back into Dos Passos’ camera-text. Indeed, the political distinction between The 
Camera Eye (39) and The Camera Eye (28) is stark: whereas the earlier exchange 
embeds Marx in its structure, the latter does no more than “chalk” him up, 
partially, and in translation, on the grimy walls of a Paris pissoir. This is the 
Marxian “interlude” as given by The Camera Eye (39):
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!         la poesie of manifestos always freshtinted on the kiosks
! and slogans scrawled in chalk on the urinals  L’UNION DES
! TRAVAILLEURS FERA LA PAIX DU MONDE
!          revolution round the spinning Eiffel Tower (NN 651)
Typographically distinct from the rest of the camera-text, a brief political 
citation - L’UNION DES TRAVAILLEURS FERA LA PAIX DU MONDE  -
provides The Camera Eye (39)’s only direct evocation of a “political unconscious” 
in Jameson’s definition.373  Dos Passos’ “capitalised” typography, which locks 
this flashing reacquaintance with Marx in the “upper case”, may be a visual 
pun on the rapid (self-)aggrandisement of capital, a “value” that congeals in the 
camera’s eye; it may not. What it is, of course, is a translation from German into 
French of the final, similarly “capitalised” line of The Communist Manifesto: 
“PROLETARIER ALLER LÄNDER VEREINIGT EUCH!” (“Workers Of All 
Countries Unite!”) Cut from arguably the formative document of nineteenth 
century political economy and grafted onto the (antagonistic) Fordist prose-
conveyor, this (famously) Marxian refrain seems, in the first instance, 
adequately positioned to pose a viable challenge to the ideological 
underpinnings of monopoly capitalism. Indeed, a case could be made that by 
re-invoking the Marxian remit in a Fordist context this moment might, 
figuratively speaking, knock out capital’s antibodies, thus facilitating 
substantive changes to the “social metabolism.” A different argument will be 
made here. The brief appeal to Marx is not, I argue, The Camera Eye’s greatest 
political asset but its signal frailty. Marx is this camera-text’s toxic asset. As a 
fleeting and entirely superficial political “event” this intrusion of Marxian 
vocabulary into the camera-text’s stringently Fordist vernacular does not 
connote an upsurge (or “flash”) of a hitherto dormant radicalism but a mea culpa 
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for Dos Passos’ dwindling Marxism. This, in short, is the point at which Dos 
Passos’ socialism starts to slide. Again, The Camera Eye (28) is the pertinent 
reference against which the political insufficiencies of The Camera Eye (39) can be 
gauged. Recall that in The Camera Eye (28) Dos Passos implements a materialist 
methodology as a theoretical centre around which an eminently historical 
“constellation” traces its orbit. In The Camera Eye (39) an entirely different 
etiquette obtains. Political meaning inheres not in the deep structures of the text 
but on its surface. Specifically the “political” graces the surface a single 
machined epithet lifted from Marx: “L’UNION DES TRAVAILLEURS FERA LA 
PAIX DU MONDE”. 
! The incorporation of this brief political “slogan” into the Fordist context 
is problematic on two linked levels. First, it vitiates the political context from 
which it is taken; second it testifies to the souring of Dos Passos’ leftism. By 
selecting for integration in his own text this particular excerpt from Marx’s, and 
only this excerpt, Dos Passos reduces to a “soundbite” the entire corpus of 
Marxian political economy. As a “part” that is (mis)taken for a whole, this 
metonymic assertion belches out an automated response to an unspoken 
complexity. This is Marxism reductio ad absurdum; into a single compact and 
portable textual location issues the putative “essence” of Marxian thought. The 
miniaturisation of Marx is a logical, if not inevitable, consequence of its 
subjection to the forms and syntax of aesthetic Fordism. “Marx” is embedded in 
and held fast [stillstellung] by a textual regime that constantly seeks to 
streamline its operations, rid itself of unnecessary parts and motions, eradicate 
“waste” (now with scatological undertones) and thus maximise its 
“productivity”. Estranged from the theoretically saturated context in which it 
originally appeared and “zipped” into an antagonistic modernist paradigm, 
“class” is subjected to the directives of the efficiency movement. Impounded by 
the syntax of the Fordist conveyor, this reference to Marxian political thought 
infers Dos Passos recanting on his previous commitments to “Marxianize the 
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American tradition.” Instead, he “Americanize[s] Marx” and, by so doing, 
evidences a shift in formal practice. Here, Marxism is the “thing” that is 
subjected to the demands of the Fordist economy. Deemed unwieldy and in 
need of trimming, Miniaturised and plugged into the Fordist context, Marx’s 
writings are “streamlined” and thus tailored (that is, “Taylored”) to meet 
specifically modern dimensions. This “reduction” is, of course, only one side of 
the dialectic. Incorporated into the Fordist situation, “Marx”, and by 
implication, the sociality to which he synecdochically refers, is simultaneously 
subjected to the machinery of mass production. Reduced but at the same time 
reproduced, Marx is limited by the apparatus of modernity yet emboldened by 
the wide circulation which it necessarily infers. Thus, “expansion” clashes with 
“contraction” to produce a new synthetic outcome for a political discourse that, 
for many Marxists, was in need of enlivening.374  Jammed between the 
interlocking cogs of “miniaturisation” and “massification”, Dos Passos’ textual 
system invokes a wider “system” of accumulation, emergent Fordism, a system 
that strives to massify its own products yet simultaneously render discreet the 
(social) processes by which these products are produced. 
! A second degradation issues from the first, and concerns the vitiation of 
Dos Passos’ political subjectivity. Once more, The Camera Eye (28) provides the 
pertinent frame of reference for The Camera Eye (39). If the former episode 
implements a fully blown materialist conception of history, the latter 
implements a casual, superficial one. By The Camera Eye (39) Dos Passos, it 
seems, lacks the energy - and perhaps the enthusiasm - to muster up and 
subsequently work through a Marxian “system” that might formalise the 
dialectic. The limitations of Dos Passos’ leftism appear to have been reached.
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THE LOCATION OF POLITICS: RADICALISM IN A PISSOIR
The physical location within which this brief “evocation” of Marx receives 
articulation confirms our suspicion of Dos Passos’ growing hostility toward the 
Marxian position. Despite its direct citation of Marx this camera-text sets out a 
space within which the Marxian discourse can only stifle. Indeed, it is through 
its mention of Marx that The Camera Eye (39) provides something to squeeze. 
Confined to the cramped dimensions of a Parisian pissoir, radical political 
sentiment is “brought inside”. Decanted into individual “kiosks”, the call for 
class solidarity is “internalised”, “disseminated” and “consumed” in “private” 
booths. The Marxian citation is “smuggled away from society” and denuded of 
the sociality upon which its political assumptions depend. As a private 
expression of class solidarity this signatory act metaphorically evokes the 
growing discomfort between the “I” and the “we” that would become 
embedded in Dos Passos’ prose writing by 1932. In addition to its impounding 
at the level of syntax, then, “L’UNION DES TRAVAILLEURS FERA LA PAIX 
DU MONDE” is “held fast” [Stillstellung] by a cramped physicality. Penned into 
a strangulated ideological no-space, Marxian thought is “inscribed” only to be 
“frozen” or petrified, in Sartre’s terms; its significance is “fixed”. This Marxian 
citation, and more urgently, the radical politics to which it refers, is duly 
prevented from spilling out into the social context. In an ironic feint, then, the 
“arrival” of “Marx” is the “event” which guarantees his disappearance. “[S]
crawled in chalk” in a “kiosk” Marx is, in effect, “withdrawn from social 
circulation”; he, to adapt a term from chapter 5, has become “hoardable”. That 
these physical “kiosks” constitute “holding cells” that immobilise and thus 
render inert potentially difficult political meaning is entirely in keeping with 
the ideological function of The Camera Eye which seeks, in short, to provide 
designated textual spaces - kiosks - within which surplus semantic liquidities 
can proliferate. This stifled call to class consciousness is privy to a battery of 
restrictions. Impounded by its syntax, smuggled into physical “kiosks” and 
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embedded in the “safety-valve” that is The Camera Eye, Marx is firmly secured. 
The chances of a socialist leak are slim indeed. 
! The notion of leakage as a form of excreted social surplus can be tied to 
Georges Bataille’s notion of “ebullition”. In his study The Accursed Share (1991), 
Bataille, a base materialist indeed, reasons that  
[i]f the space is completely occupied, if there is no outlet anywhere, 
nothing bursts; but the pressure is there. In a sense life suffocates within 
limits that are too close; it aspires in manifold ways to an impossible 
growth; it releases a steady flow of excess resources possibly involving 
large squanderings of energy. The limit of growth being reached, life, 
without being in a closed container, at least enters into ebullition: 
without, its extreme exuberance pours out in a movement always 
bordering on explosion.375
Indebted to Sartre’s theorization of capital as an airless chamber within which 
one can only stifle, Bataille’s notion of ebullition sits flush with the ideological 
imperatives of the Camera Eye, a “closed container” for the pooling of subjective 
liquidities. We might in fact have drawn upon Bataille as a pertinent means of 
theorizing the “waste” or “excess” that “bursts” and “pours out” into  the 
gullies or “trenches” that segment The Camera Eye (28). This previous moment, 
rendered porous by the collapse and fragmentation of time and space, indeed 
“involv[es] large squanderings of energy”; it ultimately “enters into ebullition”. 
The notion of ebullition is especially pertinent in the context of The Camera Eye 
(39), however. The dialectical tension between expulsion and withholding, the 
conflict that is, between “forcing out” and “keeping in” is resonant not just at 
the syntactical level but at the physical. 
! It is worth noting that as conduits for the expulsion and channelling of 
waste products, the camera-texts take on Freudian resonances. Specifically, the 
dialectical tension between ridding and retention, between withholding and 
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(New York: Zone Books, 1998), p.30. 
proliferation, is flanked by Dos Passos’ (strengthening) compulsion to control 
the release of surplus matter. The Camera Eye signifies as an aesthetic “excretion” 
that link in suggestive ways to the Freudian conception of anal fixation. Given 
the political ridding to which Dos Passos was concomitantly committed, this 
expelling is worth consideration. In this moment of abjection, political and 
aesthetic degradations elide. Indeed, and in an image that might appeal to the 
surrealistic imagination of, say, Tristan Tzara, Dos Passos here commits to 
shitting through the eye. The comparison of “anus” and “eye”/”I” as organs for 
purging or omitting matter deemed excessive to the physical “system”, 
provides a theoretical context for and a useful counterweight to the Marxian 
notion of hoarded waste. If money, as the pulped and laundered mass of an 
excreted and degraded labour, can be conceived of as a form of “shit” - money, 
that is, as labour which has been reconstituted as exchange value - the 
association comes into relief. Freud’s thought on waste thus provides a 
supplementary means of conceptualizing the paucity - or drying up - of Camera 
Eyes as the trilogy develops. Indeed, Dos Passos’ ability to “hold in” the waste 
products of a degraded (political) past are entirely in keeping with the Freudian 
model. As Dos Passos gets older his control over the surplus - the waste or shit - 
seemingly tightens; he has “trained himself”, we might say, to hold in, or better 
yet, “control” the (bowel) movements of his camera-text.376 Thus as Dos Passos 
gets older, and moves to the right, less (leftist) “shit” flows through the system. 
Our brief recourse to Freud is intended as a suggestive way of supporting the 
Marxian analysis, not of displacing it. Indeed, Freud, I would argue, is 
subordinated to Marx as the dominant theoretical lens through we come to 
view this channeling of flows.
! Lewd in its setting and, for many, in its subject matter, this socialist 
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graffiti, antisocially inflected, connotes what Taussig calls “defacement”. To 
deface, Taussig claims, is to besmirch or desecrate that which was previously 
held as sacred, a flag perhaps, a statue, or paper money. Defacement, in short, is 
“what happens when something precious is despoiled.”377  In the first instance 
the thing “despoiled” is The Communist Manifesto - the bible, perhaps, of mid 
nineteenth century social protest movements. Additionally, this act of 
defacement sullies the materialist moment that proved so pristine in The Camera 
Eye (28). That Marx is “scrawled in chalk on the urinals” is indicative not just of 
the brutal abridgement of Marxian thought, then, but the degradation of Dos 
Passos’ socialist sympathies. This Marxian doggerel resonates as a clandestine - 
and conceivably shameful - “expression”, that is to say, a “letting out” of Dos 
Passos’ previous commitments to the political left. Both Marx and Dos Passos 
are tarnished by what Taussig calls “the proliferating effect of defacement”.378 
The “kiosks” of subaltern Paris offer themselves as “semantically generative 
space[s] of annulment” that, in turn, provide a cramped location, a space of 
obscenity, for the dissemination of a degraded radicalism.379  With 
“communism” degraded and figuratively banished to the pisser it is becoming 
plain that Dos Passos’ belief in revolutionary politics as an agent of substantive 
social change is starting to wobble (or, to shadow the camera-text’s “Vorticist” 
inflections, beginning to disappear down the plughole).
! If this Camera Eye provides scant evidence of a Marxian reflex, it provides 
abundant evidence of an aesthetic one. Having plumbed the semantic 
realisations of the “slogan” and pondered its confinement to the “kiosks”, I 
seek, in the closing section of this reading, to concentrate on the materiality of 
the urinal itself. That a French urinal provides the inscriptional surface upon 
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which the degradation of Dos Passos‘ leftism achieves articulation substantiates 
the contention that the “revolution round the spinning Eiffel Tower” (NN 651) is 
aesthetically rather than politically mediated. The Camera Eye (39) makes explicit 
reference to “Cezanne Picasso [and] Modigliani”, yet the primary aesthetic 
reference is to Marcel Duchamp. More exactingly, the graffitied “urinal” begs 
comparison with Duchamp’s famous piss-take, Fountain (1917; Fig. 2), an 
installation with which Dos Passos was patently familiar by the time he began 
composition of Nineteen Nineteen in 1930. 
! ! ! !
Fig. 2, Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917), as photographed by Alfred Stieglitz.
Selected and inscribed “R. Mutt ’17”, and submitted anonymously, Fountain 
was slated to appear in a New York exhibition organised by the Society of 
Independent Artists in April 1917.380 Duchamp’s “readymade”, however, would 
never receive a proper airing. Fountain was exhibited behind a partition which 
ran along the length of the gallery; the work was thus hidden from public view. 
The exhibition would take place, yet Fountain remained behind the arras. As 
does the urinal that bears the (anonymous) imprimatur of Marx, Fountain 
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would secrete itself in a private space, an individual “kiosk”. Both urinals, then, 
and by association the meanings that congeal in their inscriptions, are 
“smuggled away from society”. Two signatory manoeuvres are semantically 
complicit in a joint project of defacement; two urinals, one signed “R. Mutt” by 
a Frenchman in America, the other signed “K. Marx” by an American in France, 
sustain a chiasmic transatlantic relation. I deem the “urinal”, as a medium 
tapped first by Duchamp and then by Dos Passos to be what Godden, in an 
altogether different context, designates a “crackable euphemism”:381  for 
Duchamp it provided a means of degrading, by rendering banal, aesthetic 
discourse;382 for Dos Passos it resonated as a means of extracting and disposing 
the waste products of a dangerously bloated political ideology. 
Notwithstanding the slippage between these two epistemologies, the tension 
between Mutt and Marx provides an aesthetic reference for “the tarnished idea 
of socialism [which] increasingly pervaded Dos Passos’s political thinking”.383 If 
Benjamin is right that the “logical result of Fascism is the introduction of 
aesthetics into political life,” this daubing, replete with Duchampian inflections, 
resonates as textual evidence of a first stage in Dos Passos’ lurch to the political 
right.384 
! Thus politics is subordinated to aesthetics. As set out in the context of 
The Camera Eye (39), the “Paris of 1919 / paris-mutuel” is reminiscent of a city in 
the thrall of aesthetic rotations. The “roulettewheel that spins round the Tour 
Eiffel” infers an aleatory turning that privileges aesthetic “revolutions” over 
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social ones. For Dos Passos, as for myriad expats and sojourners, Paris was a 
dynamic centre of cultural capital from which energy would radiate through 
Europe and across to the United States. Certainly, for Dos Passos, who situates 
all but one of his Camera Eyes in France, Paris was the epicentre of the 
modernist vortex, the “point of maximum energy.”385 It was, at the same time, 
the (plug) hole through which Dos Passos’ politics plummets.
! In distinction to The Camera Eye (39), which forces a “Marxian” history of 
the class struggle into a set of cramped semantic locations, The Camera Eye (40) 
affords what seems ample room to a portrayal of a city in the thrall of massive 
social upheaval. “Class” is no longer a shameful conversation that secretes itself 
in a public loo; it, having “spilled out” onto the streets, comes out into the open. 
The opacities that dog the previous camera-text are thus subordinated, in The 
Camera Eye (40), to a more fluid, transparent formal prose. Indeed, Nineteen 
Nineteen’s pre-penultimate camera-text evokes, and evokes with a lucidity that 
eclipses any other Camera Eye, the bitter class antagonisms that suffused capital 
and labour in Paris in the radical summer of 1919. Referring most likely to the 
second week of June, Dos Passos’ camera-text thus fixes its “Eye”/“I” on a 
“flashpoint” in the social history of the class struggle, a point at which capital 
sought to deflate the insurrectionary pressure of organized labour.386  What 
begins as a saunter quickly turns into a blitz: 
! !
! ! I walked all over town general strike no busses     no
! taxicabs        the gates of the Metro closed       Place de Iéna I
! saw  red  flags  Anatole  France  in  a  white  beard  placards
! MUTILES  DE  LA  GUERRE  and  the  nutcracker  faces  of
! the agents de sûreté
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386 The “general strike” to which Dos Passos refers is most likely a reference not to a full scale 
shutdown but to the steel strike that brought Paris to a “standstill” [stillstellung] in the days 
following June 9, 1919.    
! ! Mort  aux  Vaches
! ! at the place de la Concorde the Republican Guards in
! christmastree helmets were riding among the  crowd  whack
! -ing the Parisians with the flats of their swords        scraps of 
! the  International  worriedlooking  soldiers  in  their  helmets
! lounging   with   grounded    arms   all   along   the    Grands 
! Boulevards
!        Vive  les  poilus
!        at  the  Republique             à bas de guerre    MORT AUX 
! VACHES  à  bas  la  Paix  des  Assassins    (NN 699)  
Via metaphoric comparisons, Dos Passos evokes capital’s desire to obliterate the 
resistance of a unionized workforce; “agents de sûreté” with “nutcracker 
faces” (NN 699) personify the literal crackdown on social dissent that would 
provide 1919 with its historical identity. As custodians of capital who guarantee 
the continued fluidity of moveable property, these (anticoagulant) “agents” 
clash with the bearers of (blood) “red flags” (699) that seek, by striking, to bring 
the flux of capital to a “standstill”, to make it clot. This Eye focuses, then, on the 
dialectical interactions between two antagonistic ideological imperatives. In the 
blue corner: capital, primed to unleash a “RUTHLESS WAR TO CRUSH 
REDS” (697); in the red corner: labour, “united in a mighty bloc against all 
domination and exploitation” (698). Here, and in stark contrast to The Camera 
Eye (39), the “eye”/”I” of the camera appears to be in the service of labour 
rather than an agent of its squeezing. Indeed, The Camera Eye (40) proffers a 
sympathetic portrait of labour’s efforts to resist its liquidation - in both senses 
of this term - by corporate capital: “Barricades we must build barricades” (699) 
Dos Passos notes, as a means of defending from the! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  cav-
! alry charging twelve abreast firecracker faces      scared and 
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! mean behind their big moustaches under their
! christmastree helmets (NN 699-700)
As a supplementary line of defence Dos Passos erects a set of rhetorical 
barricades that lend additional support to labour’s attempts at repelling what 
Dos Passos slyly dubs the “charging” of corporate capital. The invective “Mort 
aux Vaches”, literally “Death to Pigs” or logically extended “Fuck the Police”, is 
an epithet which recurs throughout this episode and connotes a vehement 
verbal assault on dominant power structures. A series of “placards” daubed 
with political “slogans” add to the rhetorical intensity of the exchange. 
“MUTILES DE LA GUERRE” and “Vive les poilus” refer to injured French 
soldiers who, having fought in what Dos Passos describes as a “cockeyed 
lunatic asylum of war” (NN 529) to “Safeguard the Morgan Loans” (449), were 
now being targeted as political agitators in a parallel war for “social 
justice” (513). That Dos Passos seems broadly to support the cause of organised 
labor does not mean that his socialist sympathies have re-emerged from the u-
bend, however. This camera-text may have temporarily brought “class” into the 
open but its critique of capital fails to permeate beneath the level of rhetorical 
insistence. Here a “class consciousness” resides not in a centrally politicized 
structure, as was fleetingly the case in The Camera Eye (28) but in a set of 
“slogans” that, while “political” in coloration, remain peripheral in their 
sociality; these sayings, even when coupled with “scraps of the 
Internationale” (NN 699) connote little more than “protests scrawled on the 
margins.”387  If The Camera Eye (28) was a site of ideological struggle, a space 
within which tacit semantic realizations push through dialectically accountable 
cracks in structure, The Camera Eye (40) is a choked space, one which displays a 
hermetic formal unity. In contrast to its predecessor, this later exchange 
exemplifies a rhetorical, and by implication a superficial, engagement with the 
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class struggle. 
! The final lines of The Camera Eye (40) underscore the ideological shortfall 
and, ultimately, testify to a fuller disintegration of a coherent socialist position. 
Impelled to relocate by “revolver shots” fired into the crowd by the 
“gendarmerie nationale” (699), Dos Passos flees from the epicentre (or vortex) 
of social activity; moving back “inside”, he takes up a detached position in the 
“dark and quiet” sanctuary of a “little cafe” in a Parisian “side street” (idem). 
Dos Passos’ “relocation” is metaphorically inflected. Having figuratively 
channelled himself away from the (political) centre and embezzled himself 
within a private location, Dos Passos maintains a safe distance from the social. 
Thus hoarded, Dos Passos talks revolution with the “working men”, some of 
whom inform him that “the revolution had triumphed in Marseilles and Lille”. 
Perhaps contended by the news, perhaps made anxious by it, Dos Passos “drink
[s] grog americain”; he worries about his wet shoes. (700) Convinced that the 
coast is clear, Dos Passos “peeps out from under the sliding shutter”. An 
occluded peep through a crack between the floor and through the “hard rain” 
yields to Dos Passos’ eye a pair of seemingly mismatched and quotidian 
artefacts: a “smashed umbrella and an old checked cap”. At the literal level, 
“umbrella” and “cap” are simply “dead objects”, erstwhile repositories of use 
value that, “smashed” and “old” have been laid to rest in the “clean stone 
gutter”. Despite being drained of their use value, however, these tarnished 
coverings are semantically viable. Indeed, it is as “dead objects” and because of 
their draining that these items become metaphorically accountable. “[U]
mbrella” and “cap” constitute (ruined) things that stand in for other (ruined) 
things. Implicated in a perverse paratactical embrace (placed, that is, “side by 
side”) “umbrella” and “cap” invoke the forlorn mood of the French left in the 
wake of capital’s “smash[ing]” of labor. The sense of desolation and defeat is 
palpable; the political energy that attended the recent surge of resistance to 
capital has been siphoned off; aside from “smashed”, “old” and “torn” 
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artefacts, the streets are “empty”. With this depletion of social energy “the 
dreams of a saner social order of those who can’t stand the law of dawg eat 
dawg” (FTC 45) drain away. 
! Crucially, Dos Passos also eyes a fragment of a fragment that seems to 
have been seen somewhere before. Laying in the “clean stone gutter” next to the 
“smashed umbrella” and “old cap” is “a torn handbill”, the text of which reads: 
“L’UNION DES TRAVAILLEURS FERA”. This discarded scrap of paper 
constitutes a remnant of the Marxian discourse that was “scrawled in 
chalk” (NN 651) in the previous Eye. An eroded form of an already fraught 
political pronouncement, this fragment of a fragment invokes the vestigial 
remains of a squeezed and, finally, tattered sociality. As the next chapter seeks 
to show, it is in The Big Money that the “shutters” finally come down on Dos 
Passos’ affiliations with the left.
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CHAPTER SIX 
EYES, RIGHT: THE BIG MONEY 
In the last twenty-five years a change has come over the visual habits of 
Americans [.…] From being a wordminded people we are becoming an 
eyeminded people. 
!                              Dos Passos, “George Grosz Comes to America” (1936).388
Following the twenty-seven Camera Eyes of The 42nd Parallel come fifteen in 
Nineteen Nineteen. The final instalment of the trilogy, The Big Money (1936), 
yields only nine.389 During the course of its composition, then, U.S.A. loosens its 
reliance upon The Camera Eye as a means of formal expression. This final 
chapter explores - and subsequently seeks to theorise - the consequences of this 
conspicuous yet “seldom noted” gear change.390 The critical pile tends toward 
silence with regard to this particular shift in textual practice. The most 
significant mapping of The Camera Eye remains Westerhoven’s useful albeit 
entirely uncritical essay of 1976, “Autobiographical Elements in the Camera 
Eye.” Drawing extensively on archival materials, diaries, and 
correspondences, Westerhoven plots, with painstaking precision, the 
compositional history of The Camera Eyes and, by so doing, leavens some of the 
opacities that attend these narratives. Despite the rigour of his researches, 
however, Westerhoven ducks out of the difficulty that these episodes infer. Here 
is his rather flimsy judgement as to the reasoning behind the waning “camera 
consciousness”391 in the context of The Big Money:
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!
! For some reason, Dos Passos used the Camera Eye less as his trilogy 
! progressed. The Big Money contains only nine Camera Eyes, most of 
! them very general in character, as if the author had decided that his 
! personal memories are not really as important as he had thought 
! originally. Whatever his motives, the authorial presence in the Camera 
! Eye is diminished dramatically; most of the observations could have been 
! written by anyone who lived in New York during the twenties or who 
! was emotionally involved in the Sacco and Vanzetti case. Nevertheless it 
! is useful to point out that Dos Passos did all these things, that he knew 
! what he was writing about from first hand experience.392 
The phrasing “as if”, “most of”, “whatever” and “could have been” prod 
vaguely in the direction of exegesis yet reveal a floundering that mimics, rather 
than critiques its subject. Westerhoven is quite right to assert that The Camera 
Eyes have “diminished dramatically” by the end of the trilogy; he is also correct 
in his claim that “most of” The Big Money’s Camera Eyes are “very general in 
character”. He makes no attempt, however, to engage with why they are so few 
nor why they might be so “general”. I seek to remedy this two-pronged 
inadequacy in the coming pages. 
! The disavowal of the camera-text is neither sudden nor abrupt in its 
realisation. It does not connote a revelatory “flash” or an “explosion” in the 
materialist sense as set out in chapter 6. In fact, the “dethronement of the eye 
[/”I”]” is part of a protracted and attritional process.393 Stretching across over 
1200 pages of text,394  covering thirty years of “historical” time (1898-1927) and 
nine years of personal chronology (1927-1936), it takes a while for U.S.A. to 
work the camera out of its “system”. It takes a while, that is, to excrete the 
excreted. Despite the gradualism with which Dos Passos omits/emits The 
Camera Eyes as a structuring narrative, the change is marked in its impact. The 
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present chapter argues that the (incremental) phasing out of the (excremental) 
Camera Eye resonates on three linked levels. First, as an opening section 
suggests, the shift is visually freighted. The attenuation of the textual “Eye”/”I” 
is indicative of and accountable to the “regime of attentiveness and distraction” 
that flanked the transition from production to consumption in the first third of 
the twentieth century.395 Second, it will be argued that the de-intensification of 
the textual Eye is economically inflected. Building upon the argument of chapter 
5 that The Camera Eyes function as visual hoards within which surplus textual 
liquidities gather, I contend that the depletion constitutes a tacit recapitalization 
of the textual economy. Third, I suggest that the loss of visual traction is 
politically derived. If Nineteen Nineteen represents the point at which Dos 
Passos’ Marxian commitments begin to feel the squeeze, The Big Money 
represents the point at which these commitments are finally choked off. Three 
attenuations: visual, economic, and political thus inform what Ricoeur might 
call the “conceptual need” of The Camera Eye and provide critical direction for 
the coming arguments.396  
ANTI-RETINAL AESTHETICS: THE BIG MONEY
The twenty-seven - fifteen - nine trajectory prizes loose, if it doesn’t fully 
disable, the “eye grasp”397  that asserts a “binding grip”398  on The 42nd Parallel 
and to a lesser extent Nineteen Nineteen. Having played a formative role in the 
trilogy’s first two books, Dos Passos’ “kino-eye” asserts a dubious authority in 
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its third.399  The “extraordinary visual orientation of Dos Passos’s great trilogy”, 
in North’s wording, appears to lose a significant amount of traction by the 
publication of The Big Money.400  Now only nine in number, the machined 
visions of The Big Money seem to  problematise Dos Passos’ affirmation that 
“Americans” were becoming “eyeminded”. If “the visual habits of Americans” 
had strengthened, as Dos Passos claims, one might justifiably query why The 
Camera Eye, as U.S.A.’s preeminently “eyeminded” narrative mode, doesn’t 
play a more significant role in the final volume of the text. Conceivably, by 
banishing to the periphery of the text the “kino-eye”, replete with its Fordist 
mannerisms and objectives, the “formal premises of modernist opticality”, in 
the idiom of Rosalind Krauss, are undermined rather than confirmed.401 
! I seek to posit a counter-argument here. That The Big Money retains so 
few Camera Eyes reinforces rather than denigrates Dos Passos’ contention that, 
by the mid thirties, “Americans” were acquiring proficiency in the eye-dialect 
of American modernity. Between 1911 and 1936, the period demarcated by Dos 
Passos as one of visual realignment, the “iconicity” of modern industrial 
capitalism, voluminously made manifest in corporate skyscrapers, suspension 
bridges and, most urgently, in consumable goods, would burn itself onto the 
collective retina of the national consciousness.402 It is beyond the bounds of this 
chapter to theorise adequately the mobility of the “eye”/”I” as it scans the 
various locations of American capital. Suffice it to say that by the publication of 
The Big Money in 1936 many Americans had come to accept as normal the 
ideological prerequisites of a visual culture that would have jarred on the 
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“eye”/”I” of the previous generation.403  A rich tradition of cultural 
historiography attests to the notion that, by the mid thirties, the forms and 
syntax of industrial modernity had, in Lukács’ idiom, become “second 
nature”.404  If Americans were becoming more prone than ever before to “think 
optically”, in Zygmunt Tonecky’s phrase, it makes sense that fewer “prompts” 
would be needed to remind them of their responsibilities as spec(tac)ular 
subjects.405 The Camera Eyes, conceived of here as U.S.A.’s ideological stabilisers, 
could come off. Americans, it seemed, had learned how to use their eyes. As 
Dos Passos asserts in his biographical portrait of Frank Lloyd-Wright, “The 
crude purpose of pioneering days has been accomplished. The scaffolding may be taken 
down and the true work, the culture of a civilization, may appear” (TBM 1131, italics 
in original). The “culture” of this particular “civilization”, under construction 
for the previous twenty-five years, was a culture of consumption.   
! Between 1911 and 1936 consumption not only acquired legitimacy as a 
cultural practice but it became, in Alissa Karl’s terms, “a national moral 
imperative”.406  The commodity was the determining agent of this new found 
“morality”. Indeed, the “goodness” of “goods” fell only a little short of their 
“god-ness”. God-like in its omnipresence and serenely all-knowing, the 
commodity, a totem of a congealed labour at once “dead” yet at once 
resurrected, sat sentry over the transition from production to consumption 
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economies. Hoarding its secrets (in the form of secreted labour) the commodity 
would deliver its sermons from the corporate alters of “showwindows” (TBM 
894); through plate-glass the commodity would capture the attentions of 
coerced congregations. Devotees to a new church, those beholden were 
enchanted by the possibility that commodities might plug the hole that 
industrial modernity had (deliberately) punched in the social fabric. All of this 
is an elaborate way of making a simple point: during the first third of the 
twentieth century human vision was steadily, and with intensifying effect, 
becoming co-opted by the Fordized logic of the marketplace. This was a period 
in which the “ideology of consumption” migrated from the periphery to the 
centre of the American consciousness, cementing itself (becoming entrenched) in 
the national “eye”/”I”.407 Two things had to happen for consumer capitalism to 
flourish within this new visual order, and they had to happen simultaneously: 
first, the commodity had to be seen; second, the labour upon which its “being” 
was predicated had to remain hidden. As Marx notes, the “movement through 
which this process has been mediated vanishes in its own result, leaving no 
trace behind.”408  This “endless back-and-forth of revelation and concealment” 
proved key to the dilations and contractions that attended monopoly capitalism 
- key, in short, to its contradictions.409 
! The concretisation of a culture of consumption in the United States 
elicited a crisis of perception that imperilled what Merleau-Ponty calls “the 
labor of vision.”410  Glistening from “showwindows”, commodities became 
agents of forced perceptual relocations. The eye, in short, was made to move. 
Enchanted by the sheen of commodities the modernising “Eye”/”I” was lured 
“into” the matrices of consumerist space that simply did not exist a generation 
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before. Displaced from its (premodern) sockets, the commodified “I”/”eye” 
duly wriggled its way into brand new topographies (or perhaps better newly 
branded topographies) that, in turn, provided access to new intensities. These 
“wriggles” would prove habit forming. Indeed, the onset of a commodity 
culture assigned to the perceptual faculty a musculature that rendered 
effortless, at least for some, the latest phase in the transition from a premodern 
past dreary with use values to a dynamic and conceivably liberatory modern 
period of exchange. America would indeed gorge on its exchange values, yet 
the gorging, as Veblen noted at the turn of the century, had to be accompanied 
by a sense of display: American consumption had to be seen to be believed.411 
Rachel Bowlby writes that the “transformation of merchandise into a spectacle” 
would erode the “limits of an older economy of scarcity and moral restraint”, 
thus unleashing “the free floating possibilities of a commodified world”.412 
Duly emancipated from old forms of attention Americans could enjoy, in 
Ownby’s term, a “sense of freedom in shopping”.413  On one hand, then, 
commodities “demanded an ambulatory visual consumption”414  that would 
enliven the eye, generating what Dos Passos later called a “visual freshness”.415 
On the other hand, however, commodities, as an alienated form of extracted 
labour, occasioned what the semiotician Umberto Eco refers to as a “sort of 
perceptual cramp”.416 To see was not to see. In Intellectual and Manual Labour: A 
Critique of Epistemology (1978) Alfred Sohn-Rethel sets about exposing as 
fraudulent these claims to “visual freshness”:
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!
! There, in the market-place and in shop windows, things stand still. !They 
! are under the spell of one activity only; to change owners. They stand 
! there waiting to be sold. While they are there for exchange they are there 
! not for use. A commodity marked out at a definite price, for instance, is 
! looked upon as being frozen to absolute immutability throughout the 
! time during which its price remains unaltered. And the spell does not 
! only bind the doings of man. Even nature herself is supposed to abstain 
! from any ravages in the body of this commodity and to hold her breath, 
! as it were, for the sake of this social business of man. Evidently, even the 
! aspect of non-human nature is affected by the banishment of use from 
! the sphere of exchange.417 
As manifestations of a congealed and degraded labour, commodities thus 
connote a sort of petrification; they are “looked upon as being frozen to 
absolute immutability”. Sohn-Rethel’s arguments constitute a challenge to the 
supposed transparency of a phantasmagoric world vibrant with commodities. 
His is a refutation of the phenomenology of the “free-floating” world noted by 
Bowlby. 
! To channel the labour of the eye into the shallow locations of commodity 
culture (while maintaining an illusion of breadth and variety) was key to the 
ideological requirements of consumer capital. As Stuart Gilbert reports from the 
pages of transition in 1937, “the art of living is largely an art of elimination and 
selection; we are constantly narrowing down, sometimes deliberately, 
sometimes automatically, the field of our attention, in order to cope with the 
exigencies of daily life."418  An aptitude for visual selectivity had, for Gilbert, 
become a pressing need, a means of safely negotiating an “image choked 
world”.419  Only by “narrowing down” the glut of (commercial) traffic that 
sought to pass through the (des[pa]iring) eye/”I” could one “cope with” the 
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“sheer visual bewilderment” of technological modernity.420  The “elimination 
and selection” to which Gilbert refers did not merely seek to restrict the volume 
of signification but, and perhaps more urgently, to control its composition. To 
“narrow down” meant to filter - or “sieve”, to prompt a coming term - exchange 
values from the labour without which the commodity cannot obtain. Evidently, 
the spectral world of consumption had to find a way of concealing the opacities 
of production behind a sheen of exchange. Rendered narrow by the 
generalisation of commodification, the “eye”/”I” was duly co-opted into the 
ideological work of consumption. The commodified “I” was thus hamstrung by 
what Taussig calls “the ambivalence of active not-seeing.”421  That is, the 
“eye”/”I”, becoming narrow, was expected to “see” exchange values and 
simultaneously “not see” (or maybe more accurately not admit to seeing) the 
fundamental and fundamentally social process by which these values were 
created. Commodification would thus occasion a sort of “a sort of ontological 
freeze”; labour would be erased by its own becoming.422 
! The cultural cramps that issue from commodification originate in the eye 
but they are not limited to it. Paying close attention to The Camera Eye (43), the 
first of The Big Money, clearly shows that the “eye”/”I”-cramp induced by and 
symptomatic of emergent Fordism spreads to the “throat” and, later, to the 
“spine”. That the stress is shouldered by body parts other than the eye does not 
undermine the eye as the cardinal location for the fluctuations and contra(di)
ctions of American capital. Indeed, the eye remains the preeminent site of 
ideological paralysis in The Big Money, yet it is not the only organ that proves 
susceptible to the cultural cramping of emergent modernity. By roaming around 
the metabolism, Dos Passos draws to the attenuated “eye” a pair of linked 
contractions that thicken, and notably thicken through metaphor, the opacities 
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of visual reference. To note these parallel tightenings is to provide a more 
extensive musculature for the contra(di)ctions that inhere in emergent Fordism. 
The cramping of throat and spine routes the cramping of “eye” into a wider 
(social) physiognomy. 
! The Camera Eye (43) tracks a begrudging reintegration to the United 
States of September 1920, through what Dos Passos dubs “the painful sieve of 
Ellis Island”.423 Shot through with Sartrean inflections of muscular rigidity, the 
“eye” of Dos Passos’ petrified narrative “opens” only to be met by a “throat” 
that contracts:
 ! !
!             throat tightens when the  redstacked steamer churning 
! the  faintlyheaving  slatecolored  swell  swerves shaking in a 
! long greenmarbled curve past the red lightship
! ! spine stiffens with the remembered chill of the offshore
! Atlantic (TBM 788, emphases added)
Awash with sibilants and swamped by alliteration this (syntactically) turbulent 
approach to the United States elicits in Dos Passos a physical response that 
lodges first, in the “throat” and subsequently the “spine”. “[T]hroat” and 
“spine”, under the auspices of “eye”, are linked somatic locations within which, 
in the first instance, the reverberations of a “redstacked steamer churning” 
manifest and, in the second, the bracing sensation of a “remembered 
chill” (again, we think: “petrify”). The materiality of this transatlantic return is 
pronounced, yet the linked contractions of “throat” and “spine” draw from 
muscles that spasm a broader sociality. 
! The opening phases of The Camera Eye (43) provide a pair of linked and 
anatomically precise metaphors - “throat tightens” and “spine stiffens” - that 
refer to the perceptual cramping attendant upon the fetishisation of 
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commodities. Throat and spine share with eye a materialist reflex. As “eye”, 
confronted with the generalisation or “dilation” of exchange values, contracts at 
(the thought of) goods in “storewindows”, throat and spine contract at the 
(thought of) “America”, the preeminent national window for consumptive 
economics. Vis a vis a metaphor, an act of substitution, the tight throat and stiff 
spine that feature in this contracted Eye ruin the literal, creating the textual 
conditions through which “a new semantic congruence or pertinence” can 
emerge.424  Ricoeur writes that “[w]e can describe the word as having a 
‘metaphorical use’ or a ‘non-literal meaning’: the word is always the bearer of 
the ‘emergent meaning’ which specific contexts confer upon it.”425 
! Located within the specular (textual) realm of The Camera Eye, the joint 
attenuations of “throat” and “spine” provide Dos Passos with a means of 
referring to the contractions of capital by non-visual means. Given the amount 
of ideological work that the eye must do to maintain the fantasy of value which 
sees exchange split from labour, the co-opting of throat and spine  is significant. 
Pulling the attention from the eye and thus taking on some of its own 
ideological labour, throat and spine alleviate the semantic burden that presses 
down on the eye - an oversubscribed faculty, an organ that works to full 
capacity, if only to “survive”. Routed into larger questions of restriction and 
cramp, these parallel contractions provide parallel narrations or perhaps more 
accurately, narrations within narrations; “throat” and “spine”, as linked elements 
in the nervous cortex, narrate stories of the “stifling” (TBM 789) aspect of life 
under the “ethercone” (NN 370) of American capitalism. As textual “events” 
that accrue metaphoricity, these moments constitute “stories told sideways out 
of the big mouth” (TBM 789).
! Having claimed for the metaphorical, or “sideways” possibilities of these 
“compacted doctrines”, I seek to show how their “metaphoricity” inclines to 
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“historicity”. Historical pressures provide the “extralinguistic” context to which 
these metaphors, as “work[s] in miniature”, ultimately refer. 426  In the first 
instance, the tightening of Dos Passos’ throat is an analogue for an insistently 
historical contraction. The Emergency Quota Act, implemented in May 1921, 
only eight months after Dos Passos’ readmission to the United States provides a 
specific, and chronologically pertinent legislative framing within which an 
attenuated throat invokes the tightening of United States’ immigration policy in 
the aftermath of the First World War. The “quota” - from which “professionals”, 
regardless of national origin, were exempted - was set annually at three percent 
of the total number of persons of that nationality resident in the United States as 
recorded in the census of 1910.427  The effect of the Emergency Quota Act was 
immediately felt. Figures gleaned from the Historical Statistics of the United States 
show that admissions into America waned from around 800,000 in 1921 to a 
little over 300,000 in 1922. 
! With the passage of the Johnson-Reed bill in May 1924, quotas would 
“tighten” further; three percent contracted to two. Under the later legislation, 
which contained, as an (inflamed?) appendix, the notorious Asian Exclusion 
Act, quotas were derived not from the census of 1910 but of 1890.428 Section 11, 
subsection (a) of the Bill reads as follows: “[t]he annual quota of any nationality 
shall be 2 per centum of the number of foreign-born individuals of such 
nationality resident in continental United States as determined by the United 
States census of 1890.”429  Narrow numbers indeed. The efficacy of these two 
implicitly racist interventions is clear from the above graphic. Tightening in the 
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autumn of “that delirious year 1920” (FTC 25) and doing so at the point of his 
in-migration, Dos Passos’ “throat” becomes the “painful sieve” through which 
he, following multitudes of others, seeks to pass.430  This difficult “channel” is 
phenomenologically affiliated to the “inlets barred with trestles” that restrict 
free passage through the neck of the United States. (TBM 788) Dos Passos’ 
suddenly tight throat - tight at the thought of America as much as at the 
“churning” of engines - coincides with and semanticises around the ideological 
cramping of the national throat which, stricken with delirium and predisposed 
toward isolationism, would contract in May 1920 and contract again in July 
1924.431  Two throats, then, one personal and one national, are topographically 
twinned. As analogous channels “throat” and “port” resonate as regions of 
confined dimension into which an international cargo seeks passage. The 
congruence of corporeal and national throats is noteworthy, yet the semantic 
implications of “throat” extend beyond its (narrowing) topographic parameters. 
! Unusually, given the massified forms to which U.S.A. commits, Dos 
Passos’ tight throat signifies at the linguistic level. The phonic coupling “th [...] 
ti” implements, across two linked phases - “fricative” and “plosive” 
respectively - the ideological mandates of the national “throat”. Expressed 
simply, th and ti regulate, at the phonic level, what gets through and what gets 
stopped. To grasp how this is achieved it is necessary, first, to schematise the 
aero-acoustics of the expulsive th of throat. The preliminary phoneme of the 
word “throat” - the “th” sound - exemplifies what linguists refer to as an 
“unvoiced” or “aspirated” fricative. This particular phonic articulation is 
“unvoiced” in that it does not engage the vocal chords in its speaking. In lieu of 
sound or “voice” comes the hushed turbulence of an expulsive fricative; a blast 
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of air is forced, almost silently, through the tunnel. The th of throat plays no part 
in what linguists refer to as “phonation”; it is only at “ro” that “throat” becomes 
“voiced”.432 If, in the first instance, the phonic identity of “throat” is determined 
by its “voicelessness”, it is determined in its second by its place of articulation, 
that is, the point at which the obstruction occurs in the mouth. The initial phone 
of throat brings together the tip of the tongue and the front teeth, hence the 
“dental” assignation. The adjacency of teeth and tongue effects an almost 
complete closure of the oral cavity; the flux of “traffic” that seeks to pass 
(“sideways” and thus “metaphorically”) through the mouth is subsequently 
impeded. It is less as a “dental” articulation than as a fricative, however, that 
the th of throat gains semantic traction. The OED proffers a working definition 
of the term fricative: “[o]f a consonant sound: [p]roduced by the friction of the 
breath through a narrow opening between two of the mouth organs.” The 
“narrowing down” of the “mouth organs” conditions the opening expulsive 
sound of The Camera Eye (43). Yet this speech sound is, in Ricoeur’s phrasing, 
“related to an extralinguistic reality”.433  There is, as it were, a world to which 
this word refers. Predicated as it is on the expulsion of air through a narrow 
opening in the “big mouth” (TBM 789), the fricative is the appropriate means of 
semanticising the cramping of the national throat. The aspirated dental fricative 
th realises a grammatical friction that corresponds in significant yet suggestive 
ways to Dos Passos’ difficult readmission through the narrowing, that is, 
“choked”  neck of the United States (TBM 789). Additionally, and usefully, for 
present purposes, it also provides an analogue for the visual “contractions” 
upon which the flow of capital had come to depend. Two types of “friction” - 
phonic and social - coalesce or better yet lodge in a single phoneme, the 
obstruent th of “throat”. Mediated via the whispered workings of a phoneme, 
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the “literary” text becomes complicit in the work of patrolling, if not fully 
controlling the ideological traffic which passes through the narrow “inlet” of 
“throat” and “mouth”. 
! The restricted passage of air through the “narrow opening” of the 
mouth, exemplified here by the th of throat, is narrowed further by the plosive 
articulations of a second obstruent: the ti of tightens. A “plosive” consonant, 
sometimes dubbed a “stop” or “occlusive”, refers to a class of phonic 
articulations in which the passage of air is completely blocked, “caught” (that 
is, held in the mouth) and suddenly released. The k sound in kitch, the p in 
export, and the initial t in tightens are typical examples of the plosive phoneme; 
each “plosion” generates an audible puff of air at the moment of its articulation. 
Each “stop” is classified, in John Lyons’ phrasing, “according to the place at 
which the obstruction occurs”.434  The ti of tightens is deemed an “alveolar” 
plosive, an orientation in which the tongue comes into contact with the 
“alveolar ridge”, the part of the mouth that houses the sockets of the upper 
front teeth.435  The place of articulation is less important than the fact that in 
striking where it does on the mouth the tongue shuts off the gap through which 
air might otherwise pass. Herein lies the key distinction between fricative and 
plosive orientations. Whereas th admits a steady, if thin amount of air through 
the oesophagus, ti is less permissive, preventing air from passing through (thus 
escaping from) the mouth. Staunchly opposed to free movement, ti blocks the 
narrow channel between the tongue and the teeth through which the fricative 
sound th, albeit silently and despite heavy restriction, has successfully passed. 
Aspiration is duly “choke[d]” by a lively tongue that catches behind the top 
front teeth. Albeit briefly, the reader’s tongue is politicised; it becomes a sitting 
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sentry or, better yet, a “stopper” within an occluded - and not so “big” (NN 789) 
- mouth. Snuffing out the aspiration generated by th, ti precludes transit from 
freely issuing through the “painful sieve” of the readerly throat. Inasmuch as it 
informs the broader sociality of the national throat, this unaspirated stop is 
socially aggregated. Duty bound to block, hinder and control, ti tightens, and 
thus chokes off a social sort of “aspiration”, that is to say the “desire”, held by 
myriad immigrants during the early part of the twenties to pursue a better, 
perhaps less “constricted” life in the United States. 
! This desire for “freedom” was inextricably, if often subconsciously, 
bound up with a desire to consume. 436 A tight throat thickens, via a metaphoric 
contraction, the “perceptual cramp” that inheres in the viewing of commodities. 
From one tightness issues a second. As organs which tighten at or around the 
notion of commodification, throat and eye are ideologically freighted organs 
that work in tandem: the “eye” generates the “desire”; the throat provides a 
demographic fit to consume.437 This, then, is a moment of stifling, and one that 
is implicitly linked to the demands of the United States economy. A phonetic 
“stop” is drawn to an ideological “stop”. As it “tightens”, then, Dos Passos’ 
“throat” synecdochically affirms the socially determined “contraction” of entry 
points to the United States circa September 1920. A “choked“ throat functions as 
a common if implicitly provided semantic reference for a pair of related 
obstructions, one phatic and one social. 
! This discreet pair of fricative sounds, the former aspirated, the latter 
occlusive, are drawn to a second pair: “spine stiffens”. This second alliterative 
coupling complicates the phonic cramping of which “throat tightens” is an able 
example. As was previously the case, semantic meaning coalesces in word 
openings. The sibilant speech sounds “sp [...] st” provide corollary phatic 
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injunctions to “th [...] ti” and thus reiterate the epistemic mandates of the 
(narrowing) channel. The opening consonant cluster of “spine” consists not of 
one phonic orientation, as is the case with th and with ti, but of two. The 
“unvoiced” sibilant fricative s is followed by an “expulsive” p. Linguists refer to 
the p sound in spine as a voiceless bilabial plosive. The terms “voiceless” and 
“plosive” are by now familiar to us; “bilabial” less so. A “bilabial” denotes a 
consonant formation whose articulation occasions the meeting, “catching” and, 
subsequently the parting of both lips. Whereas the sibilant s of spine pushes air 
steadily and slowly between the teeth, the plosive p explodes, from between the 
lips, with violent force. 
! s and p are not only at variance as regard their place of articulation, but 
they also prove at odds concerning the materiality of the stuff that issues from 
the mouth. Whereas the speaking of th and ti occasioned, later to occlude, a 
stream of dry air, the speaking of sp and st occasions, or threatens, the expulsion 
of wet. Given the nature of the terrain across which Dos Passos travels, the 
inferred distinction between “dry” and “wet” sounds is not as eccentric as it 
might initially seem. Indeed, to differentiate between th [...] ti, as an exemplum 
of phonic aridity and sp [...] st as an example of precipitate provides a useful 
axis upon which we might plot the amphibious character of Dos Passos’ 
“offshore” narration. The spittle that threatens to spray from the mouth in the 
speaking - or more precisely the spitting - of spine evokes, in the first instance, 
the spume and spray that engulfs Dos Passos on his return through the great 
American neck. Spat words evoke spat scenes; spit in fact carries a number of 
connotative and denotative inflections that add to the materiality of the 
account. “[S]pit” connotes the “fluid secreted by the glands of the mouth, esp. 
when ejected [from the metabolism]; saliva, spittle, a clot of this.” More than 
this, “spit” carries geographical connotations. Referring to “a small, low point 
or tongue of land, projecting into the water; a long narrow reef, shoal or 
sandbank extending from the shore”, the sp sound of “spine” offers a 
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(submerged) reference to “tongues” of land that lick their way, saltily, out into 
the Atlantic. “Abounding in phlegm” and attuned to the contours of the 
sediment to which it describes, spit is an appropriate term by which to evoke 
the “context” of this Eye.438 
! The above discussions relate “throat” and “spine” to the ideological 
contractions that inhere in American capital. In the pages that follow I seek to 
provide a theoretical frame through which the attenuation of the ”I” might be 
adequately conceptualised. These arguments issue from a central assumption: 
that the suppression of the camera-text, and the “narrowing down” to which it 
refers, aestheticises fluctuations in American productivity. Having offered Marx, 
in chapter 5, as a pertinent theoretical location within which the workings of 
The Camera Eye can be situated I seek to interrogate more thoroughly the 
diminished role that these episodes play as the trilogy reaches its conclusion. If, 
as it has been argued, The Camera Eyes constitute agglomerations of surplus 
textual capital that are “ejected from the sphere of circulation” and secreted on 
its margins, we might want to consider the ramifications of their dissolving. 
Why are the “hoard forming tendencies” of The Big Money less pronounced than 
they are in the previous two novels?439 A case will be made in the coming pages 
that the comprehensive de-hoarding of the narrative carries meaning that, while 
congealing in the eye, transcends its workings.
! Marx’s conception of the hoard as formulated in the Critique provides a a 
first step in determining the dialectic relation between textual “paucity” and 
economic “abundance”. Here, Marx writes that hoards “act as channels for the 
supply or withdrawal of circulating money, so that the amount of money 
circulating as coin is always just adequate to the immediate requirements of 
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circulation.”440  As a mechanism which can be triggered if the amount of 
circulating money needs controlling or adjusting, the hoard is the “safety valve” 
of the monetary economy. From a general definition of the hoard as a means of 
correction that balances the system, Marx moves, in a subsequent passage, to a 
more precise analysis of the exact conditions that determine the vicissitudes of 
the hoard. He writes 
[i]f the total volume of circulation suddenly expands and the fluid unity 
of sale and purchase predominates, so that the total amount of prices to 
be realized grows even faster than does the velocity of circulation of 
money, then the hoards dwindle visibly; whenever an abnormal 
stagnation prevails in the movement as a whole, that is when the 
separation of sale from purchase predominates, then the medium of 
circulation solidifies into money to a remarkable extent and the 
reservoirs of the hoarders are filled far above their average level.441
To simplify: in an economy awash with exchange values, the hoard is 
impoverished; drained of its resources it “dwindles visibly”. Conversely, if 
“stagnation prevails” the “medium of circulation solidifies into money”, 
replenishing the hoard. The Marxian schema is pertinent with regard to the 
(meagre) dialectic expenditures to which The Big Money commits. The 
chronology of The Big Money brackets off a period of vigorous economic activity. 
Between 1919 and 1929, the United States economy enjoyed almost 
uninterrupted aggregate growth, swelling at an average rate of 4.2% per year.442 
Having expanded throughout the teens and twenties, “money” had become 
“big”. Aside from a sharp fall in deflation in 1920-21, which would occasion a 
brief but intense contraction of the national economy (and national “throat”) 
this was a period in which the “total amount of prices” would outstrip the 
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“velocity of circulation of money.”443  Stimulated by the acceleration of 
industrial production, the spread of electrification, and fuller access to 
consumer credit, America’s gross per capita national product would expand 
from $4,800 in 1919 to $5,800 in 1929.444 As the American economy expanded, 
then, the amount of money held in hoards dwindled. And as money became 
“big”, The Camera Eye became “small”. Dos Passos’ textual practice can thus be 
seen not just as a “safety valve” for its own complex economy but an outlet for 
the fluctuations of the monetary economy, which was accelerating at 
considerable velocity during the twenties. It is in this light that The Camera Eyes 
of The Big Money can be thought of as textual responses to an economy that 
threatened bigness too soon. That the massification of capital accelerated during 
the teens and twenties has become a critical commonplace.445 Less attention has 
been paid to the volume of capital held in reserve, the amount of “material 
product” that, to return to Harvey, exceeded the amount that was deemed 
“necessary to reproduce society in its existing state”.446  Y. S. Leong has shown 
that between 1914 and 1926 - the period to which eight of the nine Eyes refer - 
the amount of money in vault in the United States would undergo significant 
depreciation.447  According to Leong, American vaults held in reserve close to 
$1700,000,000 (1700 million) dollars as the United States primed itself for war in 
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1914. By the time that Dos Passos started writing U.S.A. in 1926, however, 
American vaults had shipped more than half their previous load. Only 
$800,000,000 (800 million) was held in vault as of January of that year.448 
! The economic depreciation furnishes a parallel context within which the 
depletion of The Camera Eye can be conceptualised. The massive proliferations 
of the American economy during the twenties rendered The Camera Eye, as 
examples of hoarded surplus, anathema. What was in abundance before the 
first world war was pumped, after it, back into circulation. It would not be until 
the crash at the end of the twenties that the hoard would replenish (hence  a 
glut of Camera Eyes in the final seventy pages of The Big Money). The Camera Eyes 
do not disappear entirely in this final novel yet they do give the lie, through 
their dwindling, to the fantasy of ever proliferating surplus values, a fantasy 
upon which American notions of abundance and prosperity intimately relied. 
These fluctuations infer that there are, in fact, finite resources from which to 
draw; the limits of capital are inscribed at the level of Dos Passos’ text. For the 
moment there are resources to cover any “expansion”, yet the “safety valves“ of 
capital are being stretched. Having provided a way of reading The Camera Eye 
as a vessel for cultural and economic expenditures I seek, in the second half of 
this chapter, to focus on how The Camera Eyes of The Big Money generate 
tensions at the level of aesthetic form that further complicate their function as 
repositories for textual capital.  
*
The Camera Eyes (45), (46), and (47) - The Big Money’s three “New York” Eyes  - 
constitute a distinctive cluster. While these narrations clearly refer to different 
events, they achieve a coherent semantic identity only when they are read 
collectively. Arguably, these three episodes connote the most avant-garde of 
U.S.A.’s Camera Eyes. They are certainly the most opaque. Yet from a detailed 
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explication one can yield significant insights into Dos Passos’ shifting attitudes 
to the increasingly vexed relation between aesthetic and political commitments 
as manifest in U.S.A.’s final volume. The Camera Eye (45) focuses on Dos Passos’ 
attendance of and subsequent departure from a social gathering of April 1922, 
held in a crowded apartment in New York’s Greenwich Village. [APPENDIX, C] 
Reprising the “narrow” environs of The Camera Eye (43) which evokes, in turn, 
the cubicles of The Camera Eye (39), this “narrow yellow room” with “low 
ceiling” usurps Dos Passos’ “throat” as the designated space for a host of 
“choked” articulations. Again, then, “eye” inclines toward “throat”. An 
oesophagus fashioned from “brick” (TBM 872), this distended space - a stifling 
chamber in the Sartrean sense - encloses, hoards, or “pigeonhole[s]” the “talk” 
that issues from the throats of unidentified others. Indeed, the “throaty laugh” 
of the “warmvoiced woman” who “distribut[es] with teasing looks the parts in 
the fiveoclock drama” hacks across this claustrophobic and intently 
disconcerting Camera Eye. Dos Passos is keen to vacate this strange yellow 
room, to escape the “crinkling tendrils of cigarettesmoke” that threaten to choke 
him and free himself from the “aviary squawkings of the literary gentry” from 
which he often felt unable to escape.449  Dos Passos’ apparent distaste for the 
artistic ferment of “Greenwich Village” jars, however, with the highly 
aestheticised and intently avant-garde character of this text. Suffused with a 
cubist syntax, this Camera Eye offers an anatomical study of the materiality of 
the body. Here Dos Passos conceives of the body not as an organic unit but as a 
scattered set of component “parts”, “curve[s]”  and “rims”. Occasioning a 
rhetoric of atomisation the camera-text segments the body into “noses”, “ears”, 
the “curve of a wet / cheek a pair of freshcolored lips / a weatherlined neck a / 
gnarled grimed hand an old man’s bloodshot eye”. The “crinkling 
cigarettesmoke”, itself a formation that is in the process of breaking up (it is 
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crinkling and thus becoming “crinkled”), is the unifying agent of this fragmenting 
Eye. “[C]igarettesmoke is the (immaterial) presence that links together the 
fragments of the body, it “twine[s] blue / and fade[s] round noses behind ears 
under the rims of wom-/en’s hats (872).
! The eye of the camera zooms in on the body in its second phase, 
magnifying it to cellular proportions. These are its final exchanges:
! !    the salty in all of us ocean the protoplasm throbbing
! through cells growing dividing sprouting into the the billion
! diverse not yet labeled not yet named
! !    always they slip through the fingers
! !    the changeable the multitudinous lives)
! !    box dizzingly the compass (TBM 873)
!
This is a point of maximum dilation. Here, the lens of the camera-text opens as 
wide as it can, in an attempt to capture the amoebic essence of human life. The 
telescopic manoeuvre occasions an opacity that seems almost impossible to 
retract; The Camera thus occasions an acute, and very visual disorientation. 
Indeed, the telescoping recalls a lament that Dos Passos made in 1916:
! It is possible that, from over preoccupation with what is at the other 
! end of our telescopes and microscopes, we have lost our true sense of 
! proportion. In learning the habits of the cells of a man’s epidermis, it is 
! easy to forget his body as a unit. In the last analysis, the universe is but 
! as we see it: all is relative to the sense perceptions of the body.450 
Unable to stick to his own advice, this is precisely the sort of forgetting to which 
The Camera Eye (45) commits. By moving toward - and indeed into - the “cells” 
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of the “epidermis”, Dos Passos returns to a pre-plasmic epoch, one in which the 
body is yet to achieve concretion.
! If The Camera Eye (45) proves the cardinal expression of an aesthetic turn, 
that is to say, “changing arrangements” at the formal level, The Camera Eye (46), 
coming only twenty pages after its predecessor, connotes a turn in Dos Passos’ 
politics. Composed more than a decade after the events to which it refers, this 
camera-text recalls Dos Passos’ political ruminations in the spring or summer of 
1923.451  Its first session tracks Dos Passos as he, scouring the Lower East Side, 
attempts to locate a political meeting at which he is due to deliver an oration, “a 
speech urging action”. (TBM 892) Dos Passos’ search for the “crowded 
hall” (892) - a space that replicates (and conceivably de-aestheticises) the 
cramped environs of The Camera Eye (45) - is flanked by hesitation and 
uncertainty. Dos Passos’ political destinations are opaque: “an address you 
don’t quite know you’ve forgotten the number the street may be in Brooklyn”. 
Despite Dos Passos’ utilisation of the second person, a grammatical register into 
which The Camera Eye rarely intrudes, the epistemological frailty of this Eye 
(“you don’t quite know”; “you’ve forgotten”) is notably his; more, it is as his 
that the fraught search for a “hall” takes on broader meaning. The opacities that 
subtend Dos Passos’ orientation - nominated by an inability to recall an address 
in 1923 - are less the product of organisational ineptitude than they are 
consequent of what Ray Lewis White refers to as Dos Passos’ “steadfast 
distancing of himself from socialist or communist sympathies since the 
mid-1930s”.452  This is a faux forgetting, an amnesiac response retrospectively 
ascribed on a period of “action” (892).
! Political ambivalence is The Camera Eye (46)’s sedimented material. 
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Having found the “crowded hall” Dos Passos‘ “stuttering attempt to talk 
straight” (892) abruptly breaks down:
!          you  suddenly  falter ashamed  flush  red  break  out  in
! sweat          why not tell these men stamping in the wind that
! we  stand on a quicksand?       that doubt  is the whetstone of
! understanding (TBM 893)
The terms “falter”, “quicksand” and “doubt” swell the lexicon of indecisiveness 
within which this “stuttering” exchange is couched. Paralysed by ambivalence 
and keen to begin “peeling the speculative onion of doubt” (894) - a metaphor 
which is conceivably “eye-minded” - Dos Passos returns to the first person and 
returns to his bunk. Thus reclined, Dos Passos can leisurely “ponder  the  course 
of  history  and /what leverage might pry the owners loose from  power  and / 
bring back (I too Walt Whitman) our storybook democracy” (893). We can only 
speculate as to what Gold and Lawson would have made of Dos Passos’ sedate 
treatment of historical contingency. Clearly, “ponder” is entirely alien to the 
vernacular of radical political inquiry. This benign term confirms our sense that 
Dos Passos has completed the “swing on the seesaw” (893) of American 
political life. No longer the “operating writer”, one “urging action”, Dos Passos 
had become the “informing” writer. If Benjamin, following Tretiakov, is right 
that the writer’s “mission is not to report but to struggle; not to play the 
spectator but to intervene actively”, Dos Passos evidently comes up short.453
! This is not to say that the episode is politically passive. Indeed, Dos 
Passos’ ponderings are punctured by an astonishing(ly) direct interjection that 
sheds the equivocation of earlier ambiguities: “the radicals are in their private 
lives such shits” (893). The eruption of hostility toward “radicals” is in keeping 
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with the political Dos Passos of the mid thirties. We recall, as a coterminous 
insult, Dos Passos’ sneering reference to communists as “comrats”.454  It is 
entirely incongruous, however, with the political Dos Passos of the early 
twenties. More, the derisory tone of this proclamation grates with the 
chronology that Dos Passos himself placed on his connections to the left. In a 
letter to Charles Bernadin dated January 3rd 1942, Dos Passos claimed: 
“probably the only time I accepted, in my own mind, any large part of the 
Communist thesis (ie class war, salutation by revolution, the destiny of the 
working class etc.) was in 1919 - 21 or thereabouts”.455  If the early years of the 
twenties constituted a period in which Dos Passos “accepted” a “large part of 
the Communist thesis”, we might “ponder” why this exchange, as a record of 
radical political activity in 1923, is made to carry a hostility toward the left that 
was yet to materialise. Crippled with “doubt” as to the integrity of the political 
“onion” and shot through with an ostentatious distrust toward the “shits” on 
the radical left, The Camera Eye (46) functions less as an objective expression of 
an early political radicalism than it testifies to the corrosive effects of the 
conservative counter-impulse that had gripped Dos Passos’ thinking by 1935. 
This Eye resonates as a textual exemplification of a dialectic interaction between 
radical and conservative impulses. By bringing the early twenties into conflict 
with the mid thirties the episode yields a corrupted expression of the political 
radicalism to which Dos Passos was formerly committed.!
! It is perhaps unsurprising that as the “conservative” Dos Passos eats 
away at (thus consuming) his “radical” former self, the camera-text proves 
increasingly receptive to the signs and signifiers of corporate capital, icons 
which had gained significant cultural traction by 1923. The opening “line” of 
the camera-text copiously exemplifies Dos Passos’ sudden attentiveness to what 
Dow refers to as the “ubiquitous presence of advertising”: “walk the streets and 
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walk the streets inquiring of Coca Cola signs Lucky Strike ads pricetags in 
storewindows” (892).456 Having averted its eye for the past forty-five exchanges, 
the camera-text becomes curious about commodity culture. As an occasion for 
product placement, this camera-text provides a space through which the choked 
and clotted articles of corporate culture can be viewed. Given the “unlucky” 
strikes mapped by The Camera Eye, Lawrence being perhaps the most significant 
example (25), Dos Passos’ mention of “Lucky Strike ads” seems particularly 
noxious. The “crinkling tendrils of cigarettesmoke” are reinvoked, this time via 
an advert that refers, by its own indexicality, to the incremental waste of a 
labour movement reduced to ash.!
! The spread of commercialism subsequently engulfs the city, stoking in 
Dos Passos an ambivalent response. In a world stood on its head by the 
supremacy of exchange, smoke breeds fire: “the west is flaming with gold” Dos 
Passos asserts; its “sky is lined with greenbacks” (894). Ablaze with exchange 
values and hemmed in by “dollars”, the cityscape is a site of visual 
resplendence, yet it is simultaneously apocalyptic. The prominence with which 
exchange values are displayed contrasts sharply with the opacity that 
surrounds production: “the riveters are quiet the trucks of the producers are / 
shoved off onto the marginal avenues” (894). Made mute and forced into 
peripheral channels, labour is the camera-text’s dirty secret, a problematic and 
shameful substance that Dos Passos seeks, in this episode, to expunge, hide 
from view. Capital, by contrast, is as reputable as it is plentiful; indeed, its 
public proliferation is an occasion for a shrill jubilation:
!                                    winnings sing from every streetcorner
!          crackle  in the ignitions of  the cars  swish  smooth  in 
! ballbearings sparkle in the lights going on in the showwin-
! dows croak in the klaxons tootle  in  the horns of  imported
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! millionaire shining towncars (894)
“winnings” are kept busy via a capitalised sort of onomatopoeia: they “sing”, 
“crackle”, “swish”, “sparkle”, “croak” and “tootle”. This generous kinetic 
outlay mutates into an erotics of value:
!        dollars are  silky  in  her  hair sift in her dress sprout in
! the  elaborately  contrived rosepetals  that you kiss become 
! pungent and crunchy (TBM 894)
Like the “crinkling” trail of “cigarettesmoke” that wraps its way around the 
nether regions of The Camera Eye (45), “dollars”, in this highly aestheticised and 
“elaborately contrived” episode, waft around the nape of the neck and the 
hemline, brokering as they go a sensuality that ushers exchange values - here 
fetishised as a sort of limitless confetti - to the brink of edibility. “[P]ungent and 
crunchy”, “dollars” seem good enough to eat. No longer do they narrowly 
resonate as exchange values, as a means by which to consume, but they 
themselves have taken on a delectable quality, becoming that which is consumed. 
As ends rather than means, dollars are the objects of one’s desire.  
! The Camera Eye (47), the final “New York” Eye, is a stout companion piece 
to The Camera Eye (46) inasmuch as it, like its predecessor, brokers a tension 
between political and aesthetic disorientations. The aperture of this Camera Eye 
opens to yield a synaesthetic injunction: “sirens bloom in the fog over the 
harbour” (931). Grammatically and metrically consonant with “winnings 
sing” (894), “sirens bloom” marries an auditory referent with a visual one. The 
forced reciprocity of “ear” and “eye” invokes a crisis of sensory experience that 
both pertains to and seeks to replicate the epistemological concussions 
occasioned by the onset of technological modernity and consumer culture. This 
surrealistically inflected conjunction forces us to consider, in Sarah Danius’ 
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formulation, “how to represent authentic experience in an age in which the 
category of experience itself has become a problem.”457 This is a quandary that 
the text keenly strives to answer, yet determination alone is insufficient in 
bringing “experience” into clearer focus. Indeed, the world appropriated by 
exchange is a topsy-turvy world, one in which reification has inverted social 
relations. Having “peel[ed] the onion of doubt” (893) Dos Passos seeks, via 
recourse to another epidermal metaphor, to
! !    hock the old raincoat of incertitude (in which you 
! hunch alone        from the upsidedown image on the retina 
! painstakingly out of color shape words remembered  light 
! and dark straining
! ! to rebuild yesterday       to clip out paper figures to
! simulate growth      warp newsprint into faces smoothing 
! and wrinkling in the various barelyfelt velocities of time) (931)
Attuned to the “Bergsonian memories” that Sartre enunciated in 1932, these are 
projections of a fragile phenomenology. With a significant stress on the 
intangible - the “barelyfelt” - this Camera Eye denotes the emptying out of its 
(social) sediment, a sort of ideological dehoarding. Weightless and flimsy, again 
like “paper” (see “petals”, 894), this Eye disposes of the burdensome materiality 
of the phenomenological world. The stuff of human experience is draining - or 
better, given Dos Passos’ penchant for “sifting” metaphors, (893) “straining” - 
into the ether. Indeed, Dos Passos “clip[s] out paper figures to simulate growth” 
because authentic experience has become squeezed. Or more precisely, it has 
become inverted, as Dos Passos’ allusion to the “upsidedown image on the 
retina” exemplifies. This optical inversion is of course an allusion to 
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photographic technique, yet it refers, through symbolic allusion, to the 
reification which has flipped the social world on its head. 
THE CAMERA EYES 49, 50, 51: EXIT, RIGHT. 
The final section of this chapter argues that the diminution of The Camera Eye is 
politically freighted. Having drawn from abundant resources between 1917 and 
1931, Dos Passos’ political surplus has all but evaporated by the mid thirties. I 
read the final three Camera Eyes of The Big Money as exemplifications of this 
depletion. Before attending to these texts, however, I seek to provide some 
biographical insight into the nature of Dos Passos’ political slide. 
! On March 6, 1934, an open letter of political protest appeared in the New 
Masses that would exemplify the growing schism between Dos Passos and the 
orthodox left.458 Signed by Dos Passos and “two dozen” or so other prominent 
socialists, including John Chamberlain, Lionel Trilling and Wilson, the letter 
unleashed a swingeing attack on communist intervention of a socialist rally that 
occurred in Madison Square Gardens on February 16.459  The rally, called by the 
socialist party to honour Viennese workers that had been gunned down under 
instruction of the Austro-fascist Chancellor Dollfuss would descend into a 
melee. The fracas that ensued exacerbated extant antagonisms within the ranks 
of the American left.460 Dos Passos’ criticism of what he called the “disruptive 
action of the Communists” occasioned the raising of many an orthodox 
eyebrow.461  An official rebuff came via Lawson, who proved especially 
receptive in his condemnation of Dos Passos’ spirited anticommunism. In a 
thirteen page letter Lawson berated Dos Passos for his signatory act, claiming 
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that it constituted a “hasty emotional objection” and a “dirty attack on the 
communists”. Lawson would go on to warn Dos Passos that he was gaining 
amongst the left a reputation that he might well do without. The communists, 
he cautioned
! are beginning to accuse you of consorting with their enemies [....] 
! You’ve always (far more than myself) followed a revolutionary idea. It 
! seems to me that now you (and all of us) are faced with a clear-cut 
! revolutionary choice. I maintain that there is only one revolutionary 
! line and one revolutionary party (be as sentimental as you like about 
! the wobblies, but they do not represent the working class). What’s 
! needed now is not sentimental adherence, but the will to fight a 
! disciplined difficult fight.462 
Given the fractured state of leftist politics in the mid thirties, Lawson’s assertion 
of a “clear-cut revolutionary choice” ranks as special pleading. However wildly 
Lawson overshoots the mark in claiming unity for the political left, he is spot on 
in his contention that, by 1934, Dos Passos was all but lost to the communist 
cause. Exemplified by Dos Passos’ odious responses to the Scottsboro case, it 
was becoming painfully clear that his fighting days were all but over.463 Having 
been in the twenties and early part of the thirties what Lawson described as 
“the nearest thing this country had to a proletarian writer”464  Dos Passos had, 
by the mid thirties, eased himself into the position of “middle-class liberal” that, 
as he suggested in a letter to Wilson of 1930, had been on the cards for some 
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time.465 A further letter to Wilson, dated December 23, 1934 confirms the sense 
that Dos Passos’ alienation had crystallised into a strange loathing for the 
“entangling alliances” of the twenties and early thirties.466  Dos Passos’ felt that 
the time had come to put to bed this previous affiliation: “From now on events 
in Russia have no more interest - except as a terrible example - for world 
socialism. . . . The thing has gone into its Napoleonic stage”.467  Appalled by 
what he dubbed the “intricate and bloody machinery of the Kremlin”, Dos 
Passos had, by 1935, rubber stamped his exit from the ranks of the American 
left. This year would prove key in Dos Passos’ political alienation. To Wilson in 
January he would write: “I think the time has passed to be with any of the 
Marxist parties.” In late May Dos Passos would reaffirm his position in a letter 
to Cowley:
! I don’t believe the Communist movement is capable of doing 
! anything but provoke opposition and I no longer believe that the end 
! justifies the means - !means and ends have got to be one [....] I don’t !think 
! the situation is improving in this country - the comrades are just 
! parroting Russian changes of mood and opinion, which shows their 
! impotence more than ever. 468 
More and more the Russian model irked Dos Passos. Although he was, as of 
1935, uncertain as to “[w]hether the Stalinist performances are intellectually 
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justifiable or not”, Dos Passos was convinced that such “performances” were 
“alienating the working class movement of the world. What’s the point” Dos 
Passos bitterly enquired “of losing your ‘chains’ if you get a firing squad 
instead?”469  Evidently, Dos Passos had come to view Stalinism as an execrable 
riposte to the abuses of modern American capital. Dos Passos would spell out 
his objections in a defensive letter to Wilson dated Feb 5, 1935: “it’s not the 
possibility of Stalinism in the U.S. that’s worrying me, it’s the fact that the 
Stalinist C.P. seems doomed to fail and bring down with it all the humanitarian 
tendencies I personally believe in.” Dos Passos continues, via an interesting 
rejoinder: “[n]one of that has anything to do with Marx’s work - but it certainly 
does influence one’s attitude towards a given political party. I’ve felt all along 
that the Communists were valuable as agitators as the abolitionists were before 
the Civil War - but now I’m not so happy about it.”470  Dos Passos’ political 
intransigence would spur him on to espouse a preference for “the despotism of 
Henry Ford, the United Fruit, and Standard Oil than that of Earl Browder and 
Amster and Mike Gold.”471  The anticommunist harangue would intensify 
throughout the thirties, placing under significant strain a number of Dos 
Passos’ longest friendships, including Lawson, Wilson, and Hemingway.472 As I 
now seek to show, the departure from the ranks of the hard left would leave an 
indelible mark on Dos Passos’ prose. 
! That The Big Money dumps much of the social sediment that provided 
substance for the trilogy’s first and second instalment would cause 
consternation among a number of Dos Passos’ contemporaries. In the August 
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1936 edition of Saturday Review Bernard De Voto would bristle at the political 
windchill consequent upon Dos Passos’ emergent rightism: “[T]he atoms blown 
about the universe by Mr. Dos Passos’s intergalactic wind remain atoms, remain 
symbols, and do not come alive. And so the reader does not much care what 
happens to them - interesting, spectacular, kaleidoscopic, pyrotechnic, expertly 
contrived, a fine movie, but you remain untouched.”473  “[I]t may be”, De Voto 
dryly concludes, “that the intricate and dazzling technique that has produced 
this trilogy rationalizes a personal inadequacy and veils an inability to come to 
grips with experience”.474  De Voto was not the only critic that read The Big 
Money and “smelled a Lollard”.475  Wilson praised, with certain qualifications, 
U.S.A.’s final novel in a letter to its author, dated July 22, 1936:
I’ve just read The Big Money, and the whole thing is certainly a noble 
performance. The end of it suffers a little, I think, from comparison with 
the brilliance of the end of 1919 - it does sound as if you were getting 
tired of it. Aren’t you a little bit perfunctory about the Sacco-Vanzetti 
case, for example? And I wished that when you brought your old 
characters on at the end, you had made them do more vividly 
characteristic things (though Dick Savage and Ben Compton are tellingly 
handled).476  When all the former mates are splitting up there, I don’t 
think you always indicate sufficiently just what they think they are 
getting out of it: it gets to seem a little automatic [….] As the Russians say of 
Pushkin, the writing has become “transparent” - they mean that the objects 
show through, but in your case, it is experience which shows through 
and conveys its significance to the reader without any apparent [effort] 
on your part to underline it. One of the things which you have done 
most successfully - which I don’t remember any other novelist doing - is 
show people in these moments when they are at loose ends or drifting or 
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up against a blank wall.477
I cite Wilson at length to demonstrate how frequently his evaluation of The Big 
Money draws upon a language of fatigue: Dos Passos’ prose, Wilson 
conjectured, had become “tired”, “perfunctory”; lacking in “brilliance” and 
seemingly “automatic”. For Wilson, Dos Passos’ “writing ha[d] become 
transparent”. Cast through De Voto and Wilson, The Big Money invokes what we 
might dub a literature of faded experience. In an irascible letter to Hemingway 
of July 1935, Dos Passos anticipated Wilson’s charge that his prose writing had 
gotten “to seem a little automatic”. Still nine months from completion, his was a 
“lousy superannuated hypertrophied hellinvented novel”. Dos Passos’ sense of 
relief that the project was coming to a close was in plain view: “Christ I’ll be 
glad to be quit of the whole business; it’s gotten to be a kind of quicksand.”478 It 
is in this mood of impatience and desperation that Dos Passos produced his 
final three Camera Eyes. These proscriptive and hastily composed episodes 
evidence Dos Passos’ desire to extricate himself from the quagmire that is his 
narrative. As he clawed for the exit, however, he left a number of telltale - and 
insistently historical - scratches on the reflective surfaces of The Camera Eye.
! The Camera Eyes (49) and (51) take as their focus the two most important 
expressions of Dos Passos’ commitment to the politics of the American Left: an 
involvement with the Sacco and Vanzetti defence campaign in the spring of 
1927 and his work in support of striking miners at Harlan County, Kentucky, at 
the beginning of November 1931.479  As it is noted above, these episodes 
accelerated the concretisation of Dos Passos’ (radical) political identity.480 By the 
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time that Dos Passos narrates these “radical” events, however, his belief in the 
left as a viable - or even desirable - political option had all but evaporated.481 
This “route to depletion”482  would achieve definition in the forties yet Dos 
Passos’ political drift was sufficiently pronounced by 1935 to problematise the 
relation between the told and the telling.483 The final three Camera Eyes occasion 
a “semantic clash” between radical and conservative political imperatives.484 
! The Camera Eye (49) focuses upon an excursion undertaken in the late 
spring of 1927 and tracks Dos Passos as he, conceivably on a break from visiting 
Sacco and Vanzetti in Dedham’s county jails, trudges along the coast at 
Plymouth, Massachusetts. Here are its opening exchanges:
!         walking from Plymouth to North Plymouth through 
! the raw air of Massachusetts Bay at each step a small cold 
! squudge through the sole of one shoe
looking out past the grey framehouses under the rob-
insegg April sky across the white dories anchored  in  the 
bottleclear shallows across the yellow sandbars and the slaty 
bay ruffling to blue to the eastward (TBM 1134)
From a drab palette Dos Passos composes an impressionistic coastal scene that, 
while littered with detail, comes across as almost entirely lacking in substance. 
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The intensity and vibrancy of previous Camera Eyes leaks from this episode like 
the “small cold squudge” of gritty emulsion that seeps from the hole in Dos 
Passos’ shoe. The immateriality of this camera-text alleviates the labour of the 
eye, which is free to scan its perceptual horizons. Whereas the textual sight-
lines of many of the previous Camera Eyes are congested, thick with opacity 
(mired by “cigarettesmoke” [TBM 872], or “fog” [931]; “barred with 
trestles” [789] or “bleared with newspaperreading” [893]) this camera-text offers 
scant resistance to the penetrative ambitions of the textual “Eye”/”I”. Indeed it 
captures, with a conceivably Jamesian attention to texture and contour, the 
translucent (“bottleclear”) yet eminently brittle (“robinsegg”) surroundings. 
The viewing of viewable objects is not just permitted but actively encouraged. 
Dos Passos’ eye discerns “framehouses”, “dories”, “shallows” and 
“sandbars” (accumulations of sediment that I dub above as “tongues” or 
“spits”); it also discerns their coloration: “grey”, “white”, “bottleclear” and 
“yellow”, respectively. Notwithstanding their drab coloration, each object 
remains distinct from the next; only “slaty bay ruffling to blue” is suggestive of 
tonal ambiguity. Composed of “motley objects” that are “anchored” (1134) to 
impressionistic moorings, this Eye strives toward the condition of photography. 
The “visual legibility” of the exchange is indeed pronounced.485  No doubt 
refreshed by the extended “rest” period that separates the forty-eighth and 
forty-ninth Camera Eye - a break of 163 pages - the textual “Eye”/”I” makes 
short work of a perceptual horizon saturated with signification; it sees “past”, 
“under”, “across” and again “across” in quick succession. Bestowed with a 
freedom of movement, the roving “Eye” enjoys an uncontested “eastward” 
view across Massachusetts bay. Thus, and in Danius’ phrasing “the modernist 
conquest of the visual” is affirmed.486  Unlike previous episodes, then, which 
interfere with and thus render inefficient the labour of the eye, the opening 
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session of The Camera Eye (49) is a preeminent example of a “transparent” 
formal prose. Nothing, it seems, is hidden or restricted from the probing gaze of 
the (reifying) eye. In transcending his visual horizons Dos Passos becomes the 
“transparent eyeball”: he “see[s] all.”487  Thus, and in the idiom of the 
phenomenologist thinker Merleau-Ponty, perception is reaffirmed as a 
“privileged realm of experience.”488 
! The pronounced “eyemindedness” of this exchange endows Dos Passos 
with a transhistorical subjectivity: visions become revisions. As Dos Passos 
looks “eastward” toward the “stifling cellar” of Europe, he passes - like an 
emulsion which seeps or “squudg[es]” - out of the “now”, relocating in the first 
third of the 1600s.489 “[T]his”, Dos Passos grandly proclaims of North Plymouth 
Bay,
!
                    is where the immigrants landed  the  roundheads 
the sackers of castles the kingkillers the haters  of oppression 
this is where they stood in  a  cluster  after  landing  from the 
crowded  ship  that  stank  of  bilge          on the beach that be-
longed  to  no  one         between  the  ocean  that  belonged to 
no-one   and   the  enormous  forest  that  belonged  to no one
that  stretched  over  the  hills  where  the  deertracks were up 
the  green  rivervalleys  where  the  redskins  grew  their  tall 
corn in patches forever into the incredible west (TBM 1134)
This dewey-eyed characterisation of a braver, freer, and more plentiful time - an 
epoch yet to be “choke[d]” by modern modes - marks an incipient turn in Dos 
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Passos’ historical consciousness. Having reached saturation point in his relation 
to the left, and having almost entirely reneged on his Marxian commitments, 
this is the point at which Dos Passos’ previously fluid relation to Jeffersonian 
principles begins to solidify. The revolutionary “bilge” that threatened to rise 
up and spew from Dos Passos during the twenties and early part of the thirties 
is here suppressed by a series of bland judgements as to the structural 
deficiencies of the American Republic. To label as “immigrants” America’s 
Founding Fathers constitutes a tepid critique of the imposition of an economic 
and political system dependant upon yet hostile toward non-native immigrant 
labour. The term “haters of oppression” is also insufficient. Lacking in 
definition, this utterance is essentially meaningless, rendering opaque the 
charged political context in which “America” greeted its founding colonisers. 
The anaphoric returns of the phrasing “belonged to no one” riff on the 
subsequent appropriation of territories yet the insistence of Dos Passos’ 
repetition cannot mask the fact that this camera-text connotes an anaemic 
critique of ownership. The evasive and generalised tone within which this 
regressive historical interlude is couched confirms Rosen’s assertion that 
“vague nostalgia creeps into the latter parts of U.S.A.”490  Had Dos Passos 
maintained the political coordinates that he followed throughout the twenties 
he may have found a more substantial means of  uncovering the (social) source 
of the stench. Keen, however, to navigate the political reefs, Dos Passos 
deviated from the Marxian course. Here, and in an exchange that refers to the 
high point of his political radicalism (Summer 1927), Dos Passos tows a 
traditionalist appeal to a rugged, democratic, individualism. 
! Given Dos Passos’ shift toward an asinine brand of populism in the 
forties it is unsurprising that he re-enacts the parable of America’s founding. To 
invert an idiom of Gold: he does not go forward; he retreats. Muttering to 
himself the myriad “pencil scrawls” that fill his “notebook”, and conscious that 
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the “scraps of recollection” and “mangled memories”, once collated and re-
articulated efficiently, might precipitate justice for Sacco and Vanzetti (here 
“Bart”), Dos Passos shrinks away from “the marvellous future”, taking 
sanctuary in a resplendent past. This “cognitive retreat”, in Gallagher and 
Greenblatt’s wording, is an occasion for irony, however.491 By filtering the past 
(1627) through the lens of the present (1927, a “present” which is “always 
already old” by 1935), Dos Passos not only compromises the epoch to which he 
seems keen to return but he annihilates the men that he strives to preserve. By 
invoking 1627 as a solution to a (painfully) contemporary problem Dos Passos 
expunges Sacco and Vanzetti, his putative “subjects”, from the historical record. 
In effect, their narrative has been fed through what Dos Passos referred to in 
1924 as “the smoothing presses of history.”492 To “press” in this way is to flatten, 
to stifle: in short, to take a photograph. Sontag’s famous account of 
photography provides an apposite means of historicizing the peristalses that 
give rhythm to the ebb of this eye. The ideological labour to which photography 
commits attests, in and through its very materiality, to what Sontag calls
! the cumulative de-creation of the past (in the very act of preserving it), 
! the fabrication of a new, parallel reality that makes the past immediate 
! while underscoring its comic or tragic ineffectuality, that invests the 
! specificity of the past with an unlimited irony, that transforms the 
! present into the past and the past into pastness.493
The “comic or tragic ineffectuality” of this “parallel reality” gathers in a single 
moment of degradation. Pacing out a horological journey from Founding 
Fathers to fish float, the walk from “Plymouth” to “North Plymouth” is plagued 
by an irritating and unpleasant sensation, emanating from ground level: “a 
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small cold squudge through the sole of one shoe”. A salty gob of sediment 
(analogous to the protoplasmic gunk that throbs through The Camera Eye [45]) 
permeates a leaky, that is inefficient, shoe. As a moment of inefficiency, this 
moment is generatively linked to the notion of waste. Or, more specifically, the 
notion of “mess”. David Trotter argues powerfully for the semantic capabilities 
of mess in nineteenth century literary fictions, yet a compelling case can be 
made for its spilling into the work of the twentieth.494  Faulkner, a writer less 
obviously tied to the efficiency movement, and more than a little partial to the 
odd spillage, might seem a more obvious point of comparison, yet Dos Passos’ 
Camera Eyes, as we have argued in this thesis, do stuff with stuff.495  We have 
argued already that the primary duty of The Camera Eye is to dispose of excess 
liquidities, the textual surplus. A case will be made as we draw to a close that 
metaphoric comparisons can be drawn between a perished shoe and Dos 
Passos’ political degradation. 
! The flatulent sound of fluids being admitted and ejected from a leaky 
shoe provides a flatulent sonic note for a deflated and degraded sense of the 
past. “History”, by 1935, is a thing which seeps in, pollutes, and annoys. It is a 
disgusting “squudge” that farts from a hole in a shoe. Dos Passos fails to 
provide a precise location for the source of this irritating “squudge” yet there is 
no reason why we cannot locate it here. If the “pollution” metaphor holds thus 
far, we might push it a (squudgy) step further: the leak is in the “left” shoe, 
rather than the “right”. As far as Dos Passos was concerned, the left had worn 
decidedly thin by the mid thirties. Fully “discredited” by 1935, American 
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Marxism constituted, for Dos Passos, little more than “a very dangerous pseudo 
religion with a fake scientific base.”496 
! The perishing leaks into the penultimate Camera Eye. Incessantly 
anthologised and remarked upon by a legion of critics, The Camera Eye (50) is 
U.S.A.’s most familiar and celebrated passage, and frequently cited as the 
culmination of Dos Passos‘ diatribe against American political hegemony.497 
Taking as its frame of reference the executions of Sacco and Vanzetti in August 
1927, this Camera Eye does indeed represent a point of political intensity. As 
Foley states, “the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti occupies a privileged political 
place in U.S.A.”498  Dos Passos would later testify to the effect of defeat in 
Massachusetts: “I had seceded privately the night Sacco and Vanzetti were 
executed [....] I had seceded into my private conscience like Thoreau in Concord 
Jail”.499  This Thoreauvian contraction jars with the broad “we” within which 
Dos Passos couches much of this exchange. That the two most renowned lines 
of the trilogy -  “all right we are two nations” (1157) and “we stand defeated 
America” (1158) - draw upon a collective grammar which creates, in turn, a 
tension between mass political struggle and the individual consciousness is 
intently problematic. Written during a period of conservatism yet  referring to a 
period of leftism, The Camera Eye (50) semanticizes the conflict between the the 
collective and the singular, between the presumed “we” and the narrating “I”. 
In concert with the “we” comes a “they”, an amorphous entity toward which 
Dos Passos jabs an accusatory pronominal finger: 
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!          they   have   clubbed  us  off  the  streets          they are 
! stronger      they are rich     they hire and fire the politicians 
! the  newspapereditors  the  old  judges  the small men with 
 ! reputations  the  collegepresidents  the  wardheelers (listen
! businessmen collegepresidents judges       America will not 
! forget her betrayers) they hire the men with guns     the uni-
! forms the policecars the patrolwagons 
Anaphorically impacted, Dos Passos’ penultimate Eye thus opens with liberal 
use of an emphatic, albeit non-specific “they”. In lieu of precise reference Dos 
Passos implements a vague syntax, the rhythms of which seek, through 
repetition, to hash up an insistence that might compensate for a politics that is 
less than solvent. From these non-specific pronominal beginnings Dos Passos‘ 
narrative shifts into a second person “you” which connotes a similar 
imprecision:
! ! all right you have won     you will kill the brave men our 
! friends tonight
! ! there is nothing left to do       we are beaten (1156)
Dos Passos bandies around “we”, “us”, “they” and “you”, yet he never makes 
clear to whom these markers refer. What is more, this obsessive employment of 
the collective pronoun supposes a sociality to which Dos Passos was, by 1935, 
clearly hostile. Having moved away from the “we” during this period Dos 
Passos had, to revert to Marxian terms, withdrawn himself from the social 
metabolism. Less prepared to fight the socialist fight and less inclined toward 
the textual expenditures committed to in The 42nd Parallel and Nineteen 
Nineteen, Dos Passos had become “I-minded”. Given the shift from “we” to “I” 
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we might want to consider why these final camera-texts draw so heavily upon a 
collective grammar. I would suggest that the abundant “we” occasions a 
sociality that reassures, calming the contradictions that engulfed Dos Passos’ 
politics. This is a narrative of compunction rather than compassion, an act of 
remembering that, while triggered by the deaths of Sacco and Vanzetti, brings 
into relief Dos Passos “swing on the seesaw” of American political life. More 
than mourning the deaths of Sacco and Vanzetti, The Camera Eye (50) mourns 
the death of the political Dos Passos. 
! The Camera Eye (51) reports on the labor dispute at Harlan County, 
Kentucky in the summer and autumn of 1931. The events at Harlan would 
connote a flashpoint in American industrial relations and a high water mark in 
Dos Passos’ commitment to the politics of the left. The tone of the piece is 
sombre, bleak, "defeated” (1158):
       
         at the head of the valley in the dark of the hills on the 
broken floor  of  a lurchedover cabin a man halfsits halflies 
propped  up  by  an  old  woman  two  wrinkled  girls that 
might be young      chunks of coal flare in the hearth flicker 
in his  face white and  sagging  as  dough           blacken the 
cavedin mouth the taut throat the belly  swelled enormous 
with the wound he got working on the minetipple  (1207-8)
The “tight throat” of The Big Money’s first Eye thus re-emerges as the “taut 
throat” of its ninth and final Eye. Swollen by the interventions of an extractive 
economy, these decrepit creatures are stripped of their labour, connoting little 
more than husks of erstwhile use-values. Metonymies for the collective 
hardship suffered by America’s working poor during the Depression, these 
abject “lurchdover” figures, replete with “sagging” faces, “cavedin mouth[s]” 
and “swelled” stomachs, counterpoint with the sharp, cubistically rendered 
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faces that crowded The Camera Eye (45). The “wrinkled girls that might be 
young” are a puckered and economically impoverished variant of those 
leisured creatures with “wise I-know-it wrinkles round the eyes/all scrubbed 
stroked clipped scraped with the help of lipstick/rouge shavingcream” (TBM 
872). Read in concert, these two moments bring into sharp focus an imbalance 
between those who labour and those who consume. The polarisation of classes 
is stark; the United States, a capricious “nation” cleaved into “two”, wields “a 
power that can feed you or leave you to starve” (1209). By 1931, as America 
entered its most significant and lengthy economic contraction, the “big money” 
had clearly become “small”; the depletion, for Dos Passos at least, could be 
traced to an influx of marauding “they[s]” that, having passed through the 
“painful sieve”, sought to inflict their own sort of pain:
!                                                     they are the conquering army 
! that has filtered into the country  unnoticed they  have  taken 
! the hilltops by stealth they levy toll they stand at the mine-
! head       they stand at the polls        they stand by when the 
! bailiffs  carry  the  furniture  of  the family evicted from the 
! city  tenement  out on the sidewalk they are there when the 
! bankers  foreclose on a  farm  they are ambushed and ready 
! to shoot down the strikers marching  behind the flag up the 
! switchback road to the mine  those that the guns spare they 
! jail) 
!          the laws stares across the desk out of angry eyes 
  (TBM 1209, italics added)
As was the case in the previous Eye, an indeterminate “they” stands in for a 
subject that Dos Passos proves unable to formulate. That Dos Passos provides 
account of the executions of Sacco and Vanzetti and a report upon “Industrial 
225
Terrorism” in Harlan when his belief in the validity of leftist struggle had 
evaporated problematises the political character of these episodes. Yet despite 
the opacities that are generated by the dialectic, it is clear from these records 
that Dos Passos’ political “eyes” have veered to the right. 
226
CODA: 
“THE TRUTH ABOUT VISUAL TRAINING”: 
A READER’S GUIDE TO U.S.A.
In 1941, three years after Harcourt, Brace and Co. published U.S.A. as a trilogy, 
Dos Passos began compiling preliminary notes on a topic that would occupy his 
attention, on and off, for the best part of the next thirty years. These notes, 
scribbled rapidly and often illegibly on the back of envelopes and pieces of 
scrap card, would cohere in an unpublished, yet remarkable essay, “The Truth 
About Visual Training”, the “Final Version” of which Dos Passos typed up 
sometime in 1957.500  Undertaken in collaboration with Dr. Amiel Francke, a 
behavioural optometrist practising in Washington, D.C., “The Truth About 
Visual Training” constituted an ostensibly genuine attempt to understand and 
subsequently rectify what Dos Passos diagnosed as the “visual deficiencies” of 
the American reading public.
! “Visual Training” was an umbrella term for a variety of “[t]echniques for 
improving visual functions -- either orthoptic training of particular muscles for 
correction of eyes that deviate; or perceptual training, involving practice in making 
perceptual judgements” (VTFV 6, italics added). That the eye should see 
“straight” and without error, bias or squint, was the cardinal feature of the 
visual project. By harnessing “the curative powers of eye exercises” (VTFV 3) 
Dos Passos sought to rectify “our nationwide failure to use our eyes comfortably 
and efficiently" (VTJDP 1, italics added). Much was at stake in “straightening 
crooked eyes” (VTJDP 6). “Seeing is our chief medium for understanding the 
world around us. If you don’t see well you don’t think well.” (VTFV 3) Replete 
with Cartesian inflections, the “new optometric technique” (VTJDP 6) denoted a 
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500  The folder that comprises the various drafts and fragments of of this essay is dated 
“1941-1975” and is held at the Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University 
of Virginia. I cite two undated versions of the essay here: a sixteen page manuscript denoted 
“final version” hereafter VTFV; a twenty-nine page document entitled “THE TRUTH ABOUT 
VISUAL TRAINING by John Dos Passos”, hereafter VTJDP.  
stepping stone toward an avowedly transparent epistemology. Through “the 
application of very simple visual training methods” (VTFV 4), ranging from 
tracing the trajectory of a paper plane affixed to the end of a pencil, to the 
employment of green chalkboards in the classroom, to regular use of a 
trampoline, Dos Passos sought, under the tutelage of Francke, to develop the 
“muscular skills” of “laggard readers” which, once developed, would allow 
them to maximise their “visual gains” (VTFV 11). 
! The “eye” thus connoted a location from which a rich cache of visual 
resources might be retrieved. Thus, and in a register that would not have been 
unfamiliar to contemporary advertising gurus, Dos Passos guaranteed that by 
following the proposed visual regime the reader/patient/customer would “get 
more meaning from the world” (VTFV 1). Dos Passos’ terminology implicates 
the labour of the eye in a wider epistemology. No longer was the eye considered 
a passive device for the “recording” of sense impressions. It was a machine or 
“conveyor”, to use familiar terminology, which could be tightened, made more 
productive and made, crucially, to yield a kind of visual “profit”. Promising the 
“correction of eyes that deviate[d]” Dos Passos and Frankce were offering 
“easy” meaning. Semantic leakage was duly consigned to the trashcan of a 
wonky visuality. Eye strain was a thing of the past. In short, Dos Passos’ 
collaborative researches sought to make the eye work, to restore the primacy of 
vision and effect the re-throning of the eye, to poach from Martin Jay. 
! Given that “more people [were] having more and more trouble in getting 
good use out of their eyes” (VTFV 1, italics added) the need for action was 
pressing. Yet to “get” use-value “out of” the eye seemed subordinated to the 
extraction of a sort of visual surplus, to “get more meaning from the world”. As 
Francke stressed, “Vision is output and all measurements are those of output”. 
Lamentably, the modern eye seemed limited in its operations, inclined toward 
“myopia” and “squint”. Dos Passos would speculate on the origins of the 
“visual deficiency”, appropriately enough via a technologically inflected 
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metaphor: “it’s likely that our machinery for seeing, which developed in 
primitive man for use at a distance, has not yet adapted itself to the school, the 
factory, and the office” (VTFV 3). Concluding that “the problem, in general 
terms, is one of adaptation” Dos Passos continues with his own diagnoses: “[t]
he human frame has adapted itself gradually, century after century, to gradually 
changing environments, but maybe the changes in ways of living and working 
during the last fifty years have been too drastic and sudden for us.”  (VTJDP 3) 
! More than a little blurry in contour, Dos Passos’ rhetoric was brought 
into sharper focus by Francke, as much through his surgical prose as by his 
expertise on lenses. Forming part of “the literature on visual 
deficiencies” (VTJDP 1) “The Truth About Visual Training” constituted Dos 
Passos’ debut effort in the medical sciences. Novice practitioner that he was, 
Dos Passos looked to Francke to provide the venture with the necessary clinical 
credibility. As stringent as it was unswerving, Francke’s support came in the 
form of a seven-point manifesto, the “postulates,” of which follow thus:
1. Seeing is learned.
2. A visual problem is not an eye problem, but can create an eye problem.
3. Vision is output and all measurements are those of output.
4. Lenses are fitted to enhance performance in output, rather than the 
correction of structure.
5. Ocular defects, such as astigmatism, anisometropia, adverse high 
hypermetropia, myopia and squint, are the end results in structure of 
adverse changes in process.
6. The manifest ocular defects are all varying forms of adaptation to the 
same underlying problem.
7. The remedial measures of lenses and training are designed to bring 
about unimpaired output with adequate latitudes to meet imposed 
stresses. 
Francke’s visual manifesto provided the clinical platform upon which Dos 
Passos hoped to establish what he immodestly dubbed “a new conception in 
the process of seeing.” (VTJDP 7) Francke’s fourth “postulate” is particularly 
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incisive in this connexion, providing a suggestive means of routing “The Truth 
About Visual Training” into wider conversations on vision and visuality as 
necessitated by and passed through The Camera Eye: “Lenses” Francke states, 
“are fitted to enhance performance in output, rather than the correction of 
structure.” To affix a lens to the eye is to maximise the visual product, not to 
remedy the “underlying problem” (postulate 6) that led to the “deficiency” in 
“structure”. Keyed into the rhetoric of the efficiency movement, Francke’s 
postulate rendered lenses resonated as mechanical contrivances through which 
a visual surplus might be engineered without a need to adjust the “underlying” 
causes for the laggard eye. Over the course of their collaborations, Dos Passos 
would come to consider the “hidden” work occasioned by these visual 
“transactions”. “Perhaps there was”, Dos Passos admitted, “more involved in 
the business of seeing than just the lense [sic] of the eye and the nerveends on 
the retina. Perhaps”, Dos Passos’ pondered “the use of your eyes was a skill, 
something you learned, like using your hands or walking or swimming. If 
seeing turned out to be a skill” Dos Passos concludes, “you could teach it to 
people.” (VTJDP 7) 
! The gusto with which Dos Passos carried out his research is perhaps 
difficult to grasp. Difficult, that is, if we read the effort at face value, that is to 
say, as straight science. I do not think that this is what it is. The value of Dos 
Passos’ paper lies less in its attempts to remedy the visual problems of “laggard 
readers” than in its ability to refer metaphorically to what had, by 1957, become 
a lengthy personal obsession with the pursuit of visual efficiency. Dos Passos’ 
“scientific” paper, in tandem with his “scientific” novel, enumerates a series of 
“visual transactions” or “eye exercises” that had been a constitutive feature of 
U.S.A. I would suggest, in conclusion to this thesis, that the grouped papers 
that constitute “The Truth About Visual Training” provide a covert metaphor 
for the visions and re-visions codified in U.S.A. More exactingly, the “orthoptic” 
project tacitly affirms - without directly confronting - a “correction” of the 
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political visions to which Dos Passos subscribed during the twenties and first 
half of the thirties. “The Truth About Visual Training” resonates as a 
retrospective attempt to explain, and explain, under the guise of pseudo-
science, the massive realignment of Dos Passos’ political sight-lines. In sum, 
“The Truth About Visual Training” provides post-U.S.A. commentary on how 
the modes of seeing that Dos Passos employed during the late twenties and 
early thirties had, by the outbreak of the Second World War, to be radically 
reassigned.501 As this thesis has shown, “Eyes Left” became “Eyes Right” in the 
space of three or four years. Dos Passos’ visual research paper denotes more 
than just an elaborate hoax. It was, in fact, an opportunity for Dos Passos to slip 
us a few visual clues, outside of the surveillance of the camera’s eye, as to how 
we might read U.S.A. It was not, after all, in “The Truth About Visual Training” 
that the “eye exercises” were being worked out, but in U.S.A.
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501 In Midcentury (1961), Dos Passos returns to the kind of formal techniques that he employed 
in U.S.A., yet these techniques are forced and lack the freshness that they had in the previous 
work. 
CONCLUSION
This thesis has discussed the production of semantic meaning in William 
Faulkner and  John Dos Passos, and sought to theorize how this meaning 
achieves formal expression. Over six interlinked chapters it has been argued 
that the intersections of form, vision and history in these two oeuvres generates 
different amounts of prose meaning in different ways and with different 
semantic implications. In spite of their proximate chronologies, and in spite of 
writing of the same historical period, Faulkner and Dos Passos are 
antagonistically situated, soliciting alternate formal responses to historical 
pressures. To note a formal divergence is not to assume that one writer is more 
“historical” than the other. Indeed, both Faulkner and Dos Passos place 
historical pressures at the centre of their formal practice. I have tried to argue 
here that Faulkner and Dos Passos mediate history in different ways and for 
different ends. Ultimately, I have been concerned with the extent to which these 
two modernist contemporaries are at a variance with how meaning 
accumulates and what should be done with it once it does. The comparative 
aspect of this thesis has thus provided a methodological frame through which 
we can draw out a number of key formal, political and epistemological 
differences between two of America’s primary formalists and producers of 
modernist texts. 
! The significance of this thesis is threefold. First, my opening three 
chapters constitute the first extended investigation of Faulkner’s grammar, and 
the first to specifically probe the workings of the pronoun. Second, the work on 
Dos Passos constitutes an initial exploration of the dialectical character of The 
Camera Eye. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this thesis has read as 
linked two modernists rarely discussed in the same critical discourse. 
*
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The thesis hopes to have opened up a number of areas for further study. My 
work on Faulkner seeks to have provided a formal grammar for the historcial 
contortions of a South in the wake of massive social, political and psychological 
upheaval. These investigations might be of benefit to further students of 
Southern literatures who seek to place Faulkner’s formalism within a wider 
regional context, and to those more broadly concerned wth the historical, 
political and ideological consequences of literary form. 
! My research on The Camera Eye hopes to spark further study into a 
literary figure that was once central to literary discourse but now oscillates on 
the borders of obscurity. Further work on the political aspect of The Camera Eye 
might yield significant insights. In particular, one might be drawn to pick up 
the threads of the present work and chart more fully the correlation between 
textual and economic forms. More exactingly, work is still to be done on the 
hoard, and the linkages between money and text as two potential sources of 
value. My final appendix has sought to chart the location, date and timings of 
The Camera Eyes in the order in which they appear in Dos Passos’ text. Much of 
the detail proves elusive and warrants further investigations. 
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APPENDICES
A) Dos Passos, The Camera Eye (10), from The 42nd Parallel (1930).
        the  old  major  who  used  to take me to  the  Capitol 
when the Senate and the  House  of Representatives  were 
in session had been in the commissary of the  Confederate 
Army and had  very  beautiful  manners so  the attendants 
bowed to the old major  except for the pages who were lit-
tle boys  not  much  older than your brother was a page in 
the senate once and occasionally a Representative or a Sen
ator would look at him with  slit  eyes  may  be  somebody 
and bow or shake hearty or raise a hand
         the old major dressed very well in a morningcoat and 
had muttonchop whiskers and we would walk very slowly 
through the flat sunlight in the Botanical Gardens and look 
at  the  little  labels  on  the  trees and shrubs and see the fat 
robins and the  starlings  hop  across the grass and walk up 
the steps and  through  the  flat  air  of the rotunda with the 
dead statues of different  sizes and the  Senate Chamber flat 
red and  the  committee  room and the House flat green and 
the committee  rooms  and  the  Supreme  Court  I’ve forgot
ten  what  color  the Supreme Court was and the committee 
rooms
        and whispering behind the door of the visitors’ gallery 
and  the  dead  air  and  a voice rattling under the glass sky-
lights and desks slammed  and the long corridors full of the 
dead  air  and  our  legs  would get very tired and I thought 
of  the  starlings  on  the  grass  and  the  long  streets  full of 
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dead air and my legs were tired and I  had  a  pain  between 
the eyes and the old men bowing with quick slit eyes
       may be somebody and big slit unkind mouths and the 
dusty  black  felt  and the smell of coatclosets and dead air 
and I wonder what the  old major thought about and what 
I  thought  about  maybe  about  that big picture at the Cor-
coran  Art  Gallery  full of  columns and steps and conspira
tors and Caesar in purple fallen flat called Caesar dead  
! ! ! ! ! ! !   (42P 90-91)
*
B) Dos Passos, The Camera Eye (28), from Nineteen Nineteen (1932). (I insert dates 
in parentheses as a means of flagging up the abrupt changes in chronology.)
   ! [April 1915] 
!           when  the   telegram  came  that   she   was  dying  (the  
streetcarwheels  screeched  round  the  bellglass  like  all  the 
pencils  on  all  the  slates  in all the schools) walking around 
Fresh Pond the smell of puddlewater willowbuds in the raw 
wind  shrieking  streetcarwheels   rattling   on   loose   trucks 
through the  Boston  suburbs         grief isnt a uniform and go 
shock  the  Booch  and  drink  wine  for  supper  at  the Lenox 
before catching  the  Federal 
! ! ! !         I’m so tired of violets
! ! ! !        Take them all away 
 
!           when  the  telegram came that  she  was dying the bell-
glass  cracked  in  a  screech  of  slate  pencils (have you ever
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never  been  able  to  sleep  for a week in April?)      and He
met me in the grey trainshed my  eyes were  stinging  with
vermillion  bronze  and  chromegreen inks that oozed from
the spinning April hills        His moustaches were white the
tired droop of an old man’s cheeks       She’s gone Jack grief 
isn’t a uniform and the        in the parlor       the waxen odor 
of lilies in the parlor (He  and  I  we  must bury the uniform 
of grief)
!        then  the  riversmell  the  shimmering  Potomac reaches
the little choppysilver waves at Indian Head        there were 
mockingbirds in the graveyards and the roadsides  steamed 
with spring      April enough to shock the world 
[January 1917] 
        when  the  cable  came  that  He  was   dead   I   walked 
through the streets full of  fiveoclock  Madrid seething with 
twilight in shivered cubes of aguardiente redwine gaslamp-
green  sunsetpink  tileochre         eyes lips red cheeks brown 
pillar of the throat  climbed  on  the  night train at the Norte 
station without knowing why
        I’m so tired of violets
       Take them all away
! [April 1915] 
!        the shattered iridescent  bellglass the  carefully  copied
busts the architectural details the grammar of styles
!        it  was  the  end  of  that book  and I left the Oxford po-
ets  in  the  little  noisy  room  that  smelt of stale oliveoil in 
the Pension Boston      Ahora      Now     Maintenant      Vita 
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Nuova      but we
!          who had heard Copey’s beautiful  reading voice and
read  the  handsomely  bound  books  and  breathed deep 
(breathe deep one two three four)  of  the  waxwork  lilies
and  the  artificial  parmaviolet  scent under the ethercone
and sat breakfasting in  the  library where the bust was of 
Octavius 
!        were now dead at the cableoffice
! [August 1918] 
!          on  the rumblebumping  wooden  bench  on  the  train
slamming through midnight climbing up from the steerage 
to get a  whiff  of  Atlantic  on  the  lunging  steamship  (the 
ovalfaced Swiss girl and her husband were my friends)  she 
had  slightly popeyes  and  a  little  gruff  way of saying Zut 
alors and  throwing  us  a  little  smile  a fish to a sealion that
warmed our darkness     when the immigration officer came 
for  her  passport  he  couldn’t  send   her  to  Ellis  Island  la 
grippe espagnole she was dead
washing those windows
K.P.
cleaning the sparkplugs with a pocketknife
A.W.O.L.
! grinding  the  American  Beauty Roses to dust in that 
whore’s  bed (the foggy night flamed with proclamations of 
the  League  of  the  Rights  of  Man)   the  almond  smell  of
high explosives sending singing éclats through the sweetish
puking grandiloquence of the rotting dead
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!         tomorrow  I  hoped  would  be  the first day of the first 
! month of the first year 
! ! ! ! ! ! !          (NN 368-370)
*
C) Dos Passos, The Camera Eye (45), from The Big Money (1936).
         the narrow yellow room teems with talk under the low
! ceiling  and  crinkling  tendrils of cigarettesmoke twine blue
! and  fade  round  noses  behind ears under the rims of wom-
! en’s  hats  in   arch  looks  changing  arrangement of lips the
! toss of a bang the  wise  I-know-it  wrinkles  round  the eyes
! all scrubbed  stroked  clipped  scraped  with  the  help of lip-
! stick rouge shavingcream razorblades into a  certain  pattern
! that implies
         this  warmvoiced  woman  who  moves  back  and forth
! with a throaty laugh  head  tossed  a  little  back  distributing
! with  teasing  looks  the  parts in the fiveoclock drama
         every man his pigeonhole
         the  personality  must  be  kept  carefully  adjusted over
! the face
         to facilitate recognition she  pins  on  each of us a badge
         today entails tomorrow
         Thank you but why me? Inhibited? Indeed goodby
         the  old  brown  hat  flopped faithful on the chair beside
! the  door  successfully  snatched
         outside the clinking cocktail voices fade
         even  in  this  elderly  brick  dwellinghouse  made  over
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! with  green  paint  orange  candles  a  little  tinted   calcimine
! into
         Greenwich Village
         the stairs go up and down
         lead  through  a hallway ranked with bells names evok-
! ing lives tangles unclassified
         into the rainy twoway street where cabs slither slushing
! footsteps  plunk  slant  lights  shimmer  on the curve of a wet
! cheek  a  pair   of   freshcolored   lips  a  weatherlined  neck  a
! gnarled grimed hand an old man’s bloodshot eye
         street   twoway  to   the   corner  of   the  roaring  avenue
! where  in  the  lilt  of  the  rain  and the din the four directions
         (the  salty  in  all  of  us  ocean the protoplasm throbbing
! through  cells  growing   dividing  sprouting  into  the  billion
! diverse not yet labelled not yet named
         always they slip through the fingers
         the changeable the multitudinous lives)
         box dizzingly the compass 
! ! ! ! ! ! !    (TBM 872-3)
*
D) Chart of The Camera Eyes. 
NO.     PP.        LOCATION! ! !                             DATE 
! !                                                                      
The 42nd Parallel. Composed 1927-1929; published 1930.
1         13-14        Belgium, maybe Holland,                                      Circa Jan 9, 1900.
2         19-20        Washington-New York-Havre de Grace, MD.    1898.
3         29-30        England to France channel crossing.! !     Undetermined.
4(‡)    32-33         Schuylkill River, Philadelphia.! !                 1904.
5         55-56         Kew Gardens, London.! !                             1904-5.!         
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6         57              Hampstead, London.! ! !        Before summer 1906.
7         77              Simpson’s Pond, near Choate School, CT.          Early 1907.      
8         80-81         Choate School, CT.! ! !                 1907-09.
9         86-87         Crisfield, MD (“Eastern shore of Md”)               Undetermined.  
10       90-91         Botanical Gardens, Washington, D.C.! !     Undetermined.  
11(*)   99-101       Pennsylvania.                                                          Undetermined.    
12       117-118     Downtown D.C.! ! ! !                 March, 1907-8.
13       120-121     Eastern Shore, MD. ! ! ! !     Undetermined. 
14(†)  133-134     Choate School, CT.! ! ! !     Undetermined.
15       149-150     Schuylkill, Pennsylvania. ! ! !     Undetermined.
16       154-155     Delaware. ! ! ! ! !     Undetermined. 
17       182-183     Choate School, CT.! ! !                 May 18, 1910. 
18(*)   196-197     Bow, London, England.!! !                 1909.
19       209             Northern Neck, Virginia.                                      Undetermined.
20       214-215     Lawrence, Massachusetts.! !                 July 4, 1912. 
21       227-229     Dos Passos’ farm, North Virginia.!                 August, 1912.
22       231-232     Placienta Bay, Newfoundland.!! !     Summer, 1914.
23       240-241     Magdelena River, Colombia. !                             Summer, 1914. 
24       246-248     Rideau Canal to Ottowa, Quebec.!                 Summer, 1913.
25       262-263     Harvard, Massachusetts.! !         Late 1912, early 1913.
26(*)   301-302     Madison Square Gardens, New York.!                April 19, 1916.  
27(**) 313-315     Undetermined.! ! ! ! !     June 20, 1917.
Nineteen Nineteen. Composed 1930-32; published 1932.
28(‡)  368-370     Harvard, Massachusetts.      Spring, 1915; 1917; August 12, 1918.
29       420-421     Norton Harjes, France.! ! !                 June 20, 1917.
30(‡)  446-447     Recicourt, France.! ! !                 August, 1917.
31       467-468     Ferry crossing from Weehawken.     August or September, 1917. 
32(‡)  479-480     Verdun, France.! !                                   !     September, 1917.
33       485-488     Paris; Fontainebleau; Rhone Valley; Genoa.      November, 1917.
34       507-509     Dolo, near Bassano, Italy. !                           January 4-5, 1918.
35(‡)  542-543     Left bank, Paris.! ! ! !                 June, 1918.
36       563-564     Le Havre, France.!   Mid November (likely the 12th), 1918.
37(‡)  573-575     Ferrieres en Gatinais, Lesigny, France.!      Early December, 1918. 
38       604-605     Tours, France.! ! ! !                March-July, 1919.
39       649-651     Paris, France.! ! ! ! !     March 21, 1919.
40       699-700     Paris, France.! ! ! The days following June 9, 1919.
41(‡)  715-716     Garches, France.! ! !                             May 1st, 1919.
42      744-745      Gievre, France.! ! !                             May-June, 1919.
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The Big Money. Composed 1932-1936; published 1936.
43(‡)   788-790   Coney Island; Sandy Hook.                                   September, 1920.
44        791-793   Beirut, Lebanon.! ! !                             January, 1922.
45        872          Greenwich Village, New York.   !                 April, 1922.
46        892          New York City.! !        Sometime before August 2nd, 1923. 
47        931          New York City.! ! ! ! !      1923.
48(‡)   967          Santander - Cuba.                                                      July 8th, 1920. 
49        1134        Plymouth-North Plymouth, MA.!                  April, 1927.
50(‡)   1156        Massachusetts. ! ! ! ! !      Summer, 1927.
51(‡)   1207        Harlan County, Kentucky!                              Fall, 1931.
KEY TO SYMBOLS USED:
(*) denotes a comma.
(†) denotes a semi-colon.
(‡) denotes blank spaces between prose sections.
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